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The Three Realms of Scholarship
– Wang, Guo-Wei, “Ren Jian Ci Hua”, 1908
Throughout the ages all those who have been highly successful in great ventures and in the pursuit of great
learning must have successfully undergone three stages:
“Last night the west wind shriveled the green-clad trees; alone I climb the high tower, to gaze at the
road stretching to the horizon” represents the first stage.
“I have no regrets as my girdle grows looser on my waist; with everlasting love I pine for you”
represents the second stage.
“I have sought her in the crowd a hundred, a thousand times; suddenly turning back my head, I see
her under the dimming lanterns” represents the third stage.
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Abstract
Biometrics enables convenient authentication based on a person’s physical or behavioral characteristics. In com-
parison with knowledge- or token-based methods, it links an identity directly to its owner. Furthermore, it can not
be forgotten or handed over easily. As biometric techniques have become more and more efficient and accurate,
they are widely used in numerous areas. Among the most common application areas are physical and logical
access controls, border control, authentication in banking applications and biometric identification in forensics.
In this growing field of biometric applications, concerns about privacy and security cannot be neglected. The
advantages of biometrics can revert to the opposite easily. The potential misuse of biometric information is not
limited to the endangerment of user privacy, since biometric data potentially contain sensitive information like
gender, race, state of health, etc. Different applications can be linked through unique biometric data. Addition-
ally, identity theft is a severe threat to identity management, if revocation and reissuing of biometric references
are practically impossible. Therefore, template protection techniques are developed to overcome these drawbacks
and limitations of biometrics. Their advantage is the creation of multiple secure references from biometric data.
These secure references are supposed to be unlinkable and non-invertible in order to achieve the desired level of
security and to fulfill privacy requirements.
The existing algorithms can be categorized into transformation-based approaches and biometric cryptosys-
tems. The transformation-based approaches deploy different transformation or randomization functions, while
the biometric cryptosystems construct secrets from biometric data. The integration in biometric systems is com-
monly accepted in research and their feasibility according to the recognition performance is proved. Despite
of the success of biometric template protection techniques, their security and privacy properties are investigated
only limitedly.
This predominant deficiency is addressed in this thesis and a systematic evaluation framework for biometric
template protection techniques is proposed and demonstrated:
Firstly, three main protection goals are identified based on the review of the requirements on template protec-
tion techniques. The identified goals can be summarized as security, privacy protection ability and unlinkability.
Furthermore, the definitions of privacy and security are given, which allow to quantify the computational com-
plexity estimating a pre-image of a secure template and to measure the hardness of retrieving biometric data
respectively.
Secondly, three threat models are identified as important prerequisites for the assessment. Threat models
define the information about biometric data, system parameters and functions that can be accessed during the
evaluation or an attack. The first threat model, so called naive model, assumes that an adversary has very limited
information about a system. In the second threat model, the advanced model, we apply Kerckhoffs’ principle
and assume that essential details of algorithms as well as properties of biometric data are known. The last threat
model assumes that an adversary owns large amount of biometric data and this allows him to exploit inaccuracy
of biometric systems. It is called the collision threat model.
Finally, a systematic framework for privacy and security assessment is proposed. Before an evaluation process,
protection goals and threat models need to be clarified. Based on these, the metrics measuring different protection
goals as well as an evaluation process determining the metrics will be developed. Both theoretical evaluation with
metrics such as entropy, mutual information and practical evaluation based on individual attacks can be used.
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The framework for privacy and security assessment is applied on the biometric cryptosystems: fuzzy commit-
ment for 3D face and iris recognition is assessed. I develop my own 3D face recognition algorithm based on the
depth distribution of facial sub-surfaces and integrate it in the fuzzy commitment scheme. The iris recognition is
based on an open source algorithm using Gabor filter. It is implemented in the fuzzy commitment scheme with
the two layer coding method as proposed by Hao et al.
Both features, the 3D face features and the iris features, represent local characteristics of the modalities. Thus,
strong dependency within these features is observed. The second order dependency tree is applied to describe
the distribution of 3D face features. The Markov model is applied to characterize the statistical properties of iris
features. Thus, security and privacy of these algorithms can be measured with theoretical metrics. Due to strong
feature dependency, the achieved security is much smaller than the secret size, which is the assumed security in
a perfect secure case with uniformly identically distributed features.
Moreover, the unlinkability is analyzed. The analysis shows that these protected systems are less vulnerable
to leakage amplification. However, the secure templates contain much personal identifiable information. We
demonstrate the attacks, which can identify a subject by linking auxiliary data stored in his secure templates.
Cross matching is assessed with the performance of these attacks.
Additionally, the characteristic of iris features is exploited to perform an attack retrieving features from secure
templates. The efficiency of the practical attack confirms the result of the theoretical assessment of privacy with
conditional entropy.
The coding process plays a very important role for the security and privacy properties in the fuzzy commitment
scheme. Designing a coding method should not only focus on the improvement of code rate. As shown in this
thesis, security and privacy properties can be enhanced significantly by changing the dependency pattern in iris
features and 3D face features. Therefore, the coding process should be adapted to properties of the underlying
biometric features to increase the security and privacy performance.
The security and privacy assessment within this thesis is completed by a comparison of two fuzzy commitment
algorithms with the fuzzy vault algorithm for fingerprint recognition. Here, different threat models as well as
the corresponding protection goals are considered. The fuzzy vault system has the best performance regarding
security and irreversibility of biometric features. However, all of these systems are vulnerable to cross match-
ing. The comparison results show that the proposed evaluation framework provides the fundamental basis for
benchmarking different template protection algorithms.
The proposed framework is also validated with the existing security analysis on transformation-based ap-
proaches. Unlike the analysis on biometric cryptosystems, the security is dependent on the hardness of transfor-
mation functions or randomization processes. Therefore, the presented analysis is based on efficiency of different
kinds of attacks, which measure different protection goals in the appropriate threat models. The security of these
approaches depends on the transformation parameters. The knowledge of these parameters allows generating a
pre-image, while it is still hard to estimate the original biometric features practically. However, privacy leakage
amplifications are still possible.
This thesis defines a systematic evaluation framework, which adheres to essential criteria and requirements of
biometric template protection techniques. Its applicability is demonstrated with the analysis of template protec-
tion algorithms for different biometric modalities. The assessment presented in this thesis is fundamental for a
thorough analysis. Furthermore, it provides provable evidence on security and privacy performance. Therefore,
it is the fundamental tool for technical innovation and improvement and helps system designers in selecting a
suitable template protection algorithm for their applications and needs. It creates a basis for certification and
benchmarking of biometric template protection.
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Zusammenfassung
Biometrie ist eine komfortable Authentifizierungsmethode basierend auf körperlichen oder verhaltenstypischen
Charakteristiken. Im Gegensatz zu wissens- oder tokensbasierten Methoden, kann sie eine Identität direkt mit
der zugehörigen Person verbinden. Darüber hinaus können biometrische Merkmale nicht vergessen oder einfach
weitergegeben werden. Da biometrische Techniken immer effizienter und präziser werden, sind sie in vielen
Bereichen weit verbreitet. Zu den häufigsten Anwendungsgebieten zählen physische und logische Zugangskon-
trolle, Grenzkontrolle, Authentifizierung in Bankengeschäften und biometrische Identifikation in der Forensik.
Durch die wachsende Zahl von Anwendungsbereichen ziehen Bedenken bezüglich der Privatsphäre und Sicher-
heit viel Aufmerksamkeit auf sich. Die Vorteile der Biometrie können sich leicht in das Gegenteil umkehren. Die
Nutzung von biometrischen Daten gefährdet die Privatsphäre der Benutzer, da biometrische Daten möglicher-
weise vertrauliche Informationen wie Geschlecht, Rasse, den Gesundheitszustand usw. enthalten. Außerdem
können verschiedene Anwendungen durch eindeutige biometrische Daten verknüpft werden. Zusätzlich ist Iden-
titätsdiebstahl eine ernste Gefahr für Identitätsmanagement, weil Widerruf und Erneuerung von biometrischen
Referenzen praktisch unmöglich sind. Deswegen werden Template-Protection-Techniken entwickelt, um diese
Nachteile und Einschränkungen der Biometrie zu vermeiden. Deren Vorteil ist die Schaffung von mehreren
sicheren Referenzen aus biometrischen Daten. Diese sicheren Referenzen dürfen nicht verknüpfbar und nicht
umkehrbar sein, um das gewünschte Sicherheitsniveau zu erreichen und die Anforderungen an den Schutz der
Privatsphäre zu erfüllen.
Die existierenden Template-Protection-Verfahren können in transformationsbasierte Verfahren und biomet-
rische Kryptosysteme kategorisiert werden. Die transformationsbasierten Verfahren nutzen unterschiedliche
Transformations- oder Randomisierungsfunktionen, während die biometrischen Kryptosysteme Geheimnisse
aus biometrischen Daten generieren. Die Integration der Verfahren in biometrische Systeme ist allgemein im
Forschungsbereich akzeptiert und deren Durchführbarkeit ist hinsichtlich der Erkennungsleistung bewiesen.
Trotz des Erfolgs sind deren Sicherheits- und privatsphäreerhaltenden Eigenschaften nur bedingt untersucht.
Dieser wesentliche Mangel wird mit dieser Arbeit behoben. Ein systematisches Evaluierungsframework für
Template-Prtoection-Verfahren wird vorgeschlagen und validiert:
Zunächst werden drei wesentliche Protection-Goals (Schutzziele) identifiziert, die sich aus den Anforderungen
an Template-Protection ergeben. Die Protection-Goals können als Sicherheit, Schutzfähigkeit der Privatsphäre
und Unverknüpfbarkeit zusammengefasst werden. Darüber hinaus sind die Definitionen für Schutzfähigkeit
der Privatsphäre und Sicherheit gegeben. Diese quantifizieren den rechnerischen Aufwand bei Pre-Image-
Abschätzung eines sicheren Templates und bei der Rekonstruktion biometrischer Daten.
Außerdem werden drei Bedrohungsmodelle als wichtige Voraussetzungen für die Evaluierung ermittelt. Die
Bedrohungsmodelle definieren die Informationen, einschließlich System-Parameter und Funktionen, auf die bei
einer Evaluierung oder einem Angriff zugegriffen werden kann. Das erste Bedrohungsmodell, das so genannte
naive Modell, setzt voraus, dass einem Angreifer sehr begrenzte Informationen über ein System zur Verfügung
stehen. In dem zweiten Bedrohungsmodell, dem erweiterten Modell, setzen wir das Kerckhoffs’ Prinzip ein
und gehen davon aus, dass wesentliche Details eines Algorithmus sowie Eigenschaften der biometrischen Daten
bekannt sind. Das letzte Bedrohungsmodell nimmt an, dass ein Angreifer eine große Menge biometrischer Daten
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besitzt und die Ungenauigkeit des biometrischen Systems ausnutzen kann. Deswegen wird es Kollisionsmodell
genannt.
Schließlich wird ein systematisches Framework entwickelt, das genutzt werden kann, um die Schutzfähigkeit
der Privatsphäre und die Sicherheit zu bewerten. Vor einem Evaluierungsprozess werden Protection-Goals und
Bedrohungsmodelle festgelegt. Basierend auf diesen, werden die Metriken, die verschiedene Protection-Goals
messen, sowie zugehörige Analyseprozesse hergeleitet. Sowohl die theoretische Analyse mit Metriken wie En-
tropie, bedingte Entropie, Transinformation als auch die praktische Analyse, die auf einzelnen Angriffen basiert,
können genutzt werden.
Wir wenden das Framework auf die biometrische Kryptosysteme an: das Fuzzy-Commitment-Verfahren für 3-
D-Gesichts- und Iriserkennung wird evaluiert. Wir entwickeln unseren eigenen 3-D-Gesichtserkennungsalgorith-
mus, der auf der Tiefenverteilung der Gesichtsoberflächen basiert. Das Fuzzy-Commitment-Verfahren wird er-
folgreich integriert. Ein Gabor-Filter-basierter Open-Source-Algorithmus wird für die Iriserkennung verwendet
und in dem geschützten System wird das zweistufige Kodierungsverfahren von Hao umgesetzt.
Beide Merkmale, die 3-D-Gesichtsmerkmale und die Irismerkmale, repräsentieren lokale Eigenschaften der
Modalitäten. Deswegen wird eine starke Abhängigkeit in diesen Merkmalen beobachtet. Wir verwenden einen
Abhängigkeitsbaum zweiter Ordnung, um die Verteilung von 3-D-Gesichtsmerkmale zu beschreiben. Das Mar-
kovmodell wird angewendet, um die statistischen Eigenschaften der Irismerkmale zu charakterisieren. Die
Sicherheit und die Schutzfähigkeit der Privatsphäre werden mit informationstheoretischen Metriken gemessen.
Wenn die Merkmale gleichmäßig identisch verteilt wären, wäre das System perfekt sicher und die Sicherheit kön-
nte über die Geheimnislänge gemessen werden. Aufgrund der starken gegenseitigen Abhängigkeit der Merkmale
ist die erreichte Sicherheit jedoch viel geringer als die Geheimnislänge.
Darüber hinaus analysieren wir die Unverknüpfbarkeit. Diese gestützten Systeme geben nicht viel mehr In-
formationen über die biometrischen Daten bei der Verknüpfung mehrerer sicherer Templates preis, als wenn nur
ein sicheres Template zur Verfügung steht. Jedoch beinhalten die sicheren Templates viele personenbezogene
Daten. Wir demonstrieren Angriffe, mit denen Personen anhand der Verknüpfung sicherer Templates verifiziert
werden können. Die Verknüpfbarkeit wird mit den Erfolgswahrscheinlichkeiten der Angriffe bewertet.
Zusätzlich nutzen wir die statistischen Eigenschaften der Irismerkmale aus und führen einen Angriff durch,
um Irismerkmale aus sicheren Templates zu rekonstruieren. Die Effizienz dieses praktischen Angriffs bestätigt
das Ergebnis der theoretischen Analyse über die Schutzfähigkeit der Privatsphäre mit bedingter Entropie.
Der Kodierungsprozess spielt eine sehr wichtige Rolle für die Sicherheit und den Schutz der Privatsphäre in
Fuzzy-Commitment-Systemen. Das Design eines Kodierungsverfahrens sollte sich nicht nur auf die Verbesserung
der Coderate fokussieren. Wie in dieser Arbeit gezeigt, können sich die Sicherheit und der Schutz der Privat-
sphäre durch Änderungen der Abhängigkeitsmuster in Iris- und 3-D-Gesichtsmerkmale verbessern. Deswegen
sollte der Kodierungsprozess an die Eigenschaften der zugrunde liegenden biometrischen Merkmale angepasst
werden.
Die Evaluierungsarbeit wird mit einem Vergleich der beiden Fuzzy-Commitment-Systeme und des Fuzzy-
Vault-Systems für Fingerabdruckerkennung abgeschlossen. Hier werden verschiedene Bedrohungsmodelle sowie
die entsprechenden Protection-Goals betrachtet. Das Fuzzy-Vault-System hat die beste Leistung im Hinblick
auf Sicherheit und Schutz der Privatsphäre. Doch alle Systeme sind anfällig für Verknüpfungsangriffe. Die
Vergleichsergebnisse zeigen, dass das vorgeschlagene Framework eine Grundlage für das Benchmarking der
Template-Protection-Techniken geschaffen hat.
Wir validieren das Framework mit den bestehenden Sicherheitsanalysen über die transformationsbasierten
Verfahren. Im Gegensatz zu Analyse der biometrischen Kryptosysteme ist hier die Sicherheit von der Härte
einer Transformationsfunktion oder eines Randomisierungsprozesses abhängig. Deshalb basiert die präsentierte
Analyse auf der Effizienz der verschiedenen Angriffe. Die Angriffe messen verschiedene Protection-Goals in den
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entsprechenden Bedrohungsmodellen. Die Sicherheit dieser Ansätze hängt von den Transformationsparametern
ab. Die Kenntnis dieser Parameter ermöglicht die Erzeugung eines Pre-Image. Die Rekonstruktion der originalen
biometrischen Daten kann jedoch sehr schwierig bleiben. Durch die Verknüpfung der sicheren Templates können
mehr Informationen über die biometrische Daten erhalten werden.
In dieser Arbeit wird ein systematisches Evaluierungsframework entwickelt, das sich an die wesentlichen Kri-
terien und Anforderungen an biometrische Template-Protection-Verfahren festhält. Seine Anwendbarkeit wird
durch die Analyse der verschiedenen Algorithmen demonstriert. Die in dieser Arbeit präsentierte Evaluierung
ist grundlegend für eine vollständige Analyse. Darüber hinaus ermöglicht es einen Nachweis der Sicherheit
und Einhaltung der Privatsphäre. Daher ist es ein unverzichtbares Werkzeug für technische Innovationen und
Verbesserungen. Es hilft Systemdesignern bei der Auswahl eines geeigneten Algorithmus für ihre Anwendungen
und Anforderungen. Es schafft eine Basis für Zertifizierung und Benchmark der Template-Protection-Verfahren.
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1. Introduction
The human perception system recognizes a person based on face, voice, gait information, etc. Similarly, bio-
metric techniques automatize recognition process based on physical or behavioral traits of a person. Nowadays
biometrics is not only exploited in forensics or high security areas but also is coming into everyday life. It is
due to increasing requirements on security and concerns on safety of citizens. In on-line banking or accessing
confidential documents in a company, it is necessary to authenticate whether a person with a claimed identity is
really the owner of that identity. The knowledge- or token-based authentication cannot meet this challenge: A
token or password can be stolen or handed over and they cannot provide a unique link between an identity and
a person himself. Furthermore, biometrics is currently a very powerful tool against terrorists. In Europe, face
photos and fingerprints are stored in e-Passports. In the US visit program, 10 fingers and face images are also
acquired to support visa application and border control. Uniqueness of biometric features is helpful to cut down
duplicate identities or identity fraud. This nice security property benefits e-commerce applications a lot. It can
for instance prevent unauthorized access to buildings or cell phones and ensure that a session ticket is only used
by its holder. Additionally, it has a big advantage of convenience. Biometric users do not need to remember long
passwords or to worry about forgetting their ID-cards.
As biometrics plays a growing role in diverse application areas, their security and privacy concerns grab the
attention of researchers, public sectors, government agencies and end users. Biometric information needs to be
stored for the sake of authentication. However, if personal biometric data fall into hands of adversaries, serious
security and privacy problems arise. An adversary can create a fake modality to spoof biometric systems. He
can also track activities of a victim in other biometric applications. Unfortunately a biometric modality is hard
or impossible to change. Compromise of biometric data is permanent. Renewing or revocation of biometric
identities is infeasible. Additionally, biometric data are important private information and may contain sensitive
information such as gender, race, genetic and disease information. Collection of biometric information is critical
in many countries because of privacy legislation.
This has stimulated research on the protection of stored biometric data in recent years. Template protection
techniques, also referred to as biometric encryption, untraceable biometrics, cancelable or revocable biometrics,
have been developed. These techniques convert biometric data elements into multiple (ideally) uncorrelated
secure templates, from which it is infeasible to retrieve the original information. Biometric information can be
protected and creation of a fake modality from stored templates is impossible. Issuing distinct templates from one
biometric data can stop cross matching between different applications. It also enables revocation and renewing
of a template, which are crucial functionalities in identity management. Centralized storage of a reference as
well as identification are feasible with consent of privacy law. With template protection, biometrics can be
safely exploited in manifold applications associated with multiple secure templates. It minimizes data used in
authentication, so that misuse or abuse of biometric information can be avoided. Users of such a system don’t
need to worry to expose or to loose control of their private information. System providers can popularize usage
of biometrics with increasing user acceptance and without any limitation of privacy law. Template protection
maintains the advantages of biometrics and vanquishes its security and privacy drawbacks. The developments of
the techniques are quite successful. Some of them are already available on markets. In this work we will focus
on security and privacy aspects of template protection.
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1.1. Research Questions and Contributions
As an important supplement to biometrics, template protection techniques aim at enhancing privacy and security.
Researchers have designed different kinds of template protection algorithms. Although integration of these
algorithms to biometric systems is quite successful regarding recognition performance, the evaluation of security
and privacy performance is still a weak point.
The current assessment cannot give convincing proofs on security and privacy. The existing theoretical works
give the boundaries of security capacity (maximum secret rate) and privacy leakage. However, they are not able
to represent the security and privacy in real systems. Some fundamental assumptions made in these work are
hard to apply in practice, for instance, identically independently distributed input biometric features. Security
analyses in the existing implementation papers propose different security metrics and come up with different
evaluation results. It is not clear, according to which criteria these algorithms are really secure and whether these
metrics are proper in security measurement. Other security analyses propose attacks on template protection. All
of these works address only a part of security and privacy requirements and lack the determination at a general
level.
The main research question addressed in this thesis is:
How can we make a comprehensive and systematic assessment of the privacy and security
performance of biometric template protection algorithms?
We solve this main question step by step through the following sub problems:
1. What are the criteria to evaluate privacy and security of these algorithms?
2. How can we define the security and privacy of these algorithms?
3. How can we measure the security and privacy of these algorithms quantitatively?
4. How can we rank these algorithms regarding security and privacy?
In this work we propose protection goals as evaluation criteria, which cover different security and privacy re-
quirements on template protection. The protection goals include security of templates, privacy protection ability
and unlinkability. Moreover, we show the metrics and methods to quantify protection goals. The definitions of
security and privacy are given regarding the computational complexity to break an authentication and to retrieve
biometric data. In order to enable rigorous assessment, we need to know the adversaries’ ability. We define
three threat models, which give realistic assumptions on the resource and information available to potential ad-
versaries. In the naive model, we assume that an adversary has no information about the system; in the advanced
model we suppose that an adversary has full knowledge of the algorithm and properties of the biometric data;
in the collision model, we presume that an adversary owns a large amount of biometric data and can exploit
inaccuracies of the biometric system. These threat models are the prerequisites for an evaluation.
Based upon these, we propose a generalized evaluation framework, from which we design rigorous security
and privacy assessment for different template protection systems. The framework considers all security and
privacy aspects and allows a thorough analysis. The framework supports both the evaluation using theoretical
metrics and the practical evaluation based on individual attacks. We validate the framework in two template
protection systems, the fuzzy commitment systems for 3D face recognition and iris recognition. We quantify their
security and privacy. Especially in the evaluation under the advanced threat model, we analyze the distribution
of 3D face features and iris features. We find out that the security of these systems is very poor due to the
dependency of biometric features. Additionally, we compare three different protection systems with the help
of the framework. A basis for ranking different algorithms regarding security and privacy is created. We also
demonstrate the generality of the framework using the existing security analyses of other template protection
algorithms. The framework is an indispensable tool for security and privacy evaluation.
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1.2. Outline of the Thesis
This thesis is organized as follows:
Chapter 2 gives an overview of biometric template protection techniques. The vulnerabilities in common
biometric systems such as identity theft, unchangeability, cross matching and harm of privacy are elaborated.
Different kinds of template protection algorithms are described. Furthermore, the high level abstract construction
of template protection issued in the ISO international standard is shown. The desired properties of template
protection are summarized. Furthermore, the security of biometrics at a system level is analyzed. It is shown that
template protection is indispensable to enable renewability, to provide irreversibility and to avoid linkability in
biometric systems.
Chapter 3 is the key chapter of the thesis. A generalized evaluation framework assessing privacy and security
of template protection is proposed. The existing security analyses lack comprehensive investigation. Therefore,
we identify the protection goals, which cover all security and privacy requirements. Meanwhile, threat models
are given that limit the information and resource available for an adversary. The metrics assessing different
protection goals are shown. The definitions of privacy and security with measurable metrics are given. Based
on these, a generalized framework, which enables a rigorous evaluation process, is developed. At the end of the
chapter, we analyze closely two important template protection algorithms, fuzzy commitment and fuzzy vault,
regarding the identified protection goals.
Chapter 4 gives a rigorous evaluation of a protected 3D face recognition system. A histogram-based 3D face
recognition algorithm is developed, which shows good recognition performance and computational efficiency. A
template protection system using the fuzzy commitment scheme is built. A long secret can be derived and the
recognition performance of the protected system is slightly reduced in comparison with the original unprotected
system. The feasibility of fuzzy commitment for the 3D face recognition system is proved. Later, the security
and privacy of the protected system is strictly analyzed. The statistical properties of the 3D facial features are
characterized with a second order dependency tree. It allows quantitative measurement of the security and privacy
protection ability. The achieved security is much lower than in an ideal perfectly secure case. Privacy leakage
exists for the sake of error tolerance. Additionally, cross matching is evaluated with a practical attack. The
possibilities to improve the resistance to linkage problems are discussed.
Chapter 5 assesses a protected iris recognition system. Iris features are extracted with an open source algorithm
using Gabor filter. We implement the fuzzy commitment algorithm with a two-layer coding scheme proposed
by Hao et al., which is a fundamental work of protecting iris features. The author claimed high security of this
algorithm. We systematically analyze the protected system. We find out that the iris codes have Markov property.
This introduces high leakage of security and privacy. We quantify the protection goals. Additionally, we prove
the results of our security analysis with a cracking algorithm. Both iris features and secrets can be retrieved with
low complexity.
Chapter 6 demonstrates how to compare different kinds of template protection systems with the help of the
evaluation framework. Additionally, the framework is validated for the transformation-based template protection
algorithms. The evaluations of the two real systems are summarized and completed for all threat models. The
unique metrics given in the security and privacy definitions enable the comparison of the two demonstrated
systems and a fuzzy vault system for fingerprint recognition. It can be proved that the fuzzy vault system is
the best system regarding security. However, all these systems have high privacy leakage. The linkage is a
serious problem in these systems. We also show that the framework is qualified to evaluate transformation-based
algorithms. The existing analyses of these algorithms measure one or more protection goals for special threat
models.
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Chapter 7 concludes the thesis. The contributions of this thesis are highlighted. The benefits of this work are
elaborated. An outlook for future research is given.
The appendices show the essential mathematic preliminary used in the thesis. In Appendix A the definition
of the entropy, Min-entropy and guessing entropy, etc., are shown, which are important metrics for security and
privacy assessment. Additionally the basic properties of binomial distribution and Markov chain are summarized,
which are used in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 to analyze the distribution of biometric features. Additionally the
coding methods play an essential role for fuzzy commitment scheme. Appendix B shows the basic properties of
linear block codes and introduces the BCH and RS codes as well as Hadamard code.
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Template protection is an important privacy and security enhancing technique for biometrics. In this chapter
we introduce this technique and give a detailed overview of the existing algorithms. Although biometrics pro-
vides considerable convenience and also some security advantages over token- or password-based authentication
methods, the related privacy and security issues should not be underestimated. We reveal the privacy and security
vulnerabilities in biometric systems such as strengthening of identity theft, cross matching between applications,
and exposure of the user’s sensitive information. Then, we elaborate biometric template protection techniques,
which aim to stop abuse of biometric information. The idea is to derive numerous independent non-invertible
references from a biometric datum, so that retrieval of original biometric information or tracing of individuals is
infeasible. Different algorithms exist, which can be divided into transformation-based approaches and biometric
cryptosystems. All these algorithms can be well described with a general architecture according to ISO interna-
tional standard. Additionally, we summarize the desired properties of these algorithms, namely, irreversibility,
robustness, diversity and unlinkability. At the end we reinvestigate the security and privacy requirements of bio-
metric systems and show the corresponding possible countermeasures. We emphasize that among them, template
protection is the only tool to enable the desired renewability of templates. Additionally, it can provide unlinkabil-
ity and safeguard users’ privacy. Therefore, template protection is an indispensable supplementary to biometric
systems.
2.1. Privacy and Security Vulnerabilities in Biometric Systems
People are able to recognize other persons based on their face, voice, gaits trait, etc. Scientists reproduce this
inherent way of authentication with automatic processes, so called biometric techniques. Many modalities can be
adopted for recognition. They can be physiological characteristics such as face, fingerprint, iris, palmprint, vein,
or behavioral ones like voice, taping rhythms, or the combinations of them. With these characteristics, an identity
can be bound tightly with its owner. Neither is any physical possession like ID-document or smartcard required,
nor is it needed to remember any prolong password. Therefore biometrics is becoming a strong competitor and
supplementary to the traditional token- or knowledge- based authentications. It is a powerful tool against identity
fraud.
A biometric system consists of acquisition, preprocessing, feature extraction, data storage and comparison
processes. In an acquisition process, a sensor device gives a digital representation of a biometric modality. A
preprocessing process filters irrelevant information and segments region of interest. For instance, a preprocessing
in a 2D face recognition system includes normalization of face into a frontal view, illumination correction, crop
of the facial area etc. In an extraction process, robust and discriminative features are derived. A subject, namely
a user of a biometric system, should firstly be enrolled in a biometric system and can be authenticated afterwards.
In an enrolment, biometric features or samples are stored as templates. In an authentication, a feature generated
from a queried sample is compared with the stored data. It is distinct from verification and identification. In a
verification scenario, an identifier of a subject is known (e. g. user ID, card number) and the queried datum is
compared with one stored datum. In an identification scenario, no identifier information is available and searches
in a database are necessary. An identification system requires high computational power.
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Biometrics is a special application of pattern recognition. Biometric systems are designed to maximize differ-
ence of features between distinct subjects and minimize the variation of biometric data from the same subject.
Acquisition devices are expected efficient and economical. They should be tolerant to changes of environment
and modalities, such as strong or weak light in face recognition, humidity of fingerprint, temperature of body
by vein recognition etc. The preprocessing is an important step to reduce noise in acquired samples. Quality
measurement can be included and only samples with good quality are further processed. A new acquisition can
be required if sample quality is not satisfactory. A feature extractor and a comparator aim at separating intraclass
and interclass distributions of features. Normally a training process is necessary to adapt parameters used in an
extractor and a comparator and to optimize recognition performance.
As biometric systems become more and more efficient, accurate and cost-effective, biometric applications
are growing rapidly in areas such as physical and logical access control, time of attendance, e-Passport, border
control, identity documents, banking, etc. Biometric users more and more appreciate benefits applying biomet-
rics; meanwhile, new vulnerabilities of biometric systems and potential security risks have been drawing a lot of
attention:
Identity fraud Biometric characteristics can not be copied, stolen or handed over like a token or a password.
However, they can be faked. For example, it is shown in [MMYH02, CCCe04], how effortless to make
a gummy or laminate finger using a left trace on a glass. With a camera, facial information can be com-
pletely exposed even without knowledge or consent of victims. A synthetic artifact can be created with
stored biometric templates [Hil01, Bro06, Adl03]. To attack remote authentication systems based on dig-
ital transmitted biometric data, reconstruction of a biometric modality is even not necessary. These flaws
strengthen identity fraud. Integrating liveness detection techniques in sensors is necessary to prevent coun-
terfeits. Meanwhile, protection of stored and transmitted biometric data is also urgently required to avoid
unauthorized access and exposure.
Irrevocable/Non-revocable references Applying biometrics, subjects and their identities are linked together
with their unique personal biometric characteristics. In case that biometric data are compromised, they
cannot be easily revoked or renewed as in password- or token- based authentication. We can only chose
another biometric modality or try to modify the exposed one. Unfortunately, both are not suitable solutions:
we own a limited number of biometric modalities, e.g. ten fingers, one face, two irises, on the other hand,
an alteration is possible only with very complicated methods such as transplantation, cosmetic surgery.
Cross matching As the same biometric modality is adopted in multiple applications, all these applications are
potentially linked. A malicious data collector can misuse these information and track activities of a sub-
ject in other applications. Additionally, if a biometric identity is compromised in one application, other
biometric applications get also in danger.
Privacy Biometric data are derived from human bodies or activities of a person. It contains a lot of personal
sensitive information. In [Sei06], the influence of disease and sexual orientation on fingerprint is shown.
The eye disease such as free-floating iris cyst, diffuse iris melanoma and can change iris appearance. From
a face photo, gender and race can be recognized. Applying DNA can expose genetic information. Such
private information is not relevant for authentication purpose but is saved in biometric systems. In the
European Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC [Dir95], it is defined that “[personal data] shall mean any
information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person (‘data subject’)” and an individual have
“the right of access to and the right to rectify the data concerning him”. In [ART03] of data protection
working party in EU it is explicitly pointed out that biometric data are personal data. It also emphasizes
the importance of using biometrics in privacy compliance way from legislation point of view.
Centralized storage By reason of interoperability, many applications such as AFIS, e-Passport, etc., have to
collect, transmit and store biometric samples. Many biometric systems also need to store raw samples
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for re-training when software is updated and new subjects are enrolled. Despite of these, centralized stor-
age of biometric data is indispensable in identification scenarios, such as forensics and double enrolment
check. However, from the legislation point of view, the collection of biometric data is often strictly lim-
ited. Centralized storage of biometric data is critical due to privacy issue. Moreover, databases are the
common attack target. Stored information can be intercepted, copied or tampered. It threatens the security
of biometrics.
The above issued security and privacy problems arise from lacking protection of stored or transmitted biometric
data. The Information and Privacy Commissioner/Ontario also elaborated in [CS07], that applying biometrics
is often thought to be “a zero-sum game” regarding security. In [DSB07], the Office of the under secretary of
defense for acquisition, technology and logistics in USA dwelt on the role of biometrics in identity management
and show irrevocability is a big downside: “biometrics are forever, but their association with either an identity or
with a privilege is not forever. Biometrics should never be used by themselves; when used as a reference, they
need to be digitally signed, and their association with a privilege or identity must be revocable.”
In order to overcome these drawbacks, safeguarding biometric data is necessary. In most commercial systems,
biometric data are encrypted stored. Unlike common digital data, biometric templates or samples vary due to
changes of body or ambient state, e.g. emotion changes, aging, humidity, illumination, etc. With a normal
symmetric encryption, a comparison in an encrypted domain is not possible and decryption of data is needed.
Risks that an adversary can access biometric data during comparison exist. Additionally a key management
system is required. Recently, homomorphic encryption technique has been adopted to preserve privacy. It has a
special property that some algebraic operations of plaintext are equivalent to other operations of the ciphertext.
It allows comparisons of noisy data in an encrypted domain. An application in face recognition is shown in
[EFG∗09]. However, this method is computational expensive and can not solve unchangeability.
An alternative mechanism, “comparison on card” has been developed. Biometric data are stored decentralized
in a smart card and can never leave the card. The card is held and managed by individuals. In order to prevent
eavesdropping, substitution or replay, acquisition sensors as well as modules of feature extraction, comparison
are all embedded in the smart card. Only a ‘yes’ or ‘no’ response is given after verifications. Nevertheless, the
performance of this mechanism is limited by capacity of card storage and communication channel. Furthermore,
each smart card must be authenticated prior to the usage of the contained template as well as its communication
to outside. It is currently available for fingerprint recognition, since required sensors are small and recognition
algorithms are relatively simple. It is incapable of identification.
Neither encryption nor “comparison on card” can give satisfactory resolution. In the following we introduce
template protection techniques, which overcome these shortcomings of biometric systems. (In this section we
focus only on the potential security and privacy risks happening during storage and transmission of biometric
data. A system-level security observation will be given in Section 2.3.)
2.2. Biometric Template Protection
2.2.1. State of the Art
Template protection is a collective term for a variety of methods that aim to preserve privacy and enhance the
secure storage of biometric data. Different kinds of algorithms exist, which can generate diverse unlinkable and
non-invertible references from biometric data. In [JNN08] Jain et al. gave an overview on the existing techniques
and categorized them into transformation-based approaches and biometric cryptosystems. The functions used
in transformation-based approaches can distort or randomize biometric data so that the original data cannot
be reconstructed from transformed templates. The renewability is realized by changing distortion parameters
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or randomization salt. Both parameters and salt are user- and application-specific. They are essential factors
for security and must be kept secret. Different from encryption, secure templates can be compared directly.
Additionally reconstruction of the original data should be hard or even impossible, even if this secret information
is known. The biometric cryptosystems can embed or generate secrets from biometric data. With help of some
auxiliary data, the secrets can be successfully and precisely retrieved in verification process. The secrets are
comparable with cryptographic keys and can also be revoked and reissued. The auxiliary data should contain
information neither about the secrets nor about biometric data and can be considered as public. Figure 2.1 shows
the classification of template protection algorithms. In the following we show the details of different algorithms.
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Figure 2.1.: An overview of template protection algorithms
Biometric salting methods use large random sequences to randomize biometric data. The random sequence is
comparable with the salt used in cryptography to safeguard a key. Therefore this subclass of transformation-based
approaches is called salting. Biometric encryption and biohashing are two typical salting methods.
In [RSGK99] Soutar et al. proposed biometric encryption method. A correlation filter is used to extract features
from biometric samples in frequency domain and subsequently the features are multiplied with a random pattern.
The result is transformed back into spatial domain and a blurred image is obtained. A random key is embedded
into the image by providing a masked reference, which is stored in a lookup table. The randomized correlation
filter, the lookup-table, and the hash of the key are stored in the user record. In verification, a blurred image can
be reconstructed by multiplication of a queried image and the stored filter in frequency domain. With the help of
the look up table, the key can be estimated. Every bit in the key contains more than one mask references in the
lookup-table and the decision by majority is used to tolerate variation between the blurred images in enrolment
and verification. The stored filter is strongly noised in comparison with the biometric features in frequency
domain. Other stored data are not related to biometric data and privacy is preserved. A big advantage of this
algorithm is that the random pattern is used only once in enrolment and is not stored. It reduces the risk of
retrieving biometric data. However it is suspected to be vulnerable to hill-climbing attack (see Section 3.1.2).
In [RSGK99], an implementation for fingerprint recognition is shown. This algorithm is well suited for image-
based or 2D array biometric data, but recognition performance is limited by the correlation filter. This algorithm
is also patented in [Pat01, Pat97, Pat96].
Similar algorithms are also used for face recognition [SKK04] and vein recognition [Tak07]. In [SKK04],
Savvides et al. convolute face images with a random pattern before feature extraction and comparison process.
For recognition, minimum average correlation energy (MACE) filter is used. They showed that convolution with
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the same random pattern does not influence the performance of MACE filter. In [Tak07], Takaragi convolute vein
features with a random pattern after feature extraction. In verification, a queried vein feature is convoluted with
the inversion of the random pattern. The comparison based on a mutual correlation map is not affected by the
random pattern either. In these two methods the random patterns need to be stored secretly.
Biohashing algorithm converts biometric features randomly into binary sequences, so called biohashes, with
a large amount of random codes. These random codes are typically stored in a token. Verification is possible
only if both token and the authorized biometrics are present. It consists of two main processes, randomization
and binarization. In [JLG04], Teoh et al. proposed biohashing for fingerprint recognition. Features are derived
using an integrated wavelet and Fourier-Mellin transform framework (WFMT). The inner products of the feature
and a matrix of orthogonal random patterns are calculated and binarized. The resulting bit string constitutes the
pseudo identity of the subject. The idea behind is to project high dimensional features on randomly generated
orthogonal basis vectors. The number of basis vectors is less than the dimensions of features. The orthogonality
keeps Euclidean distance between the features in new feature space. Since different projection matrix is used, the
discriminative power increases. However, Kong et al. showed later in [KCZ∗06] that the recognition performance
is degraded in comparison with the unprotected features in the case that projection matrix is stolen and used by
impostor. This algorithm is further implemented for palm recognition [CTGN05], face recognition [TwGdCN06]
etc.
In [AL09], Ao et al. also used scalar randomization process to protect infrared facial features. Here features
are binarized by comparing them with randomly generated thresholds. In order to obtain uniformly distributed
biohashes, the binarization thresholds have the same distribution as the interclass distribution of biometric fea-
tures themselves. Moreover, the resulting biohashes are given as input for a fuzzy commit scheme. They showed
that the biohashing process reduces the recognition performance, however, this degradation becomes smaller
with increasing feature size.
A much more secure biohashing algorithm is also proposed by Teoh in [JTK07]. A set of complex numbers
is built with randomly generated orthogonal vectors and biometric features, where random vectors and biometric
features are imaginary and real part of the complex numbers respectively. The phase of the complex numbers
according individual random vector are averaged. The averaged phase value is called biophasor and further
discretized to improve recognition performance. The experimental results on FERET database with PCA feature
extraction algorithm showed slight improvement of performance, even in the case that the randomization vectors
are stolen. The one-wayness is also proved in the paper.
Cancelable biometrics belongs to transformation-based approach and transforms the original biometric fea-
tures or samples using “non-invertible” functions. No match between the original data and transformed data
exists. Diverse references can be generated by changing the transformation parameters of the functions. In
[RCB01], a morphing function is used to distort a 2D facial image and extracting facial features from the dis-
torted image. No match exists between the distorted and the original images or the images with other distortion
parameters. Additionally, “one to many” transformations can be applied to biometric features so that retrieving
the original feature is hard. Additionally, the robustness and discriminative power of the resulting references
should not decrease, so that the classification power remains. In [RCCB07], the methods for minutiae-based
fingerprint recognition with Cartesian, polar, and surface folding transformations, which change positions of the
minutiae, are shown. In Cartesian transformation, a fingerprint image is divided into equal sized cells and a
minutiae located in a cell is randomly projected into another cell with the projection parameter. It can happen
that more than one cells are projected into the same cell. Polar transformation is similar as Cartesian transfor-
mation. Instead of equal sized cells, fingerprint region is divided into sectors and these sectors are also permuted
into other position. Moreover the angle of a minutia is also altered. In surface folding transformation, a Gaus-
sian kernel is used to change both position and angel information. The experimental results showed that surface
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folding gave the best performance. In all three transformation methods, pre-alignment of fingerprint is necessary.
Another example of cancelable biometrics for iris recognition is shown in [ZRC08].
Biometric cryptosystems include fuzzy commitment, fuzzy extractor, fuzzy embedder, and fuzzy vault. This
class has one-wayness property comparable with cryptographic functions. Additionally, they are robust to “fuzzy-
ness” of biometric data.
In [JW99], Juels and Wattenberg introduced a fuzzy commitment scheme. The idea is to combine existing
cryptographic function and error correction coding to protect noisy biometric data. Similarly to password au-
thentication in Unix computer, biometric authentication is possible without knowing the original biometric infor-
mation. The proposed fuzzy commitment scheme calculates a code offset, which is XOR between a randomly
chosen error correction codeword and biometric feature. Only the code offset and the hash of the message code
corresponding to the codeword are stored as secure reference. Error correction code makes the scheme error
tolerant.
In [DRS04, DORS08], Dodis et al. defined secure sketches and fuzzy extractors. A (M,m, m˜, t)-secure sketch
consists of “sketch” (SS) and “recover” (Rec) functions: for biometric data M ∈M, SS(M) returns a bit string
in a binary space {0,1}?; if the distance between M and a queried M′ is smaller than t, M can be successfully
reconstructed and M = Rec(M′,SS(W )). The min-entropy of M is denoted as m and the security is guaranteed
by the average min-entropy H˜∞(W |SS(W )) ≥ m˜. The definitions of min-entropy and average min-entropy are
given in Appendix A.2. A (M,m, l, t,ε)- fuzzy extractor consists of a generation function Gen(X) = (S,W ) and a
reproduction function Rep(Y,W ) = S. X and Y are data inM with min-entropy of m and S ∈ {0,1}l . The secure
string is nearly uniformly distributed even if its helper data is known. They also showed that fuzzy extractors
are strongly related to secure sketches. The constructions of such functions in feature spaces under Hamming
distance, set difference as well as edit distance were proposed. This construction covered other algorithms such
as fuzzy commitment and fuzzy vault. Later, Buhan et al. showed practical implementation of fuzzy extractor
for continuous noisy data in [BDH∗08]. This algorithm can embed a secret directly into continuous data.
In [TG04], Tuyls et al. showed a helper data architecture for privacy preserving biometric authentication.
Similar to fuzzy extractors, a secret and helper data are extracted in the enrolment. The helper data compensates
difference between biometric data in enrolment and verification. More important, they proved that the secrecy
capacity, the maximum secret rate with negligible small secrecy leakage in the helper data, is equal to the mutual
information between biometric data in enrolment and verification. This architecture is comparable with secret
extraction from common randomness. The fuzzy commitment scheme can be seen as a realization of helper data
architecture.
The fuzzy vault scheme is also an important biometric cryptosystem designed for non-ordered features like
minutiae of fingerprints. It was proposed by Juels and Sudan in [JS02]. The non-ordered features are in a set
difference metric space, where the number of the components in the feature varies. A variant of Shamir’s secret
sharing protocol is used. In the algorithm, a polynomial is randomly created whose coefficients indicate the
secret (key). The minutiae information is chosen as support points and projected on the polynomial. The vault
contains pairs of the minutiae data and the corresponding projection. As the degree of the polynomial is lower
than the number of minutiae used, a subset of minutiae is sufficient to recover the polynomial. This allows the
cryptographic hash of the secret (i.e. the pseudo-identity) and the vault to be stored in the database; further
obfuscation of the support points is provided by using chaff points.
The development of biometric cryptosystems is very successful. The fuzzy commitment scheme has been
integrated in 2D face recognition system using texture information [vdVKS∗06], fingerprints recognition system
[VTDL03] and ear identification [TVI∗04] etc. The implementation of the fuzzy vault scheme also achieved
good performance as shown in [NJP07]. The security of biometric cryptosystems is comparable with underlying
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cryptographic model. Additionally no specific secret information is necessary and security can be guaranteed
even if secure reference is made public.
Generally speaking, transformation-based approaches can be applied in both feature level and sample level.
Their comparators are based on similarity measurement. However, biometric cryptosystems are normally in-
tegrated in feature level and use exact comparisons. In most transformation-based approaches, transformation
parameters must be stored secretly. These algorithms are more proper for verification than for identification.
Biometric cryptosystems do not require any secret information and secure references can be stored centralized,
that facilitates identification. Transformation-based algorithms have an advantage in protection of biometric data.
Even if transformation parameters and functions are compromised, biometric data can not be retrieved precisely.
However, in biometric cryptosystems, inversion of secure references exposes essential information about biomet-
ric data. The security and privacy properties of transformation-based approaches and biometric cryptosystems
will be discussed in Chapter 6. Biometric encryption can be used to protect biometric information in spatial
or frequency domains and comparisons of secure references are based on correlation. Biohashing and cance-
lable biometrics can efficiently protect biometric data, however, degradation of discriminative power needs to be
taken into account. Fuzzy commitment requires binary feature vectors as input. Fuzzy vault is appropriate for
non-ordered feature set.
2.2.2. ISO Reference Architecture
The previous section gave an overview of the existing template protection algorithms. These algorithms are de-
signed to diminish exposure of biometric data and to prevent possible attacks using stored or transferred data.
They also enable revocation and renewing of templates, which are the crucial functionalities in identity manage-
ment. Moreover, they can obviate linkages of different applications though similar templates. The international
standard ISO/IEC 24745 [ISO11] defines a high-level architecture of template protection, which can model vari-
ous types of algorithms. It consists of the following functions:
1. The pseudonymous identifier encoder (PIE) generates a pseudonymous identifier PI and auxiliary data AD
from a biometric datum M in the enrolment: [PI,AD] = PIE(M). PI is a protected identity of an individual
or a data subject and AD is user-specific data, which help to reproduce PI in an authentication process.
Only PI and AD are stored as a secure template in the system. The biometric datum M is deleted after the
enrolment.
2. The pseudonymous identifier recorder (PIR) takes a queried biometric datum M′ and the stored AD as
inputs and calculates a pseudonymous identifier PI′ in the verification: [PI′] = PIR(M′,AD).
3. The pseudonymous identifier comparator (PIC) compares PI′ with the stored PI: v = PIC(PI,PI′). De-
pending on comparators, comparison result v is either a hard decision (yes/no) or a similarity score v.
Figure 2.2 depicts the construction of template protection with PIE, PIR and PIC. Biometric systems provide
input data M and M′ to template protection, which can be samples acquired directly from a sensor or some
compact features extracted from biometric samples. Of course, the interface between a biometric system and
a template protection algorithm marked with the red dashed line is an internal or virtual dataflow, which must
be secure against any internal or external attack. The orange lines show the communication between PIC, PIR
and PIC. They might take place over public and insecure channel. For instance, in many applications the
enrolment stations and verification stations are not at the same location and the data needs to be centrally stored.
A database easily becomes attack target. In remote enrolment or authentication, data needs to be transported,
e.g. over internet. From security point of view, transferring and storing PI, which cannot conceal biometric
information, are better than using biometric templates themself. Please note that AD is allowed to be public in
some algorithms, however, in others AD is a secret parameter.
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Contribution II – How to define the security and privacy? 
  Definition of security: 
  Let A(AD, PI)=[M’, PI’] be a reconstruction function, where PI’=PIR(M’, AD).  
TA is the computational time required in one reconstruction and  
n is the average number of reconstructions needed to get a [M’, PI’] such 
that PIC(PI,PI’)=1 for a positive authentication result. 
  Then, a template protection algorithm is (Τ, ε)- secure, if for all A!
TA  ≥ Τ!
log2 n ≥ ε!
!
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Figure 2.2.: ISO reference architecture of template protection
In order to produce secure and privacy-preserving templates, template protection must have the following
properties:
Irreversibility The extraction of PI from biometric data with PIE and PIR should be efficient (executable with
limited computational power), meanwhile, it is either computationally hard or impossible to deduce the
underlying biometric data from PI.
Robustness Biometric data vary due to acquisition noise, environment changes, aging effect, etc. The derived
PIs should be robust to variation of input biometric data and PIC can compare PIs directly. Additionally,
applying template protection should not influence the recognition performance in comparison with the
original biometric system.
Diversity and Unlinkability Numerous protected templates from one biometric characteristic that are indepen-
dent of each other can be generated, i.e. knowledge of one protected template does not yield information
on other protected templates derived from the same characteristics.
Algorithm Requirements Protected Template
Irreversibility Robustness Unlinkability PI AD
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Table 2.1.: Examples of template protection algorithms: functions used in the algorithms and the meaning of PI
and AD
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Table 2.1 shows some examples of template protection algorithms. Different functions and constructions are
used to meet the above-mentioned requirements. Additionally all these algorithms can be described with the
ISO architecture. The meaning of PI and AD is also shown in the table. The first three algorithms belong
to transformation-based approaches. Their PI is transformed features generated from transformation functions
such as random projection, whitening. Their AD is parameters for the transformation functions. Renewing PI is
through releasing a new AD. The PICs use some similarity metrics or distance measure. The last two algorithms
are biometric cryptosystems. Their PI is the hash values of randomly generated secrets, which can be renewed.
Comparisons of PIs are based on exact matches. AD helps to tolerate noise and enables regeneration of PI in
authentication.
A major difference of these two categories is the security. Transformation-based approaches require secret
AD and their security is strongly dependent on the secrecy of AD. Biometric cryptosystems need no secret
information. Both PI and AD are allowed to be public. It is also possible to combine methods from both
categories or to use additional authentication information like passwords in a template protection algorithm. In
this thesis, we only consider the basic transformation-based approaches and biometric cryptosystems without
any combination or additional information in order to keep the problem simple at the beginning.
2.3. Biometric System Security
The components of biometric systems (sensor capturing biometric data, feature extraction, storage, and com-
parator as shown in Section 2.1) can be vulnerable to system internal or external attacks [CS07, JNN08, ISO11,
KKM∗10]: Data acquisition can be spoofed by dishonest subjects with counterfeits or masquerade modalities.
Transmitted and stored data, for instance, biometric samples, features, even comparison scores, can be read,
eavesdropped, manipulated or substituted. An attacker can use a Trojan horse to change important system pa-
rameters such as decision threshold or replay the data of an authorized subject. In [KKM∗10], Kevenaar et al.
defined that security of biometric systems is related to ingoing information and activities to illegitimately accept
unauthorized subjects or to block authorized subjects and privacy is associated with outgoing information, which
can be learned from systems. The security rests on the trustworthiness of the whole process.
In the ISO standard 24745 on “Security techniques - Biometric template” [ISO11], the security and privacy
requirements on overall biometric systems are given to ensure biometric authentication: Confidentiality requires
that data is only accessed by authorized entities and any disclosure or manipulation of data is not possible.
Integrity ensures the completeness of data against any manipulation. Availability assures access and usage of
authorized subjects. Renewability and revocability require diversification of biometric references. Unlinkability
prevents link across databases of different applications with the help of biometric references. Irreversibility
prevents retrieval of biometric information. Data minimization asks for minimizing stored information, which is
irrelevant to authentication.
Different security countermeasures can be utilized in biometric systems, in order to meet these requirements.
Liveness detection can stop sensor spoofing. Cryptographic techniques such as encryption, digital signature, ac-
cess control, challenge and response are the powerful tools to guarantee confidentiality and integrity. Encryption
with different keys is also helpful to prevent linkage attack. The importance of template protection techniques is
to enable renewability and revocability, which is hard to achieve with other techniques. Biometric reference is
unique to the underlying biometric modality. In cases that biometric references is compromised or related iden-
tities are expired, it is difficult or even impossible to revoke the reference and to reissue a new one. Therefore
template protection is indispensable in biometric authentication. Additionally its constructions enable unlinka-
bility. Meanwhile in most template protection algorithms private information related to users are reduced, which
compliant with data minimization policy.
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2.4. Summary
In this chapter the weaknesses of biometric systems with respects to security and privacy concerns were shown.
These stimulate the research in biometric template protection, which aims at safeguarding biometric information
and preventing potential attacks based on stored and transmitted data. An overview of the existing algorithms is
given systematically. They can be classified into transformation-based approaches and biometric cryptosystems.
Both of them can derive multiple unlinkable references from biometric data, which reveal no information about
the original data. All these algorithms can be mapped into a general architecture defined by the ISO international
standard. The difference of these algorithms in security characteristics and secure templates is shown. Further-
more, the important security and privacy requirements and possible countermeasures for biometric systems are
given. Among different countermeasures, template protection is the only tool enabling renewability of stored ref-
erence data. Additionally it can improve other security and privacy properties such as unlinkability, irreversibility
and data minimization.
The development of template protection demands the corresponding assessment of its security and privacy
performance. Especially, comprehensive assessment of a real template protection is urgently required. In the next
chapter we propose a generalized framework for security and privacy assessment, which can quantify different
security and privacy requirements and enable empirical evaluation.
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Privacy Assessment
The previous chapter showed that template protection is not only crucial for improving privacy and security, but
also enables important functionalities such as renewing and revocation. As an indispensable supplementary to
biometrics, template protection algorithms have been successfully integrated in different systems as shown in
Section 2.2.1. The questions arise how secure these protected biometric systems are and how well security and
privacy requirements are fulfilled. The existing analyses in the literatures either concern security and privacy
performance from information-theoretical point of view, or focus on special attacks. Far fewer work defines the
actual security and privacy goals and makes a systematic analysis involving threats and risks with reference to
template protection systems. Even fewer work attempts to attach a numerical value to the these security and
privacy properties. This chapter will address the main research problem of this thesis, namely:
How to give a comprehensive and systematic assessment on security and privacy of a real
template protection system?
We investigate the existing security and privacy analyses and propose a new generalized framework for security
and privacy assessment. The important prerequisites are the protection goals and threat models. The first one
covers the essential security and privacy requirements that template protection aims to achieve and the second one
defines the capabilities and resources available to an adversary, which corresponds, for example, to accessible
system parameters and available information during evaluation. We give the definitions of security and privacy,
show how to define an evaluation process and finally demonstrate the framework on biometric cryptosystems,
namely fuzzy commitment and fuzzy vault.
3.1. Related Work
Security and privacy analyses are very important to exhibit the advantage applying template protection. Since
the very beginning of the development, the security of template protection, especially of biometric cryptosystems
has been analysed from information-theoretical point of view. Biometric cryptosystems are secret-based methods
and their security is easily compared with that of cryptography. Later, vulnerabilities of concrete algorithms have
been found regarding to attacks from the practical side. In this section we give an overview of the existing
analyses including theoretical analyses and special attacks. Before going to the details, we clarify the meaning
of security and privacy for biometric applications: security relates to activities that an adversary manipulates or
spoofs a verification process; privacy corresponds to information including biometric data and personal attribute
thereof that an adversary can learn from systems.
3.1.1. Theoretical Analysis
Theoretical analyses are fundamental to successful development of template protection. It proves the feasibil-
ity of an abstract construction and is normally based on specific mathematical models. In such work security
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and privacy have been analysed and defined in a theoretical way. For instance, in [LT03] Linnartz and Tuyls
introduced a new shielding function, where secrets are encoded in biometric data with a quantization method.
The enrolment function G−1 produces a public information W ∈ Rn2 from a random secret S ∈ {01}n3 and bio-
metric data X ∈ Rn1 and the verification function can reproduce the secret S with W and biometric data Y , if
Y is close to X . Here n1,n2,n3 are natural numbers. The shielding function should have the following three
properties: delta-contracting requires that for all X ∈ Rn1, at least one W ∈ Rn2 and one S ∈ {0,1}n3 exist
such that G(X ,W ) = G(Y,W ) = S, for all Y ∈ Rn1 and ||X −Y || ≤ δ; versatile demands that for all X ∈ Rn1
and S ∈ {01}n3, at least one W ∈ Rn2 exists such that G(W,X) = S; ε-revealing is defined for a δ-contracting
function, if for all X ∈ Rn1 a contracting vector W exists, such that the mutual information I(W ;S) < ε. These
are desired characteristics of a shielding function. “δ-contracting” indicates the robustness and also relates to
recognition performance, “versatile” interprets universal of the function, that the construction works for all the
possible input biometric features, and “ε-revealing” describes the small (or neglectable) leakage of S given W .
The secret S, with can not be arbitrarily long, must be uniformly distributed.
In [TG04], Tuyls and Goseling showed the secrecy and identification capacity of the helper data scheme, which
can be seen as a kind of fuzzy extractor. They modeled biometric features as independent identically distributed
(i.i.d.) variables of length n. The reference and queried features are assumed to be randomly (and noisily)
generated from the same source. The secrecy and identification capacity were calculated for the asymptotic
cases, where n is sufficiently large. The secrecy capacity CS is the maximum secret rate with small false reject
rate (FRR) and neglectable small leakage of the secret, meanwhile, the identification capacity Cid is the maximum
number of identifiable users normalised by feature length n with small average FRR. The construction is similar
to the extraction of common randomness from correlated data with public information [AC93]. It is shown that
the secrecy capacity is equal to the information rate between reference and queried features I(X ;Y ). It is also
proved that zero leakage of the secret (in an information-theoretically secure system) is achievable for uniformly
and independently distributed biometric features. If a binary symmetric channel exists between Xn and Y n with
a cross over probability of p, then CS = 1−h(p), where h(p) is the binary entropy function. Xn and Y n are the
n bit long biometric features and I(X ;Y ) = limn→∞ 1n I(X
n;Y n). In [Ign09], Ignatenko also analysed the privacy
leakage in this construction in term of the mutual information between the public helper data and biometric
features. A trade-off between maximum secret key rate and privacy leakage was given.
In [DORS08], Dodis et al. proposed a (M,m, m˜, t)- secure sketch and a (M,m, l, t,ε)- fuzzy extractor for
arbitrarily distributed biometric data X in spaceM with min-entropy H∞(X) = m. Secure sketch consists of a
sketch function SS(X) = W and a recover function Rec(Y,W ) = X for a distance function dist(X ,Y ) ≤ t with
threshold t. Additionally if an adversary observes W , the probability that he can recover X , is not greater than
2m˜, namely the average min-entropy H˜∞(X |W ) = m˜. Entropy loss is defined as m− m˜, which is necessary to
compensate noise. Secure sketch targets precise reconstruction of a secret from noisy data, while fuzzy extractor
focuses on generation of a reproducible key S ∈ {0,1}l from noisy data. It is important for a fuzzy extractor
that S is nearly uniformly distributed given W , with AD((S,W ),(Ul ,W )) < ε, where AD is a statistical distance
between two distributions and Ul is the uniform distribution in {0,1}l . It was also shown that fuzzy extractor
and secure sketch are strongly related. A fuzzy extractor can be derived from an existing secure sketch. Its
key length l is also related to the secret size m˜ of the secure sketch that l ≤ m˜− log( 1ε )+ 2. The factor log( 1ε )
describes the tolerance of the distribution of extracted keys to an ideal uniform distribution. In the secure sketch
and fuzzy extractor, the security is determined by the average min-entropy and privacy leakage is declared by the
min-entropy per definition. The statistical distance is used to measure uniformity and independency of extracted
keys given W .
The existing theoretical analyses focus on biometric cryptosystems, since the security of transformation-based
methods is normally based on the hardness problem. It shows possible metrics and concepts assessing security
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and privacy. However it is still unknown whether these metrics are suitable for empirical evaluation and how
they can be measured in practice.
3.1.2. Possible Attacks on Template Protection
In addition to theoretical analysis, attack-based analysis exploits vulnerabilities of template protection and con-
ducts concrete attacks on special algorithms. In this section a number of possible attacks are discussed.
FAR attack In biometrics, decision of a positive or negative response is made based on the similarity of com-
pared features. Biometric data are random variables. Due to overlap between intraclass and interclass distribu-
tions, false acceptance and false rejection can occur. For example, assume that the probability of false acceptance
(False Accept Rate FAR) of a biometric system is 0.01% at a given system setting. It means that two “identical”
subjects can be found if, on average, 104 comparisons of features from different subjects are done. An adversary
who owns or has access to a large biometric database can exploit the false acceptance properties.
Biometric modalities can be genotypical or/and phenotypical. Irises are phenotypical; Fingerprints are semi
phenotypical; Faces are genotypic. People sharing the same genes as identical twins or 50% gene as parent and
children have similar looks, however, this similarity can change over the time. A genetic disease can influence
the genotypic modalities. For example, the patients of Down syndrome (trisomy 21) have similar faces such
as hypoplastic nasal bone, flat nasal bridge. The similarity of different subjects especially for the genotypical
characteristics is an inherent property of biometrics. The FAR attack for look-alike data subjects is feasible for
all biometric systems and cannot be prevented by applying template protection.
Linkage attacks One of the advantages of using biometrics is the relative uniqueness of biometric features,
which creates a direct connection between a subject and her/his identity. However, if the same biometric char-
acteristic is utilized in different applications, similar or correlated identities of the same subjects are stored in
different databases. This might lead to linkage of individuals over applications. One of the goals of template
protection is to overcome this drawback and to enable generation of independent templates.
Biometric cryptosystems are suspected to be vulnerable to linkage attacks, since secure templates may contain
information about biometric features. In the fuzzy vault approach, the true support points, which contain position
of minutiae and the corresponding projection on a secret polynomial, are hidden in numerous chaff points. When
an adversary has two references of the same subject from different databases, it is trivial to cover the true points
by intersection of the two references [SB07]. It reduces the effort of an adversary to estimate the secret. Even
worse when the secret is compromised, he can also generate valid support points with his own minutiae and
insert them in the vault set. Then the manipulated reference works with the fingerprints of both the victim and
the adversary. This kind of substitution is difficult to be detected, but it can be prevented with a digital signature.
Nevertheless linkage attack is a serious problem for fuzzy vault.
In the fuzzy commitment scheme, the auxiliary data may contain subject-specific information. For instance,
in [STP09], Simoens proposed an indistinguishability attack and irreversibility attack to exploit information leak-
age of biometric data in auxiliary data. The detailed description and further analysis of these two attacks will be
shown in Section 3.4.2. In some implementations, length of binary features might be longer than allowed code-
word length. Then the most reliable bits are selected and their positions are noted and stored. Since selection of
the reliable bits lies on the statistical characteristics of an individual subject, it is likely to observe the correlation
of stored data in different applications. An example of such an attack is demonstrated in Section 4.3.3.
Generally, transformation-based approaches have better resistance to linkage attack. In these algorithms, user-
and application- specific transformation parameters are utilized, that increases the randomness of resulting secure
templates. Only in [SB07], Scheirer et al. showed that it is possible to link the auxiliary data in biometric
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encryption systems using correlation of phase information. However no concrete simulation of the attack was
given.
Hill climbing attacks Comparison scores in biometric systems reveal information on how similar the target
template (stored reference) and the reference template (query) are. The information is helpful for an adversary
to estimate enrolled images or templates with a recursive method [Adl04, Hil01].
The hill climbing attack is an optimization method to improve searching efficiency. For example, a facial
image can be chosen at initialization. Different random modifications on the pixels in the image are done. The
modified image, which has the best score to the target image, is selected. This process can be repeated until
there is no significant improvement of the similarity. In other words, the similarity between the modified images
and the target one can be increased iteratively with the help of comparison scores. As mentioned in [Adl05], “if
biometric comparison releases information on partial match, then hill climbing is possible.”
In biometric cryptosystems, comparisons are based on an exact match between a stored pseudonymous iden-
tifier and a live calculated one, which are normally hashes of random secrets. Only a hard decision can be made
and no similarity score is available. A hill climbing attack is impossible. However, the transformation-based
approaches rely on the similarity scores. For instance, in the biometric encryption method, the biometric sam-
ples are randomized by multiplying a random pattern and the original biometric information is still hidden in
the randomized image. A quantized hill climbing can be used to attack it as shown in [Adl04]. Although no
similarity score is directly available, a value, which is comparable with quantized scores, can be obtained with
the help of the lookup table of the secret. In each iteration, modifications are not applied globally, but locally, so
that the changes can cause sufficient improvements of the (quantized) similarity score. In [Adl04], an example
of a quantized hill climbing is given for facial images. A small facial gallery is collected and eigenfaces of the
images are calculated. An initial image is chosen and divided into 4 quadrants. Noise is added on a quadrant,
meanwhile, the opposite quadrant is varied slightly in the eigenface space, so that similarity score increases at
least by one quantized level. The experimental results show that a matchable similarity to the target image can
be obtained with a randomly selected initial image. In cancelable biometrics, the comparison is also based on
similarity. Theoretically, a hill climbing attack should be possible. However, its feasibility might be influenced
by the non-invertible function used.
Feature estimation attacks A template protection algorithm might be insecure and an adversary can perform
an efficient estimation method to retrieve biometric features. For instance, in [Bal08], Ballard proposed a bio-
metric key generation system for signature recognition. He analysed a distribution of biometric features. The
distribution information was used to crack the developed system by ranking possible features. Guessing Distance
was utilized to measure the security. Guessing distance is originated from guessing entropy. Guessing entropy
shows the average number of attempts needed to get an successful estimation by means of ordering the candidates
in an descending order of probabilities, while the guessing distance determines the number of guesses needed for
guessing a particular biometric data or secret key. Guessing distance of a feature is dependent on its position in
the candidate list. It is shown that the successful rate of the first attempt is already at 15%.
3.2. A Generalized Evaluation Framework for Security and Privacy
Assessment
The existing work analyses the security and privacy of biometric template protection from different aspects.
However, only part of security and privacy requirements are addressed and analysis in a general level is still lack-
ing. In the secret-based biometric crypto systems, correlated biometric data is observed and public information is
shared between enrolment and verification. It is expected that a unique secret can be extracted and the public in-
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formation reveals little information about the secret and biometric data. In the transformation-based approaches
(using secret auxiliary data), enrolment and verification processes share the same secret supplementary data and
can extract similar transformed features. It is hard to retrieve biometric data from transformed features.
In this section a generalized evaluation framework is proposed. Firstly the protection goals for template pro-
tection are determined, which are the evaluation criteria and indicate security and privacy aspects to be assessed.
Secondly, the threat models are given, which define the information and resource available to an adversary. Fi-
nally, we will show how to conduct a rigorous evaluation based on a framework. In order to keep generalizability,
the general construction of template protection according to ISO standard [ISO11] is used as shown in Section
2.2.2.
3.2.1. Threat Models
Template protection improves resistance of biometric systems against internal and external attacks. Before as-
sessing security and privacy, identifying the information and computational resource available to an adversary
is crucial. For example, secret size can be used to quantify the security of PI in fuzzy commitment systems.
However, if biometric features are correlated and their distribution is known, leakage of the secret exists and the
security of PI can be much smaller than the secret size. We define three main threat models as follows:
1. Naive Model: an adversary has neither information of the underlying algorithm in a template protection
system, nor owns a large biometric database. He only has access to secure templates. The protected system
is considered as a blackbox. Attacks that can be performed or biometric information that can be obtained
are restricted.
2. Advanced Model: we assume Kerckhoffs’ principle and an adversary has full knowledge of the underlying
algorithm. Essential details of the algorithm are known. System internal parameters can be accessed and
adjusted. Secure templates from one or more databases can be obtained. Additionally, we assume that an
adversary also knows statistical properties of biometric features. It is very important priori information
and can strongly influence security and privacy.
If a system possesses a secret parameter, for example, transformation parameters in cancelable biometrics,
and projection matrix in biohashing, its security relies on the secrecy of the secret parameter. Security can
be assessed under assumption that an adversary has no access to secret information. We can also make
stronger assumption that he can use the secret information but does not know it explicitly. Additionally in
privacy assessment, we can assume that an adversary also knows the secret information in clear text. It is
important to see whether leakage of biometric information exists, if secret information is compromised. In
a secret-based system, there is no secret information. We assume that all system parameters are known to
an adversary.
3. Collision Model: we assume that an adversary owns a large amount of biometric data. This allows him to
gain enough information about biometric data. He can exploit inaccuracy of biometric systems, make an
exhaustive search in his own database and find biometric data, which have sufficient similarity to that of
a target person. If FAR is false acceptance rate of the system under a given setting, 1/FAR is the average
number of biometric data from different users, which an adversary needs in his own database.
Naive and advanced models are comparable with the models in the cryptanalysis, which a cryptanalyst defines
during assessment of cryptosystems. Naive model is the basic and weakest one. Advanced model is stricter,
which can verify the security of a system against an experienced adversary. Collision model is derived based on
inherent properties of biometric systems. It is possible to refine threat models or extend new requisitions accord-
ing to security and privacy requirements on biometric systems. Threat models are prerequisites for quantifying
security and privacy.
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3.2.2. Protection Goals
Before starting an evaluation, it is necessary to clarify what are the evaluation criteria. In Section 2.2.2, the
requirements on template protection are issued. From recognition point of view, integration of template protec-
tion should not affect accuracy of biometric systems. More important, template protection should achieve the
one-wayness and randomness. With help of these indispensable properties, the desired security and privacy re-
quirements such as renewability, revocability, confidentiality, unlinkability and data minimization can be fulfilled
(see Section 2.3). The expected properties of template protection can be evaluated with the following protection
goals, namely, security, privacy protection ability, unlinkability and randomness:
Security of PI In a protected biometric system, an authentication result is based on the comparison of
Pseudonymous Identifiers PI. The security of PI is determined by the hardness to find data M′, which can
produce a PI′ = PIR(M′,AD,AD) and PIC(PI′,PI) gives a positive result. Additionally for the secret-based
algorithms, the security of PI also includes the complexity to find a secret S′, which is equal to the true secret S
generated in enrolment process. This evaluation is comparable with the “pre-image” attack in cryptanalysis. S′
equates to a pre-image of PI. The security of PI ensures trustworthiness of authentication.
Privacy Protection Ability One of the main motivations for applying template protection is to safeguard
biometric information. The privacy protection ability includes two aspects:
• Irreversibility of biometric data indicates the hardness to retrieve the original biometric data. It is not
always the same as that of PI. Data, which can pass PI-verification process, may not have enough similarity
to the original biometric data. If a “pre-image” space of a PI is larger than its corresponding biometric
data space, the system has better protection of biometric data. The security shows only expense to retrieve
biometric data, however, it can not tell us the leakage of biometric data.
• Privacy leakage shows the amount of information about biometric data exposed in protected templates. In
many template protection algorithms privacy leakage exists to compensate variation of biometric data as
shown in [Smi04,Ign09]. Exposure of biometric information is not only threat for privacy but also a serious
security shortcoming. It can be exploited to retrieve activities of a subject in other biometric applications.
The revelation is permanent and hard to amend and can also influence the renewability of PI. Therefore,
secure template [PI,AD] should contain as little biometric information as possible.
Unlinkability One of the motivations to use template protection is to stop cross matching. Unlinkability is
a crucial criterion. It also includes two parts:
• Cross matching: Assume that an adversary obtains two protected templates. It should be hard for him to
verify whether they are generated from the same subject or not. However, cross matching can happen if
secure templates contain “personal identifiable information”. For instance, AD is generated by PIE and
required in PIR. If AD is not random and contains user-specific information, identification of a subject is
feasible with AD. It is necessary to measure whether and how much personally identifiable information is
contained in AD.
• Leakage amplification: Combing two or more protected templates should not be helpful to estimate secrets
or to retrieve biometric features. Whether combination of several secure templates can increase privacy
leakage and reduce security needs to be analysed. Leakage amplification limits long term applications and
multiple uses of biometrics.
The protection goals substantiate the security and privacy requirements on template protection with consider-
ation of empirical assessment. The security of PI is fundamental for the confidentiality of authentication with
protected templates. The irreversibility of biometric data is an indispensable privacy protection property, since
compromise of biometric data results in a hardly reparable loss of biometric identity. The privacy leakage is es-
sential for data minimization and also has influence on the unlinkability. Both irreversibility and privacy leakage
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show the ability of an algorithm to safeguard biometric information. The cross matching shows unlinkability
between different applications. Together with leakage amplification, it also determines renewability and revoca-
bility of protected templates. These protection goals are gaugeable with different metrics.
3.2.3. Evaluation Metrics
In the previous section we identified the protection goals of template protection and propose threat models for
evaluation. In order to quantify protection goals, evaluation metrics are needed. In this section we show possible
metrics and interpret their meaning for security and privacy and roles in evaluation. Furthermore, we give the
definitions of security and privacy regarding computational complexity. The metrics used in the definitions have
good measurability in practice. They are more general and can be used in evaluation of different algorithms.
Section 3.1.1 showed the metrics used in the existing security analysis. Many information-theoretical metrics
and metrics used in cryptoanalysis are well suited for security and privacy assessment of template protection.
Entropy, conditional entropy and mutual information are the common information-theoretical metrics. Entropy
indicates how much information a random variable contains. It shows the discriminative power of an random
variable. It is suitable for measurement in the naive threat model, where neither additional information is available
nor other parameters and variables are taken into account. Conditional entropy is a power tool to quantify the
security and irreversibility of biometric data in the advanced threat model. For instance H(S|AD) shows the
uncertainty about secret with known auxiliary data AD. Mutual information is an important metric to assess
privacy leakage in advanced model, e.g. I(X ;AD) shows the common information in X and AD.
Min-entropy, average min-entropy, guessing entropy, conditional guessing entropy and statistical distance are
the most frequently used metrics in security assessment of a cryptographic algorithm. They assess the security
and privacy from different aspects. Min-entropy corresponds to the probability of the most frequently occurring
element of a variable. It can measure irreversibility in advanced model without taking AD into account. Average
min-entropy can also quantify both the security and irreversibility in advanced model. It corresponds to the
probability of the most likely secret or biometric data given AD. Guessing entropy and conditional entropy
measure the average number of attempts needed to retrieve target data with and without the help of AD. Statistical
distance can measure the distance between two distributions. In the secret-based template protection methods, the
secrets are expected to be random even if auxiliary data is given. The statistical distance can show the deviation
of the secret distribution from an ideal uniform distribution.
Table 3.1 gives an overview of different metrics. The information-theoretical metrics quantify the protection
goals with entropy and show average case performance. Min-entropy and average min-entropy show the lower
bound of security and privacy achieved and correspond to the worst-case performance. Entropy loss measures
privacy leakage in this case. Guessing entropy and conditional guessing entropy represent average complexity
by retrieving secrets or biometric data in an attack scenario. In [NJ09], Nagar et al. proposed coverage and
effort, which can also measure security and irreversibility in an attack scenario. Coverage is a recovering rate of
a variable at a certain number of guesses (effort). It is a more detailed measurement than (conditional) guessing
entropy. The statistical distance measures the randomness of extracted secrets with reference to an ideal uniform
distribution. They can measure one or more protection goals in different threat models. Measurability shows
whether these metrics are applicable in practice. The highly measurable metrics are already made use of in the
assessment of concrete algorithms. The lowly measurable metrics are rather concepts and difficult to measure in
practice.
Other metrics measuring recognition performance can also be used for security and privacy evaluation, espe-
cially for cross matching. Cross matching can be assessed with the recognition ability of protected templates.
The False Match Rate (FMR), False Non-Match Rate (FNMR) and Equal Error Rate (EER) are proper met-
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Metric Threat
Model
Protection Goal Measurability Remarks
Entropy naive security, H(S) high average case scenario
Conditional advanced security, H(S|AD) medium average case scenario
Entropy irreversibility, H(X |AD)
Mutual
Information
advanced privacy leakage, I(X ;AD) medium average case scenario
Secrecy
Capacity
all security low proposed in [TG04] for a
helper data scheme, boundary
of achievable secret size and
independent of adversary’s
resources
Identification
Capacity
collision security low proposed in [TG04] for a helper
data scheme and boundary of
rate of identified subjects
Min-Entropy advanced irreversibility, H∞(X) medium worst case scenario without
taking AD into account
Average advanced security, H˜∞(S|W ) medium worst case scenario
Min-entropy irreversibility, H˜∞(X |W ) (see definition in [DORS08])
Entropy loss advanced privacy leakage
H∞(X)− H˜∞(X |W )
medium worst case scenario
(see definition in [DORS08])
Guessing
Entropy
naive security, G(S) medium attack scenario
Conditional
Guessing
Entropy
advanced security, G(S|AD) medium attack scenario
Conditional
Guessing
Distance
advanced security high attack scenario
(see definition in [Bal08])
Coverage
and effort
all security
irreversibility
high attack scenario
(see also [NJ09])
Statistical
Distance
advanced security low randomness test with reference
to a uniform distribution
Table 3.1.: Possible metrics for assessment of security and privacy protection ability
rics. In [STP09], indistinguishability is proposed, which measures the difference between the probabilities of
successful guesses with secure templates and of totally random guesses.
Template protection has similarity to cryptography. There are two kinds of security in cryptographic sys-
tems, conditional (computational) security and unconditional (information-theoretical) security. Most of cryp-
tographic methods such as RSA, public-key cryptography etc. are based on the assumption of hardness of com-
putation problems. Their computational complexities are not really proved. The security is held only if an
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adversary owns limited computational resources. Unconditional security, also called perfect security, does not
rely on any assumption of attack model. And the security can be held even if an adversary has unlimited compu-
tational power. In this case, an adversary can learn nothing about message from cipher text and can not perform
an attack better than brute force. It is Shannon’s definition of perfect secrecy. He also proved that the perfect
secrecy requires one-time pad, which is, however, very impractical. The detailed elaborations on unconditional
and conditional cryptographic security are given in [Wol98, Mau99].
Similarly security of biometric cryptosystems such as fuzzy commitment and fuzzy vault can be perfectly
secure under certain requirements. In a perfect secure system, different security metrics become harmonized,
for instance entropy, conditional entropy and conditional min-entropy converge. In contrast, the security of
transformation-based algorithms is mainly based on the secrecy of transformation or randomization parameters.
The privacy of these algorithms relies on inaccuracy of inversion functions, e.g. an inversion of a many-to-one
function or a quantization function.
In practical applications, perfect security is not sufficient. For instance, in a perfectly secure fuzzy commitment
system, secure templates expose no information about secrets. However, if the achieved secret size is too small, an
adversary can use a brute force attack to retrieve the secret. Therefore computational security is more important
for practical applications and a quantitative measurement is necessary.
Measuring computational security, computational powers and storage also need to be taken into account. For
example, there are two biometric cryptosystems, one uses cryptographic hashing to protect a random secret of
length 80, another one hides 20 secret data points in 100 random points. If brute force attack is used, the search
space of the first system is 280 uniformly distributed data and the one of the second system is
(
100
20
)
≈ 269
identically probable combinations. The larger the search space is, the more storage is necessary. Addition-
ally, cryptographic hashing and hiding secret demand different computational power. Both of them should be
considered. We propose formal definitions of security and privacy from computational security aspect.
A template protection algorithm consists of a pseudonymous identifier encoder PIE, [PI,AD] = PIE(M), a
pseudonymous identifier recorder PIR, [PI′] = PIR(M′,AD) and a pseudonymous identifier comparator PIC as
defined in Section 2.2.2. M is an input biometric datum, the pseudonymous identifier PI and the auxiliary data
AD are stored as a protected template. The security and privacy of template protection is defined as:
Definition 1. Let A(AD,PI) = [Mˆ, PˆI] be a reconstruction function, where PˆI = PIR(Mˆ,AD). TA is the compu-
tational time required in one reconstruction attempt and n is the average number of reconstructions needed to
get a [Mˆ, PˆI], such that PIC(PI, PˆI) = 1 for a positive authentication result. A template protection algorithm is
(T ,ε)- secure, if for all reconstruction functions A,
TA ≥ T (3.1)
log2 n ≥ ε (3.2)
This security definition represents the average effort to find a biometric datum Mˆ, which can successfully pass
pseudonymous identifier verification process. It emphasizes computational security, however, it is also strongly
related to information-theoretical security. To break verification, a reconstruction function A is necessary. It
demands some computational power, which is quantified with computational time TA. It is the lower limit for
all the possible reconstruction functions. The reconstruction function is tied up with PIE and PIR. For a well-
designed template protection algorithm, PIE and PIR should be hard to invert (e.g. PIE and PIR are one-way
functions). The reconstruction is possible, for instance, only with a kind of brute force using PIR and PIC
functions. In some of transformation-based algorithms, inverse functions can exist and the inversion is possible,
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if transformation parameter (AD) is known. Inversion might be a one-to-many function. Only biometric data is
protected, however, security can not be ensured if AD is compromised. The factor ε indicates the average number
of guesses (reconstructions). It is dependent on the properties of the search space. In the case that inversion
function exists, the search space can be very small and ε = 1. For the secret-based algorithm ε is related to the
conditional guessing entropy G(S|AD). In practice both ε and T should be large enough that an adversary can
not find an Mˆ successfully in reasonable time.
Definition 2. Let A(AD,PI) = [Mˆ, PˆI] be a reconstruction function, where PˆI = PIR(Mˆ,AD). TA is the com-
putational time required in one reconstruction and n is the average number of reconstructions needed to get a
[Mˆ, PˆI], such that for a threshold t distance function dist(Mˆ,M)≤ t. A template protection algorithm is (T ,ε, t)-
preserving, if for all reconstruction functions A,
TA ≥ T (3.3)
log2 n ≥ ε (3.4)
This definition shows the cost to find Mˆ, which is similar to M. Biometric data is random variable. It is not
necessary to reconstruct the same M as in the enrolment. We use a distance function and a threshold to represent
the desired accuracy of the reconstruction. Other privacy related information such as birthday, gender, name,
might be saved in a protected biometric system. But we only take the input biometric data to be protected into
account.
In the definitions, the average number of attempts is used as one of the evaluation metrics. Other information-
theoretical metrics are also good metrics for the evaluation, however, they are not suitable for measurement of
the transformation-based methods. The average number of attempts represents the computational security. The
proposed definitions interpret the meaning of security and privacy from attack point of view.
3.2.4. A Generalized Evaluation Framework
In this section we will propose a generalised evaluation framework. It aims at providing a guideline, how to
design an evaluation process for a template protection algorithm. In the following we show sequentially the
process:
1. Determining protection goals: The first step is to clarify the objectives of the evaluation. They depend on
what we want to achieve with a template protection method. The possible protection goals are the security,
privacy protection ability, and unlinkability as elaborated in Section 3.2.2, which cover all the security and
privacy expectations on template protection.
2. Specifying threat models: Furthermore, it is necessary to define the ability of an adversary, e.g. system
information and computational resources available for him. It represents, which kinds of information and
system parameters an adversary can access in a practical attack. On the other hand, the same information
is also allowed to be used during the evaluation. We range the capability of an adversary into three threat
models, namely, naive, advanced and collision model as described in Section 3.2.1. The higher the security
requirements are, the stricter is the threat model and the more information and computational power is
available for an adversary.
Obviously the power of an adversary is strongly underestimated in the naive model. In a rigorous eval-
uation, we recommend that assessment should be done at least under the advanced threat model. If high
security is required, additionally the evaluation should be performed in the collision model. Please note
that evaluation in advanced and collision model cannot be substituted by each other. Collision, that bio-
metric data of different subjects can be matched, arises from the overlap of biometric data from different
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subjects. It is an inherent problem of biometrics. It cannot be solved with template protection. However,
applying template protection should not increase inaccuracy of systems. The advanced model characterizes
the security and privacy regarding adversaries with other information source.
3. Defining evaluation metrics and evaluation process: Choosing appropriate metrics is the crucial step
and is the core of an evaluation. An evaluation process is designed to measure the metrics. The identified
protection goals and threat models determine which kinds of metrics can be used and how these metrics
can be assessed. The possible metrics are shown in Section 3.2.3.
Evaluation processes distinguish between theoretical evaluation and practical evaluation. Theoretical eval-
uation measures the information-theoretical metrics, average min-entropy, guessing entropy etc. These
metrics require knowledge of distribution or conditional distribution of biometric data or secrets. However,
the probability estimation is not always possible, e.g. due to high dimension of features, limited number of
testing data. Additionally, information-theoretical metrics may not be suitable for the algorithms, which
are not based on information-theoretical security. Alternatively, practical evaluation can be used, which
depends on individual attack. It provides a direct way to evaluate an algorithm by assessing the efficiency
of a defined attack.
The theoretical evaluation shows the security and privacy in a systematic way. It can show basically
whether an algorithm has potential vulnerabilities or not. However, it cannot show whether any attack on
vulnerability is feasible in practice or not. In contrast, practical evaluation simulates what an adversary
can really achieve. But it is strongly dependent on the attack. Therefore, the theoretical and practical
evaluations complement each other. Their results will be also convergent. If a system is proved to be
highly secure with theoretical evaluation, it will be well resistant to possible security attacks. Vice versa,
if a system is found to be vulnerable to an attack, security weakness can be detected with theoretical
evaluation.
4. Evaluation and analysis: After designing the evaluation process with the metrics, an evaluation can start.
Depending on the threat model, testing material, e.g. a face database, can be required. In many attacks,
adversaries may need data for initialization. Moreover, the statistical properties of biometric data can be
learned from testing material. These are very essential input for assessment of concrete algorithms and
are an important prior knowledge for an attack. At the end of the evaluation, the results with evaluation
metrics are obtained and analyzed. If different metrics or evaluation methods are used, their experimental
results need to be compared with each other. The whole evaluation from determination of protection goals
to the analysis of evaluation results should be well documented.
Figure 3.1 illustrates the proposed evaluation framework. To sum up, the threat model and the protection goal
should be determined before an assessment process starts. Based upon these, the metrics quantifying protection
goals need to be determined. The experiments should be designed to give a substantial measurement on the
developed metrics. The assessment is completed with the analysis of the results.
Template protection is a privacy and security enhancing technique. The security and privacy assessment is
even more important than evaluation of recognition performance. This proposed framework enables an empirical
evaluation. It meets the challenge of privacy and security assessment in practice. The framework is helpful during
development of an algorithm, such that potential weaknesses can be avoided in advance. It can be specified for
assessment of different algorithms. In the next two sections, we give an overview of the security and privacy in
fuzzy commitment and fuzzy vault with consideration of this framework.
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Figure 3.1.: The generalized evaluation framework
3.3. Importance of Distributions of Biometric Data
The probability distribution of biometric data plays a very important role in security and privacy assessment. For
the security reason, we expect that secure references are random and prediction or linkage of them is infeasible.
However, biometric data are stochastic variables. The inherent dependency exists, for instance, fingerprint images
share the similar pattern. The FAR attacks and feature estimation attack shown in Section 3.1.2 are based on this
property of biometric systems.
On the one hand, protected templates are generated from dependent biometric data. The risks exist that derived
references contain user-specific information and template protection can be prone to linkage attacks. On the other
hand, distribution of biometric data can help an adversary to retrieve the original biometric data from protected
templates. Therefore, we define distribution as important priori information in advanced threat model.
In a rigorous assessment, estimation of distribution of biometric data is indispensable. Especially, in theoretical
evaluation, distribution of biometric data is necessary. Unfortunately, in the existing security analyses, precise
estimations were substituted with simple assumptions of e.g. independent and identical distribution [BCC∗07,
VDRY09], etc. That led to overestimation of security. We will show how to accurately estimate distributions of
3D face features and iris features in Sections 4.3.1 and 5.3.1, which allows strict quantification of security and
privacy.
26
3. A Generalized Framework for Security and Privacy Assessment
3.4. Assessment of the Fuzzy Commitment Scheme
The fuzzy commitment scheme is one of the most successful template protection algorithms. It was firstly
proposed by Juels and Wattenberg in [JW99]. The main idea is to assign a random secret to a subject instead
to use biometric data itself. Authentication is performed though the correct regeneration of the secret with a
biometric datum and helper data. The helper data is useful to compensate errors between enrolled and queried
biometric data. A block diagram is shown in Figure 3.2.
WSecretS XOR
X
Keystream 
Generator
Error 
Correction 
Encoder
C S’XOR
X’
Error 
Correction 
Decoder
C’
Encoder Decoder
Figure 3.2.: A block diagram of fuzzy commitment
The encoder and the decoder of fuzzy commitment share a public side information W and the two correlated
biometric feature X and X ′. They try to extract exactly the same secret S. C is an error correction code of S and
W is also called helper data, which should reveal neither information about S nor about X .
W =C⊕X (3.5)
Error correction coding is necessary, since biometric features are noisy data. It is simple to map fuzzy commit-
ment into the ISO architecture (see Section 2.2.2). The PIE consists of a fuzzy commitment encoder and a hash
function. A protected template is composed of [PI,W ], where PI = h(S) and W is the auxiliary data according
to the standard. The PIR is built with a fuzzy commitment decoder and a hash function. The decoder takes
biometric feature X ′ and W as inputs and returns a hash of the estimated secret h(S′). The PIC makes an exact
comparison of the stored PI and the new one.
Obviously fuzzy commitment is appreciate to protect binary features. The extracted biometric feature may not
be binary. In such a case, binarization process is needed to convert features into binary string X . Here we only
focus on privacy and secrecy performance regarding binary feature X . Information loss happening in binarization
process will not be addressed in this work. In this section we investigate the existing theoretical security anal-
ysis of fuzzy commitment and give a systematic overview of security and privacy properties regarding different
protection goals. Here we make an assumption of advanced threat model that an adversary knows the details of
fuzzy commitment, e.g. coding algorithms, coding parameters etc.
3.4.1. Security and Privacy
Assume secret S ∈ {0,1}LS and C is its codeword of length L (L > LS). Binary biometric feature X also contains
L bits. During enrolment process, S is randomly chosen and independent of X . The following equations are valid
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(the proof is given in section 4.2.2 of [Ign09]):
I(S;W ) = H(W )−H(W |S) = H(W )−H(C⊕X |S)
a
= H(W )−H(X) (3.6)
I(X ;W ) = H(W )−H(W |X) = H(W )−H(C⊕X |X)
b
= H(W )−H(S) (3.7)
the equality of a and b is valid, since X is independent of S and C. The mutual information I(S;W ) shows the
secrecy leakage in auxiliary data W , while I(S;W ) represents the privacy leakage. The mutual information is
non-negative, therefore, H(W )≥max{H(X),H(S)}.
Fuzzy commitment can be seen as a special case of helper data scheme and fuzzy extractor. The security and
privacy performance of fuzzy commitment is well analyzed in literatures. In the following we summarize the
important properties of fuzzy commitment:
• The number of secret bits, which can be exacted with negligibly small secrecy leakage, is not larger than
the mutual information between reference and queried biometric features I(X ;X ′). It is the boundary of
achievable secret size for a perfectly secure system with helper data scheme. In [Tuy04] Tuyls proved it
for both discrete and continuous variables. In [Ign09] Ignatenko proved it for independently identically
distributed variables and stationary ergodic variables.
• If binary biometric feature X is uniformly and independently distributed (u.i.d.), namely any element xi
of X with p(xi = 1) = p(xi = 0) = 0.5, then fuzzy commitment is perfectly secure. Eq 3.6 shows that W
exposes no information about secrets, only if H(W ) = H(X). It is trivial to prove that this condition holds,
if X is u.i.d. In [JW99] Juels et al. show that retrieval of a secret is as hard as inversion of its hash. It is
also proved from information-theoretical point of view in [Tuy04, Ign09].
• If X is non-uniformly identical independently distributed, namely any element xi of X with p(xi = 1) =
p(xi = 0) = p 6= 0.5, where p is constant for all xi, secrecy leakage exists. For instance, Ignatenko proved
the existence of the secrecy leakage in the case that X is identically independently distributed or is a non-
uniform stationary ergodic sequence in [Ign09].
• The irreversibility of biometric data is equivalent to security of PI. H(S|W ) represents the security of PI
and H(X |W ) indicates the irreversibility of X . With this construction, biometric feature X is as secure as
S, since the uncertainty about X is equal to the uncertainty about S with known W :
H(S|W ) = H(S)− I(S;W )
= H(S)+H(X)−H(W ) (3.8)
= H(X |W ) (3.9)
Obviously the security of biometric information relies on the security of S. As soon as S is compromised,
X is also totally exposed.
• Privacy leakage is unavoidable in fuzzy commitment. The auxiliary data leaks information about enrolled
biometric data in order to enable error tolerance. In a perfectly secure system, I(X ;W ) is at least H(X |Y )
as proved in [Tuy04, Ign09]. In [Smi04], Smith also proved it for the secure sketch in a Hamming distance
space with uniformly distributed bit errors. In practice this lower bound is hard to achieve and real privacy
leakage is much higher.
Fuzzy commitment exacts secrets from noisy data source. It is comparable with secret extraction from
common randomness, where helper data – the information shared between enrolment and verification –
is necessary for error compensation. In [Ign09], Ignatenko analyzed the achievable privacy performance
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with the helper data scheme. Fuzzy commitment can be seen as a special case of the helper data scheme,
but it is not the only one construction. She showed that fuzzy commitment has extremely high privacy
leakage in comparison with an ideal construction. And privacy leakage increases with the decreasing
secrecy performance.
Fuzzy commitment is one of the very few methods, which can achieve information-theoretical security. How-
ever, its security and privacy performance is optimal with uniformly identically distributed features at the max-
imum secret size. Unfortunately, this strict condition is difficult to fulfill in practice. In many applications,
dependency of biometric features is ignored and security is thus suspected to be highly overestimated. There-
fore, a rigorous assessment is necessary and important.
The information-theoretical metrics shown in Table 3.1 can be used to quantify the security and privacy.
Due to XOR operation, security and privacy are strongly related. To evaluate a fuzzy commitment system, a
randomness test on input biometric features can be firstly performed. Different kinds of tests are shown in
[RSN∗08], which can verify whether features are u.i.d or not. If features are u.i.d, the security and privacy can
be directly determined by the secret size and the codeword length. If not, the distribution of biometric features
needs to be estimated.
These security and privacy metrics can only be measurable, if distribution of biometric features as well as
condition distribution of secrets are known. It is a big challenge to estimate the distribution of high dimensional
biometric features. In Chapter 4 and 5, we will show how to model the distribution of 3D facial features as well
as iris features and give a rigorous estimation on the corresponding fuzzy commitment systems.
3.4.2. Unlinkability
Privacy leakage existing in fuzzy commitment can be misused by an adversary, especially when he has access
to many secure templates. As shown in Section 3.2.2, there are two kinds of risks related to unlinkability of
template protection, namely cross matching and leakage amplification. In principle, any personal identifiable
information contained in stored template can cause these problems. In this section we take a close look at these
two potential risks and their effects on fuzzy commitment.
In [STP09], two possible linkage attacks on fuzzy commitment were proposed. One is the distinguishability
attack, also called decodability attack, which is a cross matching attack; the other is the irreversibility attack,
which is a kind of leakage amplification attack. In [CS08, STP09, Kel10], decodability attack on fuzzy commit-
ment has been addressed. Carter and Stoianov showed in [CS08] that fuzzy commitment is vulnerable to linkage
attack due to error correction coding and XOR function. Simoens et al. gave a detailed analysis in [STP09]
regarding indistinguishability. Indistinguishability is an important property of a public key encryption system.
Based on a ciphertext, an adversary should have no advantage in guessing which key was used in encryption.
Analogously, given two secure templates, an adversary should not be able to verify whether they are derived
from the same subject or not. They defined indistinguishability and N-indistinguishability to assess this attack.
A challenger randomly sends two secure templates to an adversary and denote i = 1, if they are from the same
subject or i= 0, if they are from different subjects. In the basic indistinguishability test, the probabilities of i= 1
and i = 0 are equal; while in the N-indistinguishability, the probability of i = 1 is 1/N, where N is the number of
the subjects in the challenger’s database. The adversary should guess whether the template sent is derived from
the same subject or not. If linking secure templates is possible, the adversary can do better than a random guess.
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In [STP09] indistinguishability and N-distinguishability are defined as:
Advind = 2
∣∣P(i = iˆ)− 1
2
∣∣ (3.10)
Advind−N =
N
N−1
∣∣P(i = iˆ)− 1
N−1
∣∣ (3.11)
where iˆ∈ {0,1} is the adversary’s estimation result. Advind and Advind−N measure the advantage of an adversary
over a random guess.
Simoen et al. proposed the following practical attack on fuzzy commitment. The auxiliary data W = X ⊕C is
the distance between biometric feature X and a codeword C. The linear error correction code has the property
that the sum of any two codewords is also a codeword. The sum of two auxiliary data is the distance between
two enrolled biometric features plus a codeword. The intraclass distance is larger than the interclass distance on
average. Additionally, the space of correctable codes is much smaller than the whole code space in many linear
error correction codes. Therefore, with high probability the sum of two auxiliary data is decodable, if they are
derived from the same subject; otherwise, the sum is probably undecodable. They showed a lower boundary
of a (M,m,m′, t)- secure fuzzy sketch with uniformly independent features and uniformly distributed intraclass
errors E with Advind :
Advind ≥ 1−2−[I(X ;W )−H(E)] (3.12)
where the Hamming distance of E is not larger than t. The zero-indistinguishability can only be achieved, if
I(X ;W ) = H(E). In this case, LS = H(X ;Y ) and the maximum secret size is achieved, where H(X ;Y ) is the
mutual information between the reference and queried features. However, they also prove that an optimal code
enabling zero-indistinguishability does not exist in practice. Although the lower bound of indistinguishability
given by Simoen is derived from uniformly independent features, the distinguishability attack is general and is
applicable in many fuzzy commitment schemes.
Kelkboom analyzed the performance of the decodability attack and evaluated it in a fingerprint fuzzy commit-
ment system [Kel10]. For uniform and independent biometric features, he showed that FAR of the decodability
attack is 2LS larger than the FAR of the original fuzzy commitment system. In the fuzzy commitment scheme, a
false acceptance happens only if a feature of another subject falls into the sphere of the reference feature within
a radius t, where t is the number of correctable bit errors. However, in the decodability attack, there are 2LS
spheres, which can cause false acceptances. The difference between their centers and the original reference fea-
ture is equal to a codeword. In contrast, FRR becomes smaller, since decodable feature space enlarges. He also
proposed a bit-permutation process to improve the resistance to the decodability attack. Before calculating the
XOR of the chosen codeword and the biometric feature, a permutation function Π is used to shuffle bit position
of biometric feature. The following equations are used to describe different enrolment processes:
Π1(X1)+S1 ·G = W1
Π2(X2)+S2 ·G = W2
where G is a generator matrix of an error correction coding method. After permutation the intraclass distance
of biometric features increases so much that decoding the sum of auxiliary data is not possible any more. The
parameter of permutation is an additional auxiliary data and is independent of secrets and biometric features.
The second attack, reversibility attack, is also proposed by Simoen in [STP09]. He showed that linking dif-
ferent secure templates can lead to more leakage. Due to different coding method used in fuzzy commitment,
secure templates may contain different information about biometric features and combining them can gain more
information about biometric features as well as secrets. This reduces irreversibility of secure templates. As-
suming that X1 and X2 are the reference features of a subject in different applications; W1 = X1 + S1 ·G1 and
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W2 = X2 + S2 ·G2 are their auxiliary data, where S1 and S2 are the secrets and G1 and G2 are the two different
generator matrixes. Eintra = X1+X2 is an intraclass distance. According to the paper of Simoens,
S1 ·G1+S2 ·G2 = W1+W2+Eintra
[S1,S2] ·
[
G1
G2
]
= W1+W2+Eintra (3.13)
In this equation, S1, S2 and Eintra are unknown. Let R1,2 = Rank
{[G1
G2
]}
be the rank of the new concatenated
matrix and max{LS1 ,LS2} ≤ R1,2 ≤ min{LS1 + LS2 ,L}. Especially when R1,2 = LS1 + LS2 , the cost to retrieve
S1 and S2 reduces to that of guessing Eintra. In contrast, he showed that zero-irreversibility can be achieved, if
R1,2 = max{LS1 ,LS2} and no additional leakage exists.
The indistinguishability (decodability) attack links the secure templates through privacy leakage contained in
auxiliary data. It is feasible, if the two pseudonymous identifier encoders use the same coding method. And ω1
indicates the case that W1 and W2 are from the same subject andω0 is for the case that W1 and W2 are from different
subjects. Generally, a fuzzy commitment system is vulnerable to cross matching, if I(W1,W2|ω1)> I(W1,W2|ω0).
Eq 3.12 gives the condition for a perfect system, which is resistant to cross matching. And the mutual information
between W1 and X1 is equal to the entropy of the noise, which is the difference between X1 and X2. No additional
leakage exist. In this case, linking W1 and W2 is impossible.
The irreversibility attack combines privacy leakage in different secure templates of the same subjects and tries
to gain more information. It addresses the second linkage problem - leakage amplification as shown in Section
3.2.2. It happens, when I(X1;W2|W1)> 0. Using different error correction codes can increase the risk of leakage
amplification. We propose an attack based on exhaustive searches: Given W1, the XOR of W1 and any codeword
is a candidate of X1. The set {Xˆ1} and {Xˆ2} contain all the candidates of X1 and X2. If the exactly same linear
coding method is used, then one candidate set is the linear translated set of the other. If different coding methods
are used, two sets are very different and the candidate pairs with the small distance may be two enrolled features.
This method is more efficient than the irreversibility attack, since it is not necessary to try all the possible error
patterns. However, it obviously requires a large memory and may be very impractical. An adversary can benefit
from irreversibility attack, if LS1 +LS2−R1,2+H(Eintra)< min{LS1 ,LS2}. For instance, if the secret size is much
smaller than the number of correctable bit errors, it is not necessary to use irreversibility attack.
It should be avoided to change the coding scheme from privacy amplification point of view. The bit- per-
mutation process proposed in [Kel10] can enhance indistinguishability, however, it can also cause high privacy
amplification. If the permutation function Π is known, its unique inverse function Π−1 can be calculated and
X =Π−1(Π(X)), then:
Π−11 (Π1(X1)+S1 ·G) = Π−11 (W1)
X1+S1 ·Π−11 (G) = Π−11 (W1) (3.14)
X2+S2 ·Π−12 (G) = Π−12 (W2) (3.15)
(X1+X2)+ [S1,S2] ·
[
Π−11 (G)
Π−12 (G)
]
= Π−11 (W1)+Π
−1
2 (W2) (3.16)
(X1+X2)+ [S1,S2] · G = Π−11 (W1)+Π−12 (W2) (3.17)
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Assuming that G = [g1,g2, · · · ,gn], (u11,u12, · · · ,u1n) and (u21,u22, · · · ,u2n) are the new indexes of gi after the permu-
tation function Π−11 and Π
−1
2 :
G =
[
gu11 gu12 · · · gu1n
gu21 gu22 · · · gu2n
]
(3.18)
n≥min{n,2k} ≥ Rank(G) ≥ Rank(G) = k (3.19)
G is a 2k× n matrix. After permutation the rank of G can be much larger than k. Combining W1 and W2 will
expose more information about the secrets. In order to avoid this, the permutation functions should be kept secret.
Linkage attacks require knowledge about template protection systems. They can only be performed with
experienced adversaries. To assess unlinkability, it is reasonable to assume the advanced threat model. In a cross
matching attack, an adversary needs to have access of two protected templates. Additionally he should have
access to two templates from the same subjects to perform a leakage amplification attack. It means that leakage
amplification demands more information from a system than cross matching. Due to intraclass noise, attacks of
leakage amplification are very impractical. Therefore, resistance against cross matching has higher priority than
against leakage amplification in practice.
Nevertheless, leakage amplification determines diversity, renewability and revocability of template protection.
In the worst case an adversary can learn information from revoked templates and biometric information can
be totally compromised. Although leakage amplification cannot be realized with practical attacks yet, it is a
potential weakness of fuzzy commitment.
Unlinkability is strongly related with practical attacks. Practical evaluation based on different attacks is proper
for assessment. The metrics such as FAR, FRR can be used to quantify the efficiency of cross matching attack,
while the metrics such as coverage and effort are the proper ones.
Both cross matching and leakage amplification are caused by privacy leakage. A system designer should try
to minimize privacy leakage. Additionally any user-specific information such as name, gender, and age contain
privacy information and is suspicious of linkage problems. Therefore, the stored templates and all related records
need to be examined.
3.5. Assessment of the Fuzzy Vault Algorithm
The fuzzy vault algorithm is also a kind of fuzzy extractor for features in set difference space. In this section,
we will elaborate the fuzzy vault algorithm and the existing security analysis. We will analyze its security and
privacy performance based on the evaluation framework. Here we also assume the advanced threat model.
The fuzzy vault algorithm was firstly proposed by Juels and Sudan in [JS02] in order to protect fingerprint
minutiae. Minutiae are characteristic points of a fingerprint, which are end or bifurcates of ridge lines. They
are chosen as standardized fingerprint features in the ISO international standard. They are stored as a set of
points and their comparison must be tolerant to reordering, deletions and insertions of minutiae in the feature set.
Therefore, Shamir’s secret sharing is exploited in fuzzy vault.
It works as follows: In the enrolment a randomly generated secret forms a polynomial poly of degree κ−1. A
minutia feature αi is projected on the polynomial and a genuine point {αi,βi} is obtained, where αi can contain
position and angle information of the minutia and βi = poly(αi). Then t minutiae are used to produce the genuine
points and t > κ. In order to protect minutiae information, the genuine points are hidden into r chaff points, which
do not lie on p. Only the hash of the secret and the vault set consisting of both genuine points and chaff points
are stored in a secure template. In the verification, if the genuine fingerprint is available and κ matched genuine
32
3. A Generalized Framework for Security and Privacy Assessment
points are found in the stored vault set, then the polynomial can be successfully reconstructed and the correct
secret can be released.
In [JS02], the Peterson-Berlekamp-Massey algorithm - a classical RS decoding algorithm - is chosen for the
polynomial reconstruction and the polynomial can be reconstructed with at least t+k2 genuine points. The security
of the algorithm is calculated by counting the number of possible polynomials of degree less than κ− 1, which
includes exact t points of the vault set. It is shown that at least µ3 q
k−t(r/t)t such kinds of polynomials exist,
where q = r+ t and µ is a probability factor. If an adversary owns δt genuine points, the probability that he can
crack fuzzy vault is not larger than 2
√
1
3 q
k−(1+δ)t(r/t)(1−δ)t .
In [NJP07], Nandakumar et al. showed an implementation of fuzzy vault. During minutiae extraction in the
enrolment, local image quality is estimated. Based on this the most reliable minutiae are selected to calculate
genuine points. Additionally, cyclic redundancy check (CRC) code is applied on the secret before it forms the
polynomial, which makes it easier to check the correctness of the secret. The high curvature points on the
fingerprint is also stored and used as reference points for fingerprint alignment. High curvature points detection
is much more reliable than singular point (cores and delta) detection, since singular points do not exist on all
fingerprints. They can not reveal much information about minutiae points. In the verification, only minutiae with
high quality extracted from a query image are used in the further steps. The queried minutiae points are aligned
based on the stored high curvature points and those detected on the queried image with the iterative closest point
(ICP) algorithm. A candidate point is selected in a vault set if it is close to a minutia in the queried set. The
polynomial is reconstructed with Lagrange interpolation, if more than κ candidate points are found. However,
Lagrange interpolation is not tolerant to selection errors. The possible subsets of size κ from the candidate points
need to be tried until the genuine set is found. A large number of candidate points need many reconstructions.
Therefore, an additional coarse filter is used to filter wrongly detected genuine points, when the number of the
candidate points is beyond a threshold.
They analysed the security of this implementation based on the complexity to reconstruct the polynomial. A
successful reconstruction requires κ genuine points. A vault set contains t + r points. They assume that chaff
points and genuine points are similarly distributed and an adversary can not distinct genuine points from the chaff
points. There are
(t+r
κ
)
different κ-combinations from the vault set. From those,
( t
κ
)
combinations contains the κ
genuine points, which can successfully reconstruct the polynomial. Then, the average number of reconstructions
required to retrieve the polynomial is:
n =
(t+r
κ
)( t
κ
) (3.20)
Assessing fuzzy vault also requires the corresponding threat models. Here we assume the advanced model.
Obviously Eq 3.20 measures the security of PI in the advanced model with knowledge of system parameters of
t, r and κ. All the genuine points lie on the polynomial. Minutiae information will be totally compromised if
the secret (the polynomial) is known. Therefore, the irreversibility of minutiae is equivalent to the security of
PI. Those minutiae, which are not chosen in the enrolment, are safe. Assume that there are M possible minutiae
positions in a fingerprint image with a fix resolution and u possible orientations at each position. The uncertainty
of t minutiae is log(u · (Mt )). The privacy leakage can be calculated as follows:
log(u ·
(
M
t
)
)− logn = log(u ·
(
M
t
)
)− log
(t+r
κ
)( t
κ
)
= logu+ log
(
M
t
)
+ log
(
t
κ
)
− log
(
t+ r
κ
)
(3.21)
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Please note that both Eq 3.20 and 3.21 are based on the assumption that the minutiae are uniformly distributed
in the feature space and all the t- or κ-combinations are possible minutiae set. It is not really true: minutiae
distribution is not uniform and some finger regions have high minutiae density; minutiae in a fingerprint are
correlated e.g. due to the orientation information. These equations may overestimate the security and privacy.
Therefore, we recommend using additional practical evaluations in practice.
Although fuzzy vault is appropriate to handle the set difference metric, a disadvantage is that the protected
information is only hidden in a vault set and it is susceptible to linkage attack and substitution attack [SB07].
An adversary who has access to two vault sets of the same subject, it is trivial to uncover the genuine points in
the clouds of chaff points. The genuine points are present in both vaults, while the (independently generated)
chaff points are different. Additionally, an adversary can generate valid support points with his own minutiae
information and add them to the vault set, such that the verification process works for both the genuine user
and the adversary. This substitution attack can be easily prevented with digital signature. Obviously, linkage
attack also strengthens privacy leakage, that can not be stopped by digital signature. Therefore, researchers try to
use additional information and to circumvent this drawback. For instance, Nandakumar et al. also proposed the
approach of hardening fingerprint fuzzy vault using password to prevent the linkage attack in [NNJ07] .
Due to noise between acquisitions, the selected genuine minutiae points may be different. The inserted chaff
points may disturb the matching process. The performance detecting overlapped genuine minutiae in two vault
sets might be much worse than the performance of fuzzy vault. If fingerprint alignment information is used as
in [NJP07], it is helpful for an adversary to retrieve the genuine points. The resistance of cross matching can
be very different. It is also based on the efficiency of adversary’s minutiae matchers. Cross matching can be
assessed with the performance of corresponding attacks.
3.6. Summary
In this chapter we proposed a generalized evaluation framework, which enables a comprehensive assessment of
template protection. It consists of the fundamental steps of an assessment, namely identifying protection goals
and threat models, deriving evaluation metrics and designing evaluation process. Three main protection goals –
security of PI, privacy protection ability and unlinkability – were defined, which cover all the requirements on
template protection. Threat models were given, which are necessary to specify adversary’s ability and set the
evaluation environment. Based on these, the metrics and the corresponding evaluation process can be developed.
I emphasized the importance of distributions of biometric features in the assessment. The inherent dependency
exists in biometric data. An adversary can exploit this priori information to crack a template protection algorithm.
Additionally, security of many algorithms is based on the independency of biometric data. It is necessary to check
whether such a prerequisite is fulfilled in practice or not. Therefore, analysis of distribution of biometric data is
indispensable in a rigorous assessment.
We compare computational security and unconditional security and explain their roles in the assessment of
template protection. Moreover, we give the general definitions of security and privacy regarding the computa-
tional security, namely the complexity to invert pseudonymous identifier and to retrieve biometric data. Further-
more, different metrics measuring protection goals are elaborated with respect to their security meanings and the
corresponding threat models.
Additionally, the framework was also applied on two important biometric cryptosystems, fuzzy commitment
and fuzzy vault. Here the advanced threat model was assumed. The existing analyses were summarized, which
show the assessment of different protection goals. These analyses are based on special assumptions of distri-
butions of biometric features or intraclass errors. The security and privacy properties were shown only in a
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theoretical way. In the following two chapters, we will evaluate two real fuzzy commitment systems based on
the advanced threat model, estimate distributions of biometric features and quantify different protection goals.
In Chapter 6 we will discuss the generalizability of the framework and use it as a basis to compare different
algorithms.
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4. Evaluation of Template Protection for 3D Face
Recognition
In the previous chapter we proposed a generalized framework for privacy and security assessment of template
protection. In this chapter we apply the framework on a template protection system for 3D face recognition
and give a rigorous assessment. Firstly, we develop our own histogram-based 3D face recognition algorithm.
Compact and robust feature vectors can be derived. They represent the distribution of the facial surface. A good
recognition performance is shown. Fuzzy commitment is integrated to protect 3D facial features. The protected
system has slightly performance degradation, but a high secret length is achieved. Secondly, we evaluate the secu-
rity and privacy of the developed protected system. Here we assume the advanced threat model: an adversary has
full information about the system and biometric features. We analyze the distribution of the features, which has
strong influence on the security and is important priori knowledge for an adversary. The information-theoretical
metrics are used to quantify the security and privacy protection ability. Unfortunately, 3D facial features are
dependent and the security and privacy performance is quite poor. Additionally, we evaluate the unlinkability of
the system. Secure templates contain personal identifiable information and cross matching using auxiliary data
is possible. The system is also vulnerable to leakage amplification. Finally, we summarize the results and expe-
riences obtained during the evaluation. The assessment based on the evaluation framework detects the potential
risks and weakness of the developed fuzzy commitment system. It helps us design better systems.
4.1. 3D Face Recognition
The face is an important biometric modality. Face perception is a natural and easy way for humans to recognize
a person. Therefore, face recognition is utilized in a broad range of applications such as border control, access
control and surveillance scenarios. Face information can be represented as e.g. 2D color images, infrared images
or 3D shapes. 2D face recognition systems rely on intensity values of images and extract significant features from
a face. They have been an active research area for more than three decades. One of the most influential 2D face
recognition algorithms is the Eigenface approach of Turk and Pentland [TP91] using the Principal Component
Analysis (PCA) [MP01]. Von der Malsburg et al. introduced the Gabor Wavelets [LVB∗93]. Lu et al. [LPV03]
proposed fisher faces based on the Linear Discriminate Analysis (LDA), and the Independent Component Anal-
ysis (ICA) is used by Liu et al. [LWC99]. Today, mature 2D recognition systems are available that achieve low
error rates in controlled environments [PSO∗07]. However, face recognition based on 2D images is sensitive
to illumination, pose variation and facial expressions. Moreover, a facial photo is easy to acquire even without
consent of a person and may be used to spoof a 2D face recognition system.
In contrast to 2D face recognition, 3D face recognition relies on the geometry of the face. Due to this funda-
mental difference, it has the potential to overcome the shortcomings of 2D approaches. The 3D geometry of the
face is inherently robust to varying lighting conditions 1. A combined 2D-3D face recognition system may use
1Nevertheless, the 3D acquisition system itself can be sensitive to varying lighting conditions, especially to strong ambiance light.
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the spatial information to compensate pose changes and can make 2D recognition more accurate. Modeling and
faking the geometry of a face is much more expensive and complicated than in 2D scenario.
Different approaches for 3D face recognition have been published in the past. The Eigenface method for 2D
face recognition was extended to an Eigensurface approach by Heseltine et al. [HPA04]. Bai et al. proposed to
use the LDA for a 3D system by replacing the luminance values with depth information [BYS05]. An algorithm
combining Eigenfaces and Hidden Markov Models was introduced by Achermann et al. [AJB97]. Morphing of
face models has also been investigated by Huang et al. [HHB03] and Blanz et al. [BV99] to handle pose and
illumination changes. As shown, feature extraction methods were in many cases carried forward from 2D into
3D. In the following we propose a novel 3D face recognition algorithm using facial surface information.
4.1.1. A Histogram-based 3D Face Recognition
3D face recognition consists of the normalization, feature extraction and comparison process. The normalization
transforms a face model into a frontal view in order to compensate pose variations during acquirement. I use a
recursive normalization method as shown in [ZSBF08]. With help of an orthographic projection matrix, a 3D
facial point cloud is converted into a range image2. The most important landmark for 3D face recognition is
the nose3. It can be detected by finding maximum length convex hull segments for each horizontal line in the
range image. The intersection points for two maximum length segments are calculated. The bridge orientation is
estimated by applying PCA to the intersection points. The facial image is rendered according to the alignment of
the bridge position. The process is repeated until the translation and rotation required are below a given threshold
or convergence stops.
This normalization method is able to transform any face dataset, which has a sufficient representation of the
nose region, into a common reference orientation. It allows further processing towards a comparison of different
datasets. After the normalization, the nose tip is at the origin of the Cartesian coordinate system. The face is
vertical symmetric to the y− z plane and the noise bridge has an angle of 30◦ to the y-axis.
The transformed face dataset resulting from the normalization stage is used as input to the feature extraction
process. Since a frontal view on the face model is obtained, a straightforward approach is to compare the nor-
malized 3D model using an appropriate distance metric for surfaces such as the Hausdorff distance as proposed
by Pan et al. [PW03, PWWL03]. The downside of this immediate comparison is the poor robustness regarding
normalization inaccuracies and the necessity to store complete 3D models as biometric references, which might
need storage of several megabytes for an individual face. Here, we present an efficient histogram-based method
to extract a compact feature set from the face surface.
The distribution of depth values of a normalized face model can efficiently describe the characteristics of an
individual facial surface. In order to obtain more detailed information about the local geometry, the 3D model
is divided into N horizontal stripes, which are orthogonal to the symmetry plane of the face. The features are
extracted from the depth value distribution in each sub area. In the following, we elaborate the training process
to detect the facial region and the feature extraction algorithm.
Before starting the feature extraction, a region of interest within the 3D model must be identified, which
includes the bulk of the points belonging to the face surface. We assume pi with [xi,yi,zi] is a point in the 3D
model, where zi indicates the depth value. The tip of the nose corresponds to the origin of the coordinate system
at [0,0,0]. Around the tip of the nose a rectangle with [Xmin,Xmax] and [Ymin,Ymax] is defined as the bounding box
for the x- and y-value as shown in Figure 4.1. The points describing the background or clothes are located outside
2A range image is similar to a 2D image. Instead of illumination, depth information is given to each pixel.
3The most important landmark for 2D face recognition is eye positioned. However, fine structure of eye regions and disturbing of eyelashes,
etc., make acquired 3D information in those regions very noisy. In contrast, the acquisition and detection of the nose are very reliable.
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of this region. Nevertheless, there are still points, which do not belong to the face surface like the points in the
lower left and right corner of the rectangle in Figure 4.1, or spikes in the data set. A depth range for the points in
the rectangle can be further applied to filter out the non-facial and mismeasured points. A simple statistical test
is applied to the points in each sub area to find possible maximum and minimum depth values for facial points,
where a number of normalized 3D models from different subjects are required. The experiment of the training
process is shown in Section 4.1.2.
After the training process, the face region is determined. Figure 4.2 shows an example of the selected face
region. Then, the selected facial region is further divided into N disjoint horizontal stripes (see Figure 4.3). The
facial points of stripe Sn are defined as:
Sn = {pi(xi,yi,zi)|xi ∈ [Xmin,Xmax] ,yi ∈ [Yn,min,Yn,max] ,zi ∈ [Zn,min,Zn,max]} (4.1)
where n ∈ [1, · · · ,N]. The y-range [Yn,min,Yn,max] and the depth range [Zn,min,Zn,max] depend on the specific sub
area under consideration.
Given the bins {Zn,0,Zn,1 · · · ,Zn,K}, where Zn,0 = Zn,min, Zn,K = Zn,max, the percentage of the subset of points
in Sn with in the range [Zk−1,Zk] is given by
vk,n =
||{pi(xi,yi,zi)|pi ∈ Sn,Zk−1 < zi < Zk}||
||Sn|| (4.2)
where || · || denotes the number of points and k ∈ [1, · · · ,K] and n ∈ [1, · · · ,N].
By counting the points in each depth range, a feature vector with K elements for each stripe Sn is obtained.
The feature vector corresponds to the histogram of the stripe with respect to the bins given above. Figure 4.3
shows the division of the face area in several uniform horizontal stripes. The resulting feature is depicted in
Figure 4.4. The feature of every stripe is represented as a row in the image and the color indicates the percentage
of the number of points within the stripe falling into the respective bins.
The proposed algorithm adopts a simple statistical analysis to describe the geometrical characteristics of a
facial surface. Hetzel et al. [HLLS01] used a similar method to recognize different 3D objects. In my algo-
Figure 4.1.: Selecting the face region in the x-y view Figure 4.2.: Selected face region in the x-y view
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Figure 4.3.: Stripes division of the facial points in x-y
view
Figure 4.4.: An example of feature vector at N = 8 and
K = 7
rithm, the precise normalization of face range images enables classification based on the histogram-features. In
comparison to other approaches, it can be implemented in a very efficient way. The resulting feature is robust
to small variations of the facial points like slight normalization errors, or slight facial expressions and even to
larger variations such as spikes and holes. The distribution for each stripe is already normalized to the number
of points in the stripe such that small variations or normalization inaccuracies have only minor impact on the
feature vector.
Due to the inherent properties of the algorithm preprocessing steps like surface smoothing, interpolation of
holes in the surface or removal of outliers, which are crucial for e.g. PCA or LDA based recognition method, are
not strictly required. In the next section we present simulation results for the proposed algorithm.
4.1.2. Experimental Results
The proposed system has been implemented and tested with the database of face recognition grand challenge
[PFS∗05] (FRGC) version 1.0 and 2.0, which consist of 4950 range images from 547 subjects. The normalization
algorithm was implemented as a proof of concept. The current approach doesn’t perform optimally. 4522 range
images of the FRGC database have been normalized correctly. The failure to normalize rate is at 8.65%.
The range of valid facial region can be determined in a training process. 250 models of different subjects are
randomly chosen from the correctly normalized 3D models as training data. As the detection and removal of
outliers are computationally expensive, we use the percentile of depth values as bounding in order to suppress
the effect of outliers. In Figure 4.5 the candidates of the upper limit for each sub area are plotted, where the stripe
number increases from the lower jaw to the forehead. As shown in the lower sub figure, the circle marker of the
99.95 percentile has significant difference in stripes 4, 10, 11 and 12 to the magenta cross of the local maximum
and it is more robust to the outliers in the data set. The variation of the 99.95, 99.9 and 99.5 percentile in nose
area (stripes 6 to 10) is relatively small as shown in the upper figure, since the nose tip is defined as the origin and
the normalization is oriented according to the form of the nose. It indicates also that the normalization is very
precise. In other areas such as the mouth and forehead stripes the difference is high. Especially, the variation
of stripes 15, 16 and 17 is extremely high. In these areas the data is disturbed by the hair, therefore, their upper
limit is taken from the adjacent area, stripe 14.
After determining the facial region, the proposed feature extraction algorithm is applied to the selected facial
regions of the correctly normalized 3D models. The face region is divided into N stripes. The feature vector of
each stripe is calculated in K continuous depth values intervals. The resulting feature vector consists of N×K
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components. To compare the features, different metrics can be utilized. We tested our results with three different
metrics. Other metrics such as maximum likelihood, support vector machine can also be used. Given two feature
vectors V = {vi} and U = {ui}, the city block metric is defined as:
L1 =∑
i
|vi−ui| (4.3)
The Euclidean distance can be calculated with:
L2 =
√
∑
i
(vi−ui)2 (4.4)
And the correlation is calculated as follows 4:
C = 1− (V −µV )
T
(U−µU )
σUσV
(4.5)
where µV , µU are the mean of the feature vectors, σV ,σU are their standard deviations.
For N = 67 and K = 6, the ROC curves using different metrics are depicted in Figure 4.6. The use of different
metrics has a strong effect on the verification performance. The comparator using city block metric gives the best
results: the red line of its ROC curve is above the blue line of Euclidean distance and the green of correlation.
The correlation comparator is slightly better than the Euclidean distance comparator.
Changing the parameters N and K influences the robustness and discriminative power of the algorithm. If K
remains constant and the facial region is divided into different segments, Figure 4.7 shows that both FNMR and
FMR shift to left by decreasing N. A small N increases the number of evaluated points per stripe. Therefore, the
robustness of the resulting features is improved, however, their discriminative power reduces. Similarly, if N is
fixed and different depth value division is chosen, both FNMR and FMR move to left by reducing K as shown
in Figure 4.8. So enlarging the number of evaluated depth regions strongly enhances discriminative power and
4Normally, the correlation indicates the similarity of the templates. In order to compare it with the other distance-based comparators, the
comparison score C is one minus the correlation coefficient.
40
4. Evaluation of Template Protection for 3D Face Recognition
reduces robustness. The adjustment of K and N is dependent on the size of facial region. Comparing Figures 4.7
and 4.8, changing K has a much stronger influence on the robustness and discriminative power than N. Similar
results can also be observed in Figure 4.9. The performance of the algorithm is dependent on K and N. The equal
error rates (EER) at different N and K are shown in Table 4.1. The best equal error rate of 5.89% is achieved at
N = 67 and K = 12.
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N K EER
67 3 7.36%
28 6 6.18%
48 6 6.13%
67 6 6.00%
67 12 5.90%
Table 4.1.: EER at different N and K.
In this section a 3D face recognition algorithm was introduced and its recognition performance in the FRGC
database was evaluated. In the next section a template protection algorithm is integrated to protect the 3D facial
features.
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4.2. The Fuzzy Commitment Scheme for 3D Face Recognition
The fuzzy commitment scheme is proposed in [JW99]. As shown in Section 2.2.1, it is one of the most suc-
cessful template protection algorithms and has been implemented in different kinds of biometric systems. We
showed in the previous section that the extracted 3D face features are vectors with a fixed length and have good
robustness. The integration of fuzzy commitment is very promising. In this section, we show the details of the
fuzzy commitment implementation in the 3D face recognition system.
4.2.1. Implementation of the Fuzzy Commitment Scheme
Fuzzy commitment binds unique secrets to biometric data. It combines error correction coding and cryptography
so that reliable secret regeneration from noisy data is possible. Helper data is necessary to compensate the noise
during biometric acquisitions. Therefore, fuzzy commitment is a kind of helper data scheme [Tuy04]. The
helper data is the auxiliary data defined in the ISO standard [ISO11]. It is not allowed to reveal information
about secrets. In the following we show the fuzzy commit scheme for 3D face recognition. The block diagram is
depicted in Figure 4.10.
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Figure 4.10.: The block diagram of the fuzzy comment scheme for 3D face recognition
A biometric template M is extracted from a biometric sample. In the enrollment process, the binarization
converts the biometric template M into a binary vector Q. The binarization should make Q uniformly distributed
for different users and invariant for identical user. The binarization is detailed described in Section 4.2.1.1. The
random number generator creates randomly a secret S. The hash h(S) is the pseudonymous identifier and stored
as a part of the secure template. The error correction encoder adds redundancy and produces a codeword C,
which is longer than S. Depending on the property of bit errors, different error correction codes can be adopted.
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To correct uniformly distributed bit errors, the BCH- code can be used. It has a codeword length of 2L−1 (L is a
natural number). If the length of the bit string Q extends the length of the codeword C, only the most reliable bits
in Q are selected so that the resulting binary string X is as long as the codeword C and robustness can be further
improved. R indicates the position of the reliable bits. W , the bitwise XOR of X and C, is the so-called helper
data. With the help of W , the same secret S can be regenerated in the verification process. Only the position
vector R, the helper data W , the hashed secret code h(S) and user identity information are stored in data storage.
Ideally, both W and h(S) should reveal little information about S.
During the verification process, R, W and h(S) are released from data storage with a claimed identity. The
binary string Q′ is extracted from biometric template M′, which is a noise-distorted version of M. The binary
string X ′ is estimated with M′ and R. A corrupted codeword C′ can be acquired from W and X ′. The following
error correction decoder removes errors in C′ and outputs a secret S′. Comparing h(S) with h(S′), a positive
or negative verification response can be given. Only a “hard decision” (rejected or accepted) is given and no
similarity scores are available in the comparer of the fuzzy commitment system due to the hash function. Hill
climbing attack, which iteratively reconstructs biometric data using matching scores [Adl04,Sou02], is prevented.
The random number generator enables randomness in the system. Distinct secure templates can be created
from the same biometric for different applications. Additionally, revocation and reissuing of templates are en-
abled. Error correction coding eliminates bit errors due to variations in biometric measurements. The length of
the secret is restricted by the error correction ability, if the length of the codeword is fixed. Ideally, the secret
length should not be larger than the average min entropy of binary feature X given the helper data W [DORS08].
Binarization and selecting reliable bits are decisive to the recognition performance. In the following we introduce
their functionalities and constructions.
4.2.1.1. Binarization
Binarization is the core component of helper data scheme. The binarized features should be uniformly and in-
dependently distributed from the security point of view (see Section 3.4). Additionally, these features should
have good robustness to noise, since the error correction code has limited error correction ability. The binariza-
tion aims to extract a long uniformly and independently distributed bit string from biometric templates without
significant degradation of authentication performance.
We use here a simple method, which depends on the statistical analysis of the input biometric templates. As-
suming that a training set contains N subjects and each subject has K samples and Mn,k =
[
mn,k,1,mn,k,2, · · · ,mn,k,T
]
is the template with T components extracted from the k-th samples of the subject n, where k ∈ {1, · · · ,K} and
n ∈ {1, · · · ,N}. Assume that each component is statistically independent and at least one bit can be extracted
from each component, the binarization function B can be defined as:
qn,t = Bk∈[1,··· ,K](mn,k,t) =
{
1 if µn,t ≥ µt
0 if µn,t < µt
(4.6)
where µn,t is an estimation of the real feature component for subject n and the binarization threshold µt is the
median of µn,t over all the subjects in order to achieve the uniform distribution of binary vectors. Instead of
the median, the mean can also be adopted. If the training set is large enough, there is no significant difference
between median and mean. In practice, we suggest to use median, which is resistant to outliers caused by measure
errors.
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4.2.1.2. Selection of Reliable Bits
Selecting reliable bits contributes to the robustness of the system. It is based on the estimation of the error
probability for each bit. Only the bits with the lowest error probability are selected. Error probability depends
on the distance between µn,t and µt . For a relatively stable bit, its µn,t is far from µt . On the other hand, intraclass
variation is also decisive for error probability. The smaller the intraclass variation is, the more reliable is the
corresponding bit.
Statistical analysis of intraclass characteristics for each subject has a major effect on the performance of se-
lecting reliable bits. If biometric templates are Gaussian distributed, then:
µn,t = E
{
mn,k,t
}
(4.7)
p˜n,t =
|µn,t −µt |
σn,t
(4.8)
where E is the function calculating the expected value, σn,t is the standard deviation of mn,k,t for k ∈ [1, · · · ,K].
p˜n,t is derived from the Gaussian error function and shows the strength of the error probability of the t-th com-
ponent of subject n, (see also [vdVKS∗06]). The smaller the p˜n,t is, the lower is the error probability.
If the templates are uniformly distributed, then µn,t and p˜n,t can be calculated with:
µn,t = median
{
mn,k,t
}
(4.9)
p˜n,t = |µn,t −µt | (4.10)
Actually, a reliable estimation of error probabilities is only possible with a sufficient number of enrolment sam-
ples. However, in practice, we can not make too many acquirements during an enrolment. Gaussian distribution
is commonly used in the case of lack of information about a random variable. In the next section we show the
recognition performance of the implemented fuzzy commitment scheme for 3D face recognition.
4.2.2. Experimental Results
We have implemented the template protection algorithm in the 3D face recognition system described in Section
4.1.1. As proof of concept, we firstly evaluate the recognition performance with a subset of FRGC version 1.0.
Later we give an enormous evaluation with the test data from both FRGC database version 1.0 and 2.0 [PFS∗05].
4.2.2.1. Results with Small Dataset
A small-scale experiment is done with FRGC v1.0. During the test, 99 of 289 subjects are chosen, who have at
least 4 samples. Three samples per subject are randomly chosen as enrolment data and one sample as verification
data. The tests are repeated 4 times and different enrolment samples are chosen each time. A feature vector is
extracted from 68 sub-areas of the normalised facial image and consists of 68× 6 = 408 real values. The false
match rate (FMR) and false non-match rate (FNMR) using the correlation classifier are plotted in Figure 4.11.
The equal error rate (EER) is equal to 3.38%.
Then, we use the above mentioned binarization function to convert the extracted feature vectors into binary
strings. The receiver operation characteristic (ROC) curves before and after binarization are plotted in Figure
4.12. The solid line of the binary vectors is obviously above the dashed line of the real-valued feature vector. That
is to say, binarization function improves slightly the authentication performance. Generally, a good binarization
function should not result strong degradation of the recognition performance.
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Figure 4.11.: Classification results of the histogram-
based face recognition algorithm
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Figure 4.12.: ROC curves of real-valued feature vec-
tors and binary feature vectors
In the previous experiment, the median is adopted to calculate the binarization thresholds. If we compare
the FMR and FNMR curves of the binarization using median (the blue ones) and mean (the red ones in Figure
4.13), there is no significant difference regarding recognition performance. Both EER are around 3%, however,
the FNMR-curve of mean-based binary vectors deviates from the probability-axis in comparison with the one of
median-based binary vectors. The median-based binarization has higher robustness to noise. This makes it better
than the mean-based binarization, since the performance of fuzzy commitment is restricted by errors occurring
in the binary feature vectors.
BCH (LC,LS,LE) Correctable BER Results for uniform distribution Results for Gaussian distribution
255, 107, 22 8.6% FNMR=12%; FMR=0.4% FNMR=21%; FMR≈ 0
255, 91, 25 9.8% FNMR=11%; FMR=0.6% FNMR=16%; FMR=0.2%
255, 79, 27 10.5% FNMR=10%; FMR=0.7% FNMR=13%; FMR=0.3%
Table 4.2.: Examples of possible BCH code settings and the corresponding FNMR and FMR
In the implemented scheme, a BCH-code is chosen as error correction code. The maximum length of a
codeword below 408 is 255. The 255 most reliable bits are selected from the 408-bits long binary vector. The
classification results under the assumption of uniformly distributed templates and Gaussian distributed templates
are shown in Figure 4.14. Both classification results are similar. Under the assumption of uniform distribution,
the robustness is better than under the assumption of Gaussian distribution, however, the discriminative power is
slightly worse.
We denote LC, LS, and LE as the codeword length, the secret length and the number of correctable bit errors
respectively. With the BCH-code, only certain combinations of LC, LS, and LE are possible. Several examples
and their corresponding Bit Error Rate (BER), FNMR and FMR are given in Table 4.2. For all the settings, the
FNMR under the assumption of uniform distribution is significantly better than under the assumption of Gaussian
distribution, while its FMR decreases slightly.
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4.2.2.2. Results with Full Dataset
We extend our experiments with all range images from face recognition grant challenge (FRGC) database version
1.0 and 2.0. There are 4950 range images from 547 different subjects. Only 380 subjects have more than 4
samples. 3 samples per subject are randomly chosen as enrolment samples and the rests are for verification. The
tests are repeated 4 times.
Figure 4.15 and 4.16 show the influence of binarization on the recognition performance. Each line represents
a ROC curve of real-valued or binary features by a setting of N×K, (N is the number of stripes, K is the number
of bins in histogram calculation and N×K is the length of the feature vectors). The solid lines - ROC curves of
binary features - are below the dashed lines of real-valued features. The performance is degraded after applying
binarization. The degradation is strong in the area of small FMR (FMR < 0.1). Changing the parameters of
N and K, the effects on real-valued and binary features are very similar: the performance is improved with
increasing K and there are no significant changes by changing N.
After the binarization process, the most reliable bits are selected in order to fit the length of the BCH-codeword.
The performance of selected bits at different length LC of 127, 255 and 511 is shown in Figures 4.17 and 4.18.
The performance changes in the area of large FMR are not as significant as in the area of small FMR. As de-
scribed in Section 4.2.1.2, different estimation methods of error probability, namely Gaussian model and uniform
distribution model (using median) are tested. Figure 4.17 shows that the dashed lines of the results using median
are below the solid lines of the Gaussian model. The Gaussian model gives more reliable error estimation in com-
parison with the median. In Figure 4.18, we can see that the best three ROC curves are at (LC = 255,68× 13),
(LC = 255,68×7) and, (LC = 127,68×13). The best setting of LC is 255. A longer LC cannot always improve
the performance. For instance, for biometric features with a length of m = 68× 13 = 884, the performance of
LC = 511 is the worst one in LC ∈ {127,255,511}. The black dash-dotted line is the best ROC curve of binary
features without feature selection. It is very close to the three best ones with selected features. Therefore, the
selection influences slightly the performance.
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Figure 4.15.: ROC curves of real-valued and binary
features at N = 68
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Figure 4.16.: ROC curves of real-valued and binary
features at K = 7
Figure 4.19 shows the performance after applying the fuzzy commitment scheme. FMR and FNMR at some
sampled operational points are given in Table 4.3. The best recognition performance is achieved with m =
68×13. The codeword length LC = 255 is the best for all possible feature lengths.
m = 28×7 = 196 m = 68×13 = 884
(LC,LS,LE) FNMR FMR (LC,LS,LE) FNMR FMR
(127, 8, 31) 4.28% 6.06% (127, 29, 21) 3.88% 6.32%
(127, 15, 27) 6.90% 4.14% (127, 36, 15) 7.42% 3.43%
(127, 29, 21) 13.20% 2.16% (127, 50, 13) 9.27% 2.62%
m = 68×7 = 476 (127, 64, 10) 13.64% 1.59%
(127, 15, 27) 2.25% 9.33% (127, 71, 9) 15.61% 1.29%
(127, 29, 21) 4.13% 6.03% ( 255, 29, 47) 4.81% 5.13%
(127, 43, 14) 9.22% 3.09% (255, 37, 45) 5.28% 4.68%
(127, 64, 10) 14.75% 1.72% (255, 47, 42) 6.09% 4.03%
(255, 21, 55) 4.58% 5.28% (255, 55, 31) 11.44% 2.04%
( 255, 29, 47) 7.07% 3.59% (255, 71, 29 ) 12.86% 1.73%
(255, 37, 45) 7.96% 3.21% (255, 87, 26) 15.43% 1.34%
(255, 47,42) 9.64% 2.75% (511, 19, 119) 7.40% 3.84%
(255, 55, 31) 17.68% 1.32% (511, 31, 109) 9.98% 2.79%
(255 , 71, 29 ) 19.97% 1.12% (511, 49, 93) 16.08% 1.59%
Table 4.3.: FNMR and FMR at different coding settings and feature lengths
In comparison with the results in the previous section, the recognition performance becomes worse. Here
the full FRGC dataset is used, which includes challenging samples with strong variations. The reliability of
the feature extraction algorithm has to be improved. The performance improvement with binarization cannot
be observed any more. However, binarization has only a minor influence on the performance. The selection of
the reliable bits can filter the unreliable bits and choose the stable bits individually for each subject. Therefore,
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form distribution
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Figure 4.19.: ROC curves after applying fuzzy commitment
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the performance after selection does not change. Although error probability estimation with median delivers
better results in the previous section, the opposite result is obtained with the full dataset. On the one hand, the
error probability estimation is dependent on the dataset. On the other hand, Gaussian distribution shows better
generalizability than the uniform distribution. In practice the best setting of a system can be found with well
chosen training data and a good training algorithm. Additionally, a longer secret is desired for security reason.
However, the length of the secret is limited by the robustness of the features, since the BCH-code can only correct
about 25% bit errors. In this section we focused on the recognition performance of the fuzzy commitment system.
In the next section we focus on the security and privacy assessment.
4.3. Privacy and Security Assessment
In this section we evaluate security and privacy of the developed fuzzy commitment system for 3D face recogni-
tion. Here we assume the advanced threat model. The assessment of “naive attack model” and “collision model”
will be shown in Section 6.1.1.
4.3.1. Statistical Properties of the 3D Face Features
Section 3.4.1 showed that a fuzzy commitment scheme is perfectly secure if input biometric features are uni-
formly and independently distributed. In this section we examine whether the binary 3D facial features fulfill
this requirement or not. Furthermore, the statistical properties of the features are analyzed.
The binary features are binarized from the real-valued features with interclass means. Let X = [x1,x2, · · · ,xm]
be a m-bit long facial feature. A uniformly distributed bit has p(xi = 1) = p(xi = 0) = 0.5. We give an estimation
of p(xi) with the interclass mean of xi and denote it as pˆ(xi). The number of samples to estimate p(xi) is limited
and pˆ(xi) may be different from the real p(xi). Assuming that pˆ(xi) is estimated from n independent trials. The
confidence interval of pˆ(xi) with probability 1−α/2 can be calculated as follows:
pˆ(xi)± z1−α/2
√
pˆ(xi)(1− pˆ(xi))
n
(4.11)
where z1−α/2 is 1−α/2 percentile of a standard normal distribution [Ken64]. If xi were uniformly distributed,
then 0.5 should be within the confidence interval of pˆ(xi):
pˆ(xi)− z1−α/2
√
pˆ(xi)(1− pˆ(xi))
n
≤ 0.5 ≤ pˆ(xi)+ z1−α/2
√
pˆ(xi)(1− pˆ(xi))
n
1
2
− 1
2
1√
1+ n
z21−α/2
≤ pˆ(xi) ≤ 12 +
1
2
1√
1+ n
z21−α/2
(4.12)
We evaluate the distribution of the binary features with the length of 196, 476 and 884. These settings are
representative for other settings and have relatively good performance (see Section 4.2.2.2). The 95% confidence
interval with z95 = 1.96 is chosen. The features are derived from different 380 subjects and n = 380. If 45% ≤
pˆ(xi) ≤ 55%, the expected probability of 0.5 is within the 95% confidence interval of pˆ(xi) and xi can be seen
as uniformly distributed. Figure 4.20 depicts pˆ(xi) at different settings. Obviously many bits are not within the
desired interval: only 75 of 196 bits, 196 of 476 bits and 289 of 884 bits can be seen as uniformly distributed. It
is about 30%-40% of all the bits in binary features.
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Figure 4.21 shows some examples of the interclass distribution of real-valued features. Some features can not
be converted into uniformly distributed bits as shown in the histogram of x116 on the left of the figure. It contains
a lot of zeros. Such features occur often at the smallest or largest bins in the depth value interval in a stripe during
feature extraction. On the other hand, there are some real-valued skew-distributed features (e.g. the histogram
on the right of the figure). Their binarization results are much more sensitive to the variation of the thresholds
in comparison to those symmetrically distributed features as show in the middle of the figure. It is not always
possible to achieve a uniform distribution in practice.
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Figure 4.20.: pˆ(xi) for m= 196,476,884 (blue line with circles) and the expected range [0.45, 0.55] of a uniform
distribution (red solid-dashed lines).
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Figure 4.21.: The interclass histograms of different real-valued features for m = 476 (the number of the bins is
50).
Most of the bits in the feature are not uniformly distributed. Moreover, we analyze their dependency. We
denote the probability of feature X = [x1,x2, · · ·xm] as P(x1,x2, · · ·xm). It is very hard to estimate the probability
distribution of high dimensional data. Here I make a simplification and describe P(x1,x2, · · ·xm) with a second-
order dependency tree:
Pˆ(x1,x2, · · · ,xm) =
m
∏
i=1
P(xui |xu j(i)) (4.13)
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where [u1,u2, · · · ,um] is a permutation of index [1,2, · · · ,m], 0 ≤ j(i) < i and P(xu1 |xu j(1)) = P(xu1). Chow and
Liu analyzed how to optimize this estimation in the sense of Kullback-Leibler distance [CL68]. Therefore, Eq
4.13 is also called Chow-Liu representation. The definition of Kullback-Leibler distance is given in Eq A.15 of
Appendix A.1.
The Kullback-Leibler distance between the real distribution of X and the second-order dependency tree is
dependent on the following variables [CL68]:
D(P(X)||Pˆ(X)) =−
m
∑
i=1
I(xui ,xu j(i))+
m
∑
i=1
H(xui)−H(X) (4.14)
The last two terms - the entropy of X and the sum of the entropy of individual bits - are constant. Minimiz-
ing the estimation error in the sense of Kullback-Leibler distance is equivalent to maximizing ∑m1 I(xui ,xu j(i)).
Then finding the best estimation Pˆ(x1,x2, · · · ,xm) is to determine optimal [u1,u2, · · ·um], the tree structure, which
maximizes ∑m1 I(xui ,xu j(i)).
The entropy of X can be estimated with Pˆ(X). According to the chain rule of the joint entropy:
Hˆ(X) = Hˆ(xu1 ,xu2 , · · · ,xum)
= H(xu1)+
m
∑
i=2
H(xui |xu j(i))
=
m
∑
i=1
H(xui)− max
[u1,··· ,um]
{ m
∑
i=1
I(xui ,xu j(i))
}
(4.15)
In the experiments, the mutual information I(xi,xi′) for all i, i′ ∈ [1,2, · · · ,m] and i 6= i′ is calculated. If xi and
xi′ are independent, I(xi,xi′) = 0. If they are totally dependent on each other, then I(xi,xi′) = H(xi) = H(xi′).
The sum of the mutual information is maximized with a hierarchical clustering method and the corresponding
permutation of feature vectors is returned. The database contains 4 subsets generated with different enrolment
samples. We take one subset as a training set and estimate [u1,u2, · · ·um] and Hˆ(X) with the second order
dependency tree. Then we apply the resulting tree structure to the remaining 3 subsets and calculated Hˆ(X). The
experimental results are shown in Table 4.4.
If X were uniformly independently distributed, its entropy should be equal to the feature length. Obviously,
the estimated entropy is much smaller, since the dependency of features is taken into account. The features
of m = 196 have the highest information rate. However, the corresponding recognition performance is spoiled
due to the poor discriminative power. A trade-off between security and recognition performance is necessary.
Although the tree structures trained with different datasets are similar, variations of 17.4 bits, 21.9 bits and 69
bits between training and testing can be observed for m = 196,476,884 respectively. The estimation results are
sensitive to the change of the tree structure. If high order dependency between features is taken into account and a
sufficient amount of training data is available, the estimation will be more stable. Despite that, the uncertainty of
X reduces strongly when applying the training structure on the testing data. Additionally, the standard deviation
of the results is very small. It means that the estimation of Hˆ(X) with training and testing set is very reliable.
The entropy Hˆ(X) only shows the properties of interclass distribution. The security and recognition perfor-
mance of fuzzy commitment are based on both interclass and intraclass distributions.
Moreover, Hˆ(X) is an approximation of the real entropy. More accurate estimation is possible, if high order
dependency of the features is analyzed. The dependency in binary features inherits the real valued features.
Figure 4.22 shows the correlation of the 3D face features before and after binarization. The correlation between
features remains after binarization. The binarization method shown in Section 4.2.1.1 is not optimal and not
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m
Hˆ(X) Hˆ(X)/m
Training Testing
Training Testing
Mean Std Mean Std
196 88.4 0.31 105.8 0.32 0.451 0.539
476 153.7 1.51 175.6 1.45 0.323 0.370
884 280.2 1.67 349.2 2.62 0.317 0.395
Table 4.4.: The mean and standard deviation of the estimated entropy (in bits) and the information rate for the
training and testing set
suitable for binarizing dependent features. A better alternative of binarization might be to group the highly
correlated features and binarize them together in order to get more independent and reliable bits.
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Figure 4.22.: Correlation coefficients of the real-valued features (left) and the binary features (right) at m = 476
(The color indicates the absolute values of the correlation coefficients.)
In this section we analysed the distribution of binary facial features. They are neither totally uniformly nor
independently distributed. We used the second order dependency tree to simulate their distribution and estimated
the entropy as well. In the following section we analyse the influence of the dependent features on the security
and privacy of the template protection system.
4.3.2. Assessment of Privacy and Security
In this section we measure privacy and security of the protected 3D face system with information-theoretical
metrics. We can give an upper bound of the security based on the knowledge about systems and statistical
properties of X . Based upon this, we evaluate the privacy protection ability.
In fuzzy commitment, helper data W = C⊕X , where C is a (n,k)-codeword of S, where n is the codeword
length and k is the secret length. Assuming that C is a linear block code with C = S ·G:
(c1, · · · ,cn) = (s1, · · · ,sk) ·
g
1
1 · · · gn1
...
. . .
...
g1k · · · gnk
 (4.16)
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where g ji is the element at the i-th row and the j column in the k×n generator matrix G. The rank of G is denoted
as rG = Rank(G) = k. We denote gi as the i-th row of G and g j as the j-th column of G. Each bit in C is a linear
combination of S with a corresponding column vector in G:
c j = (s1, · · · ,sk) ·g j (4.17)
In order to retrieve S, at least k bits in C must be known:
(s1, · · · ,sk) = (cu1 , · · · ,cuk) · (gu1 , · · · ,guk)−1 (4.18)
where u = [u1, · · · ,uk] ⊂ [1, · · · ,n] is the index vector of the bits selected from C and gui is the corresponding
column vector of cui in G as shown in Eq 4.17. An inverse matrix of (g
u1 , · · · ,guk) exists, if and only if its rank
is equal to k. Then an upper bound of H(S|W ) can be given:
H(S|W ) = H(xu1 ,xu2 , · · · ,xuk |W ) (4.19)
≤ H(xu1 ,xu2 , · · · ,xuk) (4.20)
The first equation is valid, since S can be calculated with W and xu1 ,xu2 , · · · ,xuk , if Rank{(gu1 , · · · ,guk)} = k.
The second inequality is valid due to the chain rule of joint information.
Recall that Eq 3.9 in Section 3.4.1 shows: H(S|W ) = H(X |W ) = H(S) +H(X)−H(W ). Given an error
correction code and biometric features, H(S) = LS and H(X) are constant. Therefore, a coding process should
be optimized to minimize H(W ).
In our protected 3D face recognition system (see Section 4.2.1), the BCH-code is used. The BCH-coding
method is introduced in Section B.2. The BCH-code is a systematic code, which consists of k secret bits and
n− k redundant bits. It is sufficient to retrieve S, if the first k elements in X are successfully guessed. Therefore,
we can use a sub-optimal method to give an approximation of H(S|W ) with the entropy of the first k bits in X .
The mutual I(xi,x j) for all i, j ∈ [1, · · · ,m] and i 6= j is calculated. And LC is denoted as the codeword length.
For each subject, the enrolled secure template is loaded. The secure template contains the position vector U ,
which is the index of the LC most reliable bits in X . U = [u1,u2, · · · ,uLS , · · · ,uLC ] and U ⊂ [1, · · · ,m]. Figure
4.23 shows the information rate of the selected binary feature Hˆ(XLC1 )/LC at different settings. Comparing
with Hˆ(Xm1 )/m shown in Table 4.4, the selected bits become more uncorrelated, since less bits are used. The
information rate decreases with increasing number of selected bits. The information rate at m= 196 and m= 884
is higher than that of m= 476 at the same LC. The variation of the boxplot of Hˆ(X
LC
1 )/LC is due to the difference
of the selected reliable bits between the subjects.
We give an approximation Hˆ(S|W ) = Hˆ(xu1 , · · · ,xuLS ) and use it to measure the security of the system. Here
the bits [xu1 , · · · ,xuLS ] are those corresponding to the secret S. Then the entropy of these features is calculated
using Eq. 4.15. The variation of Hˆ(xu1 , · · · ,xuLS ) is shown as the boxplot in Figure 4.24. Hˆ(xu1 , · · · ,xuLS ) is not
the half of LS. Strong degradation of security is observed here. Additionally for the same LS, Hˆ(xu1 , · · · ,xuLS ) of
m = 196 and m = 884 is higher than m = 476. The variation of Hˆ(xu1 , · · · ,xuLS ) increases with LS. Additionally
the boxplot shows strong variations of Hˆ(xu1 , · · · ,xuLS ). The variation also increases with LS. For instance, the
minimum and the maximum at m = 476 and LS = 71 have 18 bits difference. It shows that the system provides
different security to various subjects. In practice, we should set a minimum security number and the system
should achieve this for all the subjects.
We show the results with different settings in detail in Table 4.5. The security increases with secret size, since
the uncertainty of the secret is enlarged. In the current estimation, only the first LS bits in the selected binary
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Figure 4.23.: Boxplot of Hˆ(XLC1 )/LC at different m and LC
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Figure 4.24.: Boxplot of Hˆ(xu1 , · · · ,xuLS ) at different LS
feature are used. Eq 4.20 shows that this results is a close upper bound of H(S|W ). In the optimal estimation, all
LS bits combinations should be tested, whose corresponding bits in the codeword can reveal the remaining bits.
Additionally, the influence of W should be taken into account.
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If we estimate S with W and [xu1 , · · · ,xuLS ], then the conditional guessing entropy G(S|W ) is approximately
equal to the guessing entropy of [xu1 , · · · ,xuLS ]. Eq A.19 in Appendix A.2 shows the relation between guessing
entropy and entropy. From Eq A.19, we can give the following lower bound of G(S|W ):
Gˆ(S|W ) = G(xu1 ,xu2 , · · · ,xuLS )
≥ 2H(xu1 ,xu2 ,··· ,xuLS )−2+1 (4.21)
Privacy protection ability is another important evaluation criteria. In the fuzzy commitment scheme, the pri-
vacy is strongly related to the security. If the secret S is compromised, the biometric feature X
uLC
u1 = [xu1 , · · · ,xuLC ]
is also exposed. Depending on the requirements of applications, privacy can also be measured regarding real-
valued feature M or acquired biometric samples. Along data flow in biometric systems, information about raw
biometric data reduces. For instance, a 3D range image contains more information about the 3D face than the
extracted facial feature. In this section we only look at the privacy regarding binary feature X 5. We use the
conditional entropy to quantify the irreversibility of secure templates:
Hˆ(X
uLC
u1 |W ) = Hˆ(S|W ) = Hˆ(X
uLS
u1 ) (4.22)
Hˆ(X |W ) = Hˆ(XuLCu1 |W )+ Hˆ(XumuLC+1 |W,X
uLC
u1 )
(a)
= Hˆ(X
uLC
u1 |W )+ Hˆ(XumuLC+1 |X
uLC
u1 )
= Hˆ(X
uLS
u1 )+ Hˆ(X)− Hˆ(X
uLC
u1 ) (4.23)
the equality of (a) is valid, since W = X
uLC
u1 ⊕C and W gives no additional information about X
uLX
uLC+1
if X
uLC
u1 is
known.
The irreversibility shows the hardness to retrieve biometric data. Additionally, the information about biometric
data contained in secure templates needs to be measured, namely the privacy leakage. Irreversibility and privacy
leakage are not directly related. For instance, a protected biometric system can be very safe and it is hard for
an adversary to estimate biometric data, meanwhile, it can have high privacy leakage. The privacy leakage can
cause further security problems such as linkability. Therefore, it is important to evaluate privacy leakage. We use
the mutual information to assess the privacy leakage. With Eq 4.23 and Eq A.11, it can be calculated with:
Iˆ(X ;W ) = Hˆ(X
uLC
u1 )− Hˆ(X
uLS
u1 ) (4.24)
The equation shows that the privacy leakage is only related to the selected binary feature X
uLC
u1 .
Table 4.5 shows the experimental results of irreversibility and privacy leakage. For each setting, irreversibility
is larger than security. The binary feature is more secure than the secret, since several bits of the binary feature
are discarded and not used in the secure template generation. The privacy protection ability can be improved
with the enhanced security. For the same secret size, irreversibility of a short codeword is much higher than that
of a long codeword and privacy leakage is also much lower than the long codeword. For the settings with the
same feature size and codeword length, the irreversibility increases and privacy leakage reduces with the secret
size. It shows that the high secret size can improve irreversibility and reduce privacy leakage. It also confirms
the theoretical results of fuzzy commitment in the work of Ignatenko [Ign09].
5If the privacy of real-valued feature M need to be considered, the quantization loss during binarization process should be calculated, for
instance, using rate-distortion theory.
55
4. Evaluation of Template Protection for 3D Face Recognition
m LS
Security Irreversibility Privacy Leakage
Hˆ(S|W ) Hˆ(X |W ) Iˆ(X ;W )
mean min max LC = 127 LC = 255 LC = 127 LC = 255
196
8 3.35 2.52 5.60 24.4 - 64.0 -
15 6.21 4.26 8.46 27.3 - 61.1 -
29 12.08 9.57 16.60 33.2 - 55.2 -
476
21 5.29 3.45 8.97 - 62.7 - 91.0
29 7.35 4.36 12.59 109.0 64.8 44.7 88.9
37 9.37 5.58 16.50 - 66.8 - 86.9
47 11.95 7.20 20.73 - 69.4 - 84.3
55 14.14 8.79 24.48 - 71.6 - 82.1
71 18.72 13.13 31.57 - 76.2 - 77.5
884
29 9.44 5.03 16.50 231.3 182.7 48.9 97.5
37 12.09 6.60 20.72 - 185.3 - 94.9
47 15.41 8.37 25.27 - 188.6 - 91.6
55 18.10 10.89 28.28 - 191.3 - 88.9
71 23.74 13.96 34.52 - 197.0 - 83.2
87 29.64 17.51 42.44 - 202.9 - 77.3
Table 4.5.: Assessment of security, irreversibility and privacy leakage (in bits) at different secret length LS and
feature lengthm
If a fuzzy commitment scheme is perfectly secure, the uncertainty about the secret given the auxiliary data
is equal to the secret length. Our assessment shows that the developed system is far from perfect security. The
security and irreversibility are poor. Privacy leakage is quite high. It is possible to improve the security and
privacy performance to a certain extent by changing the coding construction. However, the perfect security
with fuzzy commitment can be achieved with uniformly and independently distributed binary features. More
appropriate efficient binarization process is necessary.
4.3.3. Assessment of Unlinkability
Section 3.4.2 elaborated linkage problems in fuzzy commitment. In the developed fuzzy commitment system for
3D face recognition, a secure template consists of [R,W,h(S)], where R is the vector indicating the positions of
the most reliable bits, W is the XOR of the selected binary biometric feature and the codeword of the secret S. In
this section we will carefully analyze auxiliary data R and W and examine the possibility of linkage attacks.
The position vector R is determined by the statistical properties of biometric features. It is user-specific. As
shown in Section 4.2.2, only LC bits are chosen from an m-bit feature vector. LC is the length of a BCH-codeword
and LC = 2N−1 for N ∈N . R = [r1,r2, · · · ,rLC ]⊆ [1,2, · · · ,m]. ||R|| is the number of all possible R:
||R||=
(
m
LC
)
(4.25)
An intersection function is used to measure the similarity of two position vectors R and R′ and is defined as:
InS(R,R′) = ||R∩ R′|| (4.26)
where InS(R,R′) ∈ {max{0,2LC−m}, · · · ,LC−1,LC}. If LC > m/2, InS(R,R′) is at least 2LC−m.
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We calculate the intersection of the stored position vectors in the dataset generated in Section 4.2.2. Between
different enrolment processes of a subject, at least one enrolled sample is different. The overlap between the
position vectors of the same subject is computed as well as that of different subjects.
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Figure 4.25.: The selection frequencies of individual bits for m = 884 and LC = {127,255,511}
We take the enrolment sets with m= 884 and different LC as examples and plot the frequencies in Figure 4.25,
that an individual bit is selected as a reliable one for all the subjects. It is shown that some bits are more reliable
and selected more frequently than others. There are also bits, which are never selected. Their corresponding
real-valued features are strongly skewed distributed and can not be binarized into uniformly distributed bits (see
Section 4.2.2) or their error probabilities are too high. The variations of the frequencies show that R is user-
specific and contains distinguishing information. Additionally, the local maxima of the frequencies are located
at the same positions and occur periodically. They are easier to recognise at smaller LC. Those are the features
with relatively good discriminative and robustness.
We calculate InS of position vectors at different settings. The range of interclass and intraclass InS is shown
in Table 4.6. For the same m, both intraclass and interclass InS increase with LC. The more features are selected,
the more overlapping occurs in R. The minimum of InSinter shows how many features are always selected in the
ranking list of the LC most reliable bits.
m 476 884
LC 127 255 127 255 511
InSinter
max 87 213 74 185 479
min 6 105 4 41 287
InSintra
max 119 249 114 241 503
min 35 149 21 86 359
Table 4.6.: The minimum and maximum of InS at different m and LC
Figures 4.26, 4.27, 4.28, and 4.29 show the recognition performance using the InS at different settings. Figures
4.26 and 4.28 show that for the same m, FMR and FNMR of different LC are located at different ranges of InS
57
4. Evaluation of Template Protection for 3D Face Recognition
(see also Table 4.6). Figure 4.27 shows that for m = 476, the performance of LC = 127 and LC = 255 are similar
and their equal error rate is about 5%. Figure 4.29 shows that for m = 884, the best performance can be achieved
at LC = 255 and the worst one is at LC = 511.
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Figure 4.26.: FMR and FNMR over InS at m = 476
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
FMR
1−
FN
M
R
m=476
 
 
LC=127
LC=255
Figure 4.27.: ROC curves using InS at m = 476
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Figure 4.28.: FMR and FNMR over InS at m = 887
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
FMR
1−
FN
M
R
m=884
 
 
LC=127
LC=255
LC=511
Figure 4.29.: ROC curves using InS at m = 887
At the same m, cross matching of two secure templates is possible, even if different codeword lengths are used.
We denote LC1 as the codeword length used in one enrolment and LC2 as the codeword length used in the other
enrolment. Figures 4.30 and 4.31 show the performance comparing R generated with different codeword lengths.
Figure 4.30 shows that all intraclass InS stop at min{LC1,LC2}. Figure 4.31 shows that the setting of m = 884,
LC1 = 127, and LC2 = 255 gives the best performance. The performance of m = 884, LC1 = 255, and LC2 = 511
is similar to m = 476, LC1 = 127, and LC2 = 255. The setting of m = 884, LC1 = 127, and LC2 = 511 is the worst
one. A large difference between LC1 and LC2 reduces the performance.
Figure 4.32 compares the performance of cross matching using R, the real-valued features and selected binary
features. The performance of m = 887 is better than m = 476 in all the cases. Using LC = 255 is also better
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Figure 4.30.: FMR and FNMR over InS of different
LC
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Figure 4.31.: ROC curves using InS of different LC
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Figure 4.32.: ROC curves using R, real-valued features and selected binary features
than LC = 127 or 511. In the region FMR > 0.7%, the performance using R at m = 884 and LC = 255 is the
best and is even better than that of the real-valued features and the selected binary features. The performance
of real-valued and binary features is obtained with 3 enrolled samples and 1 probe sample per comparison. The
results using R are from two different enrolment sets, that is comparable with the scenarios using 3 enrolled
samples and 3 probe samples in the normal recognition. Additionally, the same samples can be reused in other
enrolments. Nevertheless, in the 3D face recognition algorithm, the reliability of individual features is not taken
59
4. Evaluation of Template Protection for 3D Face Recognition
into account. This experiment shows that R contains significant information about the subjects and is very useful
for cross matching.
In order to avoid cross matching with the position vector R, we can change feature selection strategy. For
instance, the same bits can be chosen for all the subjects in such a way that the general performance is optimized.
As a consequence, the performance of individual subject is not optimal and the performance will be reduced in
comparison with the current selection method. Alternatively, we can reduce the dimension of the feature to the
length of the error correction codeword. However if no position vector is used, fuzzy commitment is vulnerable
to indistinguishability attack proposed in [STP09] and the XOR of auxiliary data W of the same subject is
decodable. In this case, even if two auxiliary data are generated with different secret size but the same codeword
length, this attack is still possible. As shown in Section B.2 the BCH codewords of a short secret length are a
subset of the codewords of a long secret length.
As described in Section 4.2.2, the auxiliary data W contains privacy information and can be used to distinguish
different subjects. Table 4.6 shows that the maximum InSintra is always smaller than LC. InS is the number
of bits, which are selected in both enrolment processes. The selected features for the same subject are never
totally identical and their Hamming distance can be very large due to the shifting of bit positions. Therefore,
the indistinguishability attack is no longer feasible. We test this attack for two settings. At m = 476, LC = 255,
LS = 29, and LE = 47, there are 50.96% genuine subjects, which can not be recognized with the decoding method.
At m = 884, LC = 255, LS = 29, and LE = 47, it increases to 99.78%. There is no advantage in identifying a
subject with the XOR of auxiliary data W . However, if we increase the number of samples used in enrolment,
the bit selection becomes more and more stable. If the same reliable bits are selected in every enrolment, the
indistinguishability attack of W might be possible.
Additionally since the selected reliable bits in enrolments are different, the secure templates of the same
subjects contain the information about different feature part. Combining them can expose more information
about biometric features.
4.4. Summary
In this chapter we developed a 3D face recognition system and integrated the fuzzy commitment scheme to
protect 3D face features. We applied the evaluation framework on the protected system and assessed strictly its
security and privacy performance.
The developed 3D face recognition algorithm uses the distribution of depth values of the face surface to
characterize facial geometry. The algorithm is evaluated in the FRGC database. The intraclass variation of the
resulting features is small. It enables a smooth integration of the fuzzy commitment scheme and it is easy to find
appropriate a coding method. In the fuzzy commitment implementation, the BCH code is used and long secrets
can be extracted. The recognition performance is only slightly degraded.
We analyzed the distribution of 3D face features and estimated the probability distribution with the second
order dependency tree. The features are highly dependent and their entropy is calculated. Furthermore, we
evaluated the security and privacy with information-theoretical metrics. The achieved security is much smaller
than the secret size. Since not all the bits in a feature are used in fuzzy commitment, the complexity to retrieve
a biometric feature is higher than guessing a secret. Additionally, high privacy leakage exists. Increasing secret
size can improve both the security and irreversibility, meanwhile, privacy leakage can be reduced. The position
vectors of the selected vectors contain personal identifiable information. Cross matching is possible and evaluated
with the recognition performance. Linking the auxiliary data - the XOR of biometric features and codewords -
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is infeasible, however, combining two different auxiliary data of the same subject can expose more information
about biometric features.
The security of a fuzzy commitment scheme is strongly dependent on the entropy of the auxiliary data. The
security can be improved by e.g. permutation of biometric features in such a way that the entropy of the auxiliary
data increases. On the other hand, the security is influenced by the selection of binary features. During the
feature selection, not only the reliability of features but also the entropy of selected features should be taken into
account. Selection of less dependent features can improve the security.
With the evaluation framework, we are able to give a rigorous assessment of the system. We disclosed that the
dependency of 3D face features reduces significantly security and privacy. Linkability is a serious problem and
is hard to prevent with the current construction.
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In this chapter we demonstrate the developed framework in a template protection system for iris recognition. We
first give a brief introduction of iris recognition. Together with face and fingerprint, iris belongs to the biometric
modalities recommended by ICAO for the use in biometric passports. Iris patterns contain rich information and
enable reliable authentication. Iris features are extracted with an open source algorithm. The feature extraction
algorithm used in this chapter is a revised version of the Gabor filter method proposed by Daugman, which is the
most important iris recognition algorithm. Additionally, we implement the existing fuzzy commitment algorithm
for iris recognition introduced by Hao. The main contribution of this chapter is to evaluate the protected iris
recognition system. We analyze the distribution of iris codes and use a Markov model to describe the dependency
of iris codes. Furthermore, we measure three protection goals of the protected system, namely security, privacy
protection ability and unlinkability. Here we assume the advanced threat model. We also design a cracking
algorithm to empirically quantify the complexity of retrieving iris codes. We compare the results of theoretical
and practical assessments. A discussion on the possibility to improve the security and the boundary of security
performance is given at the end.
5.1. Iris Recognition
5.1.1. An Overview of Iris Recognition
Iris is a part of the eye responsible for controlling diameter and size of pupils [NST06]. It is a biometric modality
inside the body and visible from outside. In 1987, Flomand and Safir awarded a patent and proposed the idea of
iris recognition. Later in 1994, Daugman awarded a patent with an automatic iris recognition algorithm [tag06].
Thereafter iris recognition technologies are more mature and widely used in border control, access control etc.
Many airports in England and the Netherlands chose iris for quick crossing border [HO,Pri]. Due to ethics issues,
iris recognition techniques are very popular in Arabian countries [DM04]. Nowadays, iris becomes one of the
most important biometric modalities.
The iris appears between pupil and sclera as shown in Figure 5.1. It contains fine patterns and is suitable to
distinguish individuals. Most iris capture devices use Near InfraRed (NIR) light in order to avoid reflection of
cornea under visible light. After acquirement, the iris region is segmented from the image. Among different iris
recognition methods, Daugman’s Gabor filter based algorithm is the most common one [Dau03, Dau04]. In the
iris detection process, an integrodifferential operator is calculated to find both the pupillary and the outer (limbus)
boundaries1. Then the detected iris area in a polar coordinate system is projected onto complex-valued 2D Gabor
wavelets. The resulting complex values represent the texture information of an iris. Only the phase information
of every complex value is used and converted into 2 bits. The feature contains altogether 2048 bits (256 bytes).
1The centre of these boundaries is not always the same.
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Additionally, a mask vector is generated, which indicates the iris region corrupted by eyelid, eyelash occlusion,
specular reflection etc. During comparison, iris codes in the noisy region are not considered.
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Figure 5.1.: Eye and iris under visible light
Moreover, Daugman analyzed the distinguishing power of the obtained iris features. Individual iris bits are
uniformly distributed. The interclass distribution of Hamming distance obtained from 9.1 million comparisons
fits perfectly a binomial distribution with p = 0.5 and N = 249. The entropy of iris features is empirically
determined and equal to 249 bits.
Sun et al. proposed an alternative method using ordinal measure [STW04, ST09]. Ordinary measure is an
efficient tool for texture classification. Multi-lobe differential filters (MLDF) are applied over iris regions and
every filter has a special spatial meaning and represents point, line, edge, corner etc. Every resulting lobe is
encoded with one bit according to its sign. This method provided a very good performance. Interestingly,
the 2D Gabor wavelet can be seen as a special case of ordinal measure. However, the ordinal measure avoids
transformation and is much more efficient than 2D Gabor wavelet. In the next section we show the recognition
performance of iris recognition with an open source algorithm.
5.1.2. Experimental Results
Masek developed an open source iris recognition algorithm [Mas03]. The algorithm contains localization and
segmentation, normalization, feature extraction and matching process. Figure 5.2 shows the block diagram of
the algorithm and intermedian results of individual steps. An input iris image is captured with a NIR device as
shown in the left of Figure 5.2. The color information is lost, however, no strong specular reflection occurs in
the iris region. For iris localization and segmentation the Hough transformation is used, which is an efficient
image analysis tool to detect shapes such as edges, circles, ellipses etc. The circular Hough transform is applied
on an iris image to detect the boundaries of iris and pupil. Moreover, the linear Hough transformation finds the
upper and lower eyelids. Additionally, the probable eyelid and specular reflection areas are marked black. The
localization and segmentation result is depicted in the second left image in Figure 5.2. We denote I(x,y) as the
illumination value at pixel (x,y) in the grey level image. In the normalization process, Daugman’s rubber sheet
model is utilized to convert the iris ring I(x,y) in a Cartesian coordinate system into rectangular form I(ρ,φ) in
a polar coordinate system, where the difference between the centre of the iris and of pupil is taken into account
during normalization.
During feature extraction, the 1D log-Gabor filter is applied to each row of the normalized iris region. Masek
considered the spatial combination of 1D log-Gabor filters as 2D Gabor filter. In [Kov], it is shown that the
log-Gabor filter has two advantages: log-Gabor functions have always zero DC component and they can describe
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Figure 5.2.: The block diagram of Masek’s iris recognition algorithm. (The iris image example is from CASIA-
Irisv3 database [CAS])
high frequency regions better. The feature extraction works as follows:
Fi(ω) = Ii(ω)G(ω) (5.1)
where i indicates the corresponding row in normalized iris region, Ii(ω) = FFT (I(ρi,φ)) is the Fourier transfor-
mation of the 1D signal of I(ρi,φ) at a fix ρi, and G(ω) is 1D log-Gabor filter, expressed as:
G(ω) = exp
(
− [log(ω/ω0)]2
2 [log(σ/ω0)]
2
)
(5.2)
where ω0 represents the centre frequency, and σ gives the bandwidth of the filter. The iris features are the sign
of the real and imaginary parts of the frequency value after applying the Gabor filter:
bi =
[
sgn
{
Re{Fi}
}
,sgn
{
Im{Fi}
}]
(5.3)
Every frequency is converted into 2 bits, which is corresponding to one of four quadrants in the phase space
[0,pi/2), [pi/2,pi), [pi,3pi/2), [3pi/2,2pi).
The iris template consists of a binary code B and a mask vector Bm. The mask vector shows noisy positions
in the iris code. During the enrolment, the template is stored in a data storage. In the verification, the stored
iris template is compared with that of a queried iris image. The fractional Hamming distance is used in the
comparator. Only the bits in the region which are marked as noiseless are used and the comparison function can
be described with:
HD =
‖(B1⊕B2)∩Bm1∩Bm2‖
‖Bm1∩Bm2‖ (5.4)
where [B1,Bm1] and [B2,Bm2] are two iris templates, || · || denotes the Hamming weight, ⊕ is the XOR operator,
∩ is the Boolean AND operator. During the comparison, the enrolled template is shifted maximum 4 bits to the
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right and 4 bits to the left. The minimum fractional Hamming distance is returned. In this way the rotation of the
eyes is compensated to a certain extent.
We applied Masek’s implementation on CASIA-v1.0 and CASIA-Irisv3 [CAS] to generate iris features. We
make no change of the original implementation. The CASIA databases were collected by the Chinese Academy
of Sciences (CAS), Institute of Automation. CASIA v1.0 contains 756 iris images from 108 subjects captured
with a CAS-self-developed iris camera. There are three subsets in CASIA-Irisv3, namely, CASIA-Irisv3-Interval,
CASIA-Irisv3-Lamp and CASIA-Irisv3-Twins. The first subset was collected with the CAS-self-developed sen-
sor and the other two were captured with the OKI IRISPASS-h sensor. In our experiments, only CASIA-Irisv3-
Interval is used. It contains 2639 images with a resolution of 320×280, which are from 395 different eyes of 249
subjects. CASIA-Irisv3-Interval is a superset of CASIA v1.0. The pupil regions of all iris images in CASIA v1.0
were marked black in order to protect the NIR illuminator information of the capture devices due to the patent
issue.
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Figure 5.3.: FMR and FNMR at different m with CA-
SIA databases
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DB m EER @ BER
CASIA-v1.0 2048 7.20% 38.85%
CASIA-v1.0 9600 2.78% 43.04%
CASIA-Irisv3-Interval 2048 10.25% 40.87%
CASIA-Irisv3-Interval 9600 5.16% 43.96%
Table 5.1.: EER at different m and CASIA databases
Two different settings are tested. For the feature length m= 2048, the normalized squared iris region is divided
into 8 rows and each row results in 128 1D-Gabor filter coefficients. Every coefficient is converted into 2 bits.
For m= 9600, 20 rows and 240 coefficients are used. The performance of Masek’s algorithm in CASIA-v1.0 and
CASIA-Irisv3-Interval is shown in figures 5.3 and 5.4. Figure 5.4 shows that the performance of CASIA-v1.0 is
better than that of CASIA-Irisv3-Interval at the same setting. CASIA-Irisv3-Interval contains more challenging
iris images than CASIA-v1.0. Increasing feature length m can improve the performance significantly. Figure 5.3
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shows that increasing m, the change of FNMR is minor, but FMR is shifted strongly to the right. It indicates small
variation of the robustness, but large improvement on the discriminative power. The EER and the corresponding
BER are shown in Table 5.1.
The experiment with CASIA-v1.0 database and m = 9600 has the best performance. In the previous chapter
it was shown that an EER of 5.90% is achieved in the 3D face recognition system at feature length of 804. The
recognition performances of both systems are in a comparable level.
5.2. The Fuzzy Commitment Scheme for Iris Recognition
Iris texture is an epigenetic phenotypic characteristics in [DC01]. Even irises sharing identical genetic infor-
mation have different appearances. Diseases such as free-floating iris cysts can change iris appearance. It is
necessary to protect iris features for security and privacy reasons. Hao et al. proposed an algorithm combining
cryptography with iris recognition, which is the milestone work in this area [HAD05]. Fuzzy commitment is
the basic structure of the algorithm. In order to overcome high intraclass variation, Hao analyzed carefully error
patterns of iris codes and applied a two-layer error correction method: Hadamard codes are used to correct ran-
dom errors caused by acquisition devices or iris distortion; Additionally, Reed-Solomon codes compensate burst
errors due to undetected eyelashes and specular reflections. Using this efficient error correction coding, a 140
bit long secret is achieved at FRR of 0.47% and FAR of zero. Furthermore, the security of the proposed scheme
was studied regarding the complexity for an adversary to retrieve iris features. The discriminative entropy of
iris codes is 249 bits. The coding scheme tolerates up to 27% bit errors. If an attacker knows the correlation
properties of iris codes, at least 244 computations need to be tried in an exhaustive search. Hao also suggested
a three-factor scheme including biometrics, token and additional passwords, in order to achieve higher security.
This system is sufficient for practical use because of the high security and good user convenience.
In [BCC∗07], Bringer et al. used the product codes and a two-dimensional iterative min-sum decoding al-
gorithm in the error correction process. They modeled errors between reference and queried iris codes with a
binary symmetric channel (BSC) with erasure. A two-dimensional product code is used, where every column
and row are a codeword of a linear code. In order to handle burst errors, an interleaver is applied to break the
burst errors. During verification, an iterative minimum method is exploited. They showed that the results are
close to the theoretical limit of the ideal BSC coding according to Shannon’s information theory, which is based
on the assumption of independently distributed iris codes. In [VDRY09], Vetro et al. used the syndrome coding
to protect iris codes. From the extracted iris codes, only 1806 most reliable bits are utilized. The syndrome of iris
features is calculated with the low density parity coding. In the verification, the decoding process uses a belief
propagation process. The security of 50 bits can be achieved at FNMR of about 15%, which is comparable with
FNMR of the unprotected system.
Iris features are binary vectors and are suitable for the fuzzy commitment scheme, however, the challenge is to
correct large amount of intraclass bit errors. In this work we implemented the two layer coding scheme proposed
by Hao [HAD05]. Figure 5.5 shows the block diagram. In the enrolment a randomly generated secret S is first
encoded with Reed-Solomon (RS) encoder and then with Hadamard encoder. The codeword is XOR-ed with the
input iris feature X . The stored secure template consists of the XOR-output W and the hash of the secret h(S).
Binary iris features with length of e.g. 2048 fit the code length of many coding methods. In comparison with
the 3D face method shown in Section 4.2, neither additional binarization nor selection of the most reliable bits is
necessary. During verification, the probe iris feature is XOR-ed with the stored W and a corrupted codeword C′
is obtained. By the Hadamard decoder and RS decoder, the errors are corrected. The hash of the estimated secret
S′ is compared with the stored h(S). If they are identical, a positive result will be given.
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Figure 5.5.: The block diagram of the implemented iris fuzzy commitment algorithm proposed by Hao
The RS code is computed in Galois field GF(q), where q= 2u and u is a positive integer. An RS code consists
of k message symbols and 2t parity symbols, where t is the number of correctable symbol errors. Its minimum
Hamming distance is 2t + 1. The length of the RS code is not larger than 2q− 1. The Hadamard code is a
(2l−1, l,2l−3− 1) binary code2. The details of RS code and Hadamard code are shown in Appendixes B.2 and
B.3.
Figure 5.6 depicts the coding scheme in details. The LS bit secret is divided into mS blocks and each block
is l bit long as shown in the first row in Figure 5.6. The RS encoder adds 2tRS parity blocks at the end of the
secret blocks (see the second row), where tRS is the number of the correctable block errors in an RS code. Then
Hadamard encoder extends each block into a 2l−1 bit Hadamard code. In the original paper [HAD05], Hadamard
code of (64,7,15) and RS code of (32,mS, tRS) are used. Different settings of mS ∈ [6,8,10, · · · ,32] are tested.
With the database used in their experiment, an FAR of zero can be achieved at LS ≥ 140 (mS = 20) and the
minimum FRR of 0.47%.
l bits
mS x l-bits blocks
mRS x l-bits blocks
mRS x 2
l-1-bits blocks
S
CRS
CRS+Had
2tRS Parity block
Figure 5.6.: The coding scheme used in the iris fuzzy commitment algorithm proposed by Hao
2In this chapter, we denote an error correction code as a (n,k, t) code, where n is the codeword length, k is the number of message bits, and
t is the number of correctable bit errors. For instance, in this case, the length of Hadamard codeword is 2l−1, the corresponding message
contains l bits and it can tolerate 2l−3−1 bit errors.
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In our experiment we use the features extracted with Masek’s Gabor filter algorithm from the CASIA databases.
The fuzzy commitment algorithm is implemented according to Hao’s method. Table 5.2 shows the settings with
different coding parameters and feature lengths. The Hadamard codeword lengths of LHad = {64,128} are tested,
which allow to correct (2n−2−1)/2n ≈ 25% bit errors in each Hadamard block. Different numbers of message
blocks are also tested in order to change robustness to block errors.
m 9600 2048
LS 24 40 56 72 14 16 32 48 64
l 8 8 8 8 7 8 8 8 8
LHad 128 128 128 128 64 128 128 128 128
mS 3 5 7 9 2 2 4 6 8
mRS 75 75 75 75 32 16 16 16 16
tRS 36 35 34 33 15 7 6 5 4
Table 5.2.: The settings of different coding parameters and feature lengths: m is the feature length, LS =mS× l is
the secret length, l is the number of message bits of a Hadamard code, LHad = 2l−1 is the Hadamard
codeword length, mS is the number of message blocks in a RS code, mRS is the block length of a RS
codeword, and tRS is the number of correctable block errors.
DB m LS
With Mask Without Mask
CER∗intra CER
∗
inter FNMR FMR CER
∗
intra CER
∗
inter FNMR FMR
9600
24 35.67% 50.76% 17.80% 1.59% 36.88% 49.68% 47.43% 0.21%
40 35.04% 39.51% 19.96 % 0.86% 36.88% 34.78% 49.59% 0.17%
56 34.54% 32.89 % 21.30% 0.69% - - - -
CASIA 72 34.05% 32.89% 22.74% 0.59% - - - -
v1
2048
14 38.67% 51.61% 15.33% 4.86% 41.55% 55.71% 36.73% 1.81%
16 40.23% 49.41% 10.60% 6.65% 47.46% 56.49% 28.19% 1.49%
32 36.42% 42.68% 16.56% 3.38% 39.55% 48.68% 41.67% 0.30%
48 34.13% 35.11% 23.66% 1.80% 38.19% 38.67% 53.19% 0.20%
64 32.67% 32.96% 34.57% 0.96% - - - -
9600
24 44.49% 50.61% 36.29% 0.15% 47.86% 52.97% 47.22% 0.05%
40 43.46% 32.74% 39.33% 0.08% 45.88% 0 51.21% 0
CASIA 72 39.40% 31.43% 43.10% 0.04% - - - -
Interval
2048
14 46.53% 55.52% 32.50% 2.89% 51.46% 59.28% 41.92% 1.50%
v3 16 48.39% 54.98% 24.36% 3.61% 52.78% 56.84% 32.30% 1.10%
32 42.50% 42.19% 35.22% 1.35% 49.85% 47.41% 46.16% 0.11%
Table 5.3.: The recognition performance and the maximum correctable intraclass and interclass bit error rates
The experimental results are shown in Table 5.3. The coding scheme can correct both block errors and bit
errors. The maximum number of correctable bit errors, which can be achieved theoretically, may not represent
the true error correction ability for this application. We denote CERintra as Correctable bit Error Rate of the
intraclass comparisons and CERinter as the one of the interclass comparisons. We empirically measure CER∗intra =
max{CERintra} and CER∗inter = max{CERinter}, which show roughly the error correction ability at different
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settings. Obviously, whether the bit errors can be corrected or not, depends on their pattern. Therefore, the
maximal correctable bit error rates are not comparable with the threshold of the Hamming distance comparator
used in iris recognition.
In the setting with mask, an iris code is firstly XOR-ed with its mask vector before sent to the enrolment or the
verification process of fuzzy commitment. In the setting without mask, an iris code is used directly and its mask
information is ignored. Mask vectors can filter noisy and invalid regions in an iris code. In CASIA v1 database,
the FNMR with mask reduces to less than the half of the FNMR without mask. In CASIA interval v3 database,
the reduction of FNMR is about 10% with mask. Meanwhile, FMR increases slightly, if the mask is used.
Although the mask is not stored, applying the mask can decrease the security of the algorithm. Later in Figure
5.9, it is shown, that appearance of the mask region is quite static and can be predicted. It can provide significant
information about the secret to an adversary. Therefore, we do not recommend using mask information for the
sake of the security, if FNMR is within an acceptable range. Unfortunately, this is not the case in our experiments.
As in other fuzzy commitment algorithms, FNMR increases and FMR decreases with increasing LS. Different
LS are used for m = 9600 and m = 2048. Their recognition performance can not be compared directly. However,
we still can see that the results of m = 9600 are better than m = 2048 in CASIA v1. For instance, lower FNMR
and FMR are achieved at m= 9600 and LS = 72 in comparison with the results of m= 2048 and smaller LS = 64.
The FNMR of CASIA v1 is much better than that of CASIA interval v3 at the same setting. The FMR of
CASIA v1 is only slightly worse than that of CASIA interval v3. The similar results are also observed in the
iris recognition experiment without template protection (see Section 5.1.2 and Figure 5.3). LS = 14 is the only
setting with l = 7 and the corresponding Hadamard block length is 64, which is the half of the block length used
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Figure 5.7.: The recognition performance of iris recognition and the fuzzy commitment system: the solid lines
are ROC curves of the iris recognition; the lines with markers plot FMR and 1−FNMR of the fuzzy
commitment system; the dash-dotted lines with plus are the ones of the fuzzy commitment system
with mask; the dotted lines with cross are the ones of the fuzzy commitment system without mask;
the color shows different feature size m = {2048,9600} and the database (CASIA v1 or CASIA
Interval v3);
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in other settings. Comparing it with LS = 16, the FNMR of LS = 14 is much worse. Therefore, we choose the
block length 128 in the rest of the experiments.
We depict the operational points of the fuzzy commitment system as well as the ROC curves of the original
iris recognition in Figure 5.7. In Hao’s paper [HAD05], they did not compare the performance of the original
iris recognition and fuzzy commitment, because the perfect performance was achieved with fuzzy commitment.
However, in our experiments, the performance is far from optimal. We can observe strong performance degra-
dation and all the operational points are below the ROC curves with the same database and feature length. The
operational points at the settings without mask are concentrated in the area of low FMR and high FNMR. The
operational points of the settings with mask show a better trade-off between FMR and FNMR. We do not achieve
the perfect performance as well as the high secret size as shown in [HAD05]. The secret size in our experiment is
limited by the poor recognition performance of the input binary iris features. If the feature extraction algorithm
is improved and iris codes are more reliable, both secret size and the recognition performance can be enhanced
significantly.
5.3. Privacy and Security Assessment
In this section we investigate the security and privacy of the protected iris recognition system, which is imple-
mented in the previous section. We analyze the statistical properties of iris features. It includes the distribution
of intraclass and interclass bit errors, the position of mask region, and the distribution of the iris codes. Later
we evaluate the system regarding the three protection goals. Here we assume the advanced threat model that
an adversary has full knowledge about the system as well as the statistical properties of biometric features. A
cracking algorithm to retrieve the secret and iris codes is proposed, which utilizes the security weakness of the
system.
5.3.1. Statistical Properties of the Iris Features
The distribution of iris codes plays an important role in privacy and security assessment and is useful prior
information for an adversary. In the existing work of Daugman [Dau03], the statistical properties of the iris
codes using Gabor filter were investigated with a large database. It is shown that their iris codes contain 249
bit entropy. Since a similar feature extraction algorithm is used in Masek’s implementation, we will perform the
same analysis on the extracted iris codes.
In the original method of Daugman, the iris codes are uniformly distributed, that an iris bit is equal to zero
or one is identically probable. We randomly select one sample from each subject and calculate the interclass
mean at every bit position. The bits in the mask region are not taken into account. For a uniform distribution,
the interclass mean is expected to be 0.5 (see also the uniform test in Section 4.3.1). Figure 5.8 depicts the
interclass mean of individual feature elements for CASIA databases: y-axis shows the number of rows divided in
the normalized iris region and x-axis indicates the number of iris bits derived from each row; the color indicates
the mean value. If iris features are uniformly distributed, the images in Figure 5.8 would appear light blue for
m = 9600 or light green for m = 248. The colors at many bit positions appear red, orange or dark blue. It
indicates that the corresponding bits are not uniformly distributed. Additionally, the spacial correlation of mean
values can be observed in vertical direction. The feature of m = 2048 has stronger non-uniformity than those of
m = 9600. As a conclusion, interclass distribution of iris codes can not be considered as uniform.
We look at the distribution of mask region, namely the probability that an iris bit is detected as corrupted.
We collect all the mask vectors and compute their average, which correspond to the empirical probabilities. The
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Figure 5.8.: Interclass means of iris features of CASIA databases
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Figure 5.9.: The probability of mask region
result is depicted in Figure 5.9. The dark red region is with high probability marked as valid iris region and the
dark blue region is normally marked as invalid region. Two circular sector regions can be recognized obviously
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and they are caused by eyelids. Most of iris codes outside these sectors are considered as valid. Recall that RS
code is used in the fuzzy commitment scheme as shown in Section 5.2. This code is used to correct the burst
errors occurring in the iris codes. However, Figure 5.9 shows that the corruption of iris codes does not occur
uniformly. It is down to the effect, that obstruction of eyelids is normally on the upper and lower parts of an iris.
We argue that RS coding is not the best choice for these iris codes.
We also analyze the distribution of intraclass errors. During a comparison, shifting of queried iris codes
maximum 4 bits to left and right is used. The error pattern with the minimum Hamming weight is counted. We
calculate the error probability at each bit position. The erasures, which are calculated with at least one invalid
bit, are not considered. The result is shown in Figure 5.10. The error probability varies from zero (the dark blue
color) to one (the dark red color). A light blue green region in a sector form can be recognized on the left side of
the first and second images. Similarly a sector region with relatively high noise in red and yellow red color can
also be observed on the left of the third and fourth images. These regions correspond to the upper part of iris ring.
Generally the lower part of the iris codes has less errors than the upper part. The upper part of iris ring is easily
distorted by eyelashes and the error probability is also higher. There is also dark blue appearing on the right of
the images in Figure 5.10 (e.g. in the region of x = [180,190] and y = [7,8] of CASIA V1, m = 2048), which
corresponds to the lower part of iris ring. These bits look very stable, because no or very few intraclass errors are
observed in this region due to erasures. Therefore, its error probability estimation is not confident. Additionally,
the upper part of iris codes has smaller error probability than the lower part. For instance, the region of y = [1,5]
in the first plot of Figure 5.10 for CASIA V1, m = 2048 is bluer than the region of y = [6,8]. It means that
iris region close to the sclera is noisier than that close to the pupil. Moreover, comparing the error probability
of CASIA interval v3 database, the setting of m = 9600 is more reliable with less intraclass errors than that of
m = 2048.
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Figure 5.10.: The probabilities of intraclass errors at each bit position
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m 2048 9600
Database CASIA v1 CASIA Interval v3 CASIA v1 CASIA Interval v3
E{BERinter} 0.4506 0.4555 0.4763 0.4780
var{BERinter} 12.252×10−4 13.019×10−4 4.845×10−4 4.593×10−4
0.25
var{Einter} 204 192 516 544
Table 5.4.: The statistics of BERinter
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Figure 5.11.: The histogram of interclass BER (black bar) and the ideal binomial distribution with the same mean
and variance (red line)
The interclass distribution determines the discriminative power of biometric features. In [Dau03], Daugman
showed that the interclass bit errors in their experiments are perfectly binomially distributed. It is proved with
a quantile-quantile plot. The observed cumulative distribution of interclass distance is plotted against the ideal
cumulative binomial distribution and they lie on a line. He assumed that iris features were derived from a
uniformly Bernoulli-distributed source. Then the entropy of iris codes can be calculated with the following
equation:
H(X) = H(BERinter) =
0.25
var{BERinter} (5.5)
where X is an iris code, BERinter is interclass bit error rate of iris codes and var{·} is the variance. The equation
is deduced from Eq A.23 and A.25 (see the details in Appendix A.3). It shows the number of independent bits
(trials) in the Bernoulli distribution. The 2048 bit long iris code contains 249 bit discriminative entropy.
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We apply the similar experiments on our iris features. Table 5.4 shows the statistical results. The expected
value of BERinter is not 0.5. It confirms the previous observation that these features are non-uniformly distributed
(see Figure 5.8). The variance for m = 2048 is much larger than for m = 9600. The longer features contain more
discriminative information about the iris and the variation of interclass bit error rate is also smaller. Additionally,
we display the histogram of the interclass BERinter (black bars) as well as the ideal binomial probability density
function with the same mean and variance (red lines) in Figure 5.11. The empirical distributions are skewed to
the left and are quite different than the ideal binomial distributions. The assumption and entropy estimation made
by Daugman is not valid in this experiment. The reason is the use of different databases and feature extraction
algorithms. In our experiments, 23,219 different interclass comparisons of CASIA v1 and 77,814 of CASIA
Interval v3 database are performed, which are much smaller than the 9,060,003 comparisons used in Daugman’s
experiment.
Since the existing model is not suitable in our experiment, I start with my own analysis. Every phase of Gabor
filter coefficients is converted into two bits. They represent local properties of the iris texture. It is well known
that spatial dependency exists in nature images. It inspires me to investigate the properties of iris codes with
Markov model.
Given X is a 2D binary iris code and each row of X corresponds to the phase information of Gabor filtering of
an iris ring with a fix radius to the central of the pupil (see Figure 5.2 in Section 5.1.1). As shown in Eq 5.3, the
phase of every complex value of Gabor filtering results is converted into two bits. Therefore, we use four states
Z = {Zi|i ∈ GF(4)}= {[00], [10], [11], [01]} and denote X as a matrix in {Z}mr×mc :
X =
 z
1
1 · · · zmc1
...
. . .
...
z1mr · · · zmcmr
 (5.6)
where zvu ∈ Z , mr and mc are the number of rows and columns, GF stands for Galois Field. The length of binary
iris codes is m = 2×mr×mc. For m = 9600, mr = 20; for m = 2048, mr = 8.
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Figure 5.12.: Boxplots of the probability p(zvu = Zi,z
v+1
u = Z j) at different settings
We calculate the joint probabilities of two successive elements in each row. Figure 5.12 shows the boxplots of
p(zvu = Zi,z
v+1
u = Z j) at different settings. The four patterns of [Zi,Zi], namely z
v
u = z
v+1
u , have obviously much
higher probabilities than others. The pattern [Zi,Zi+1] is the second most frequently occurring one. It happens
rarely that zvu = Zi and z
v+1
u = Zi+2 or Zi+3. This complies with the typical Markov property and it is observed at
all the settings with different feature sizes and different databases.
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Additionally, the variation of [Zi,Zi+2] and [Zi,Zi+3] is very small. [Zi,Zi+1] has larger variation and their
boxplots with different i are very similar. The variation of [Zi,Zi] depends on i, but they are very similar for the
same i with different settings. For instance, [11,11] is highly probable than others and has large variation.
We determine p(Zi,Z j) with the mean of the estimation from all four different settings. Based upon this, the
state probability p(Zi) can be calculated with Eq A.3, meanwhile the transition probability p(zvu = Zi|zv+1u = Z j)
can be derived with Bayesian rule as shown in Eq A.2. The resulting state and transition probabilities are
shown in Table 5.5. The state probabilities are almost equal, p([00]|[00]) is slightly smaller and p([11]|[11])
is slightly larger than others. The transition probabilities on the diagonal in Table 5.5 are larger than 74% and are
considerably higher than others. The probabilities p(zvu = Zi+1|zv+1u = Zi) are larger than 21%. The probabilities
p(zvu = Zi+2|zv+1u = Zi) are the smallest.
Zi
State Probability Transition Probability p(zv+1u = Zi|zvu = Z j)
p(Zi) p(Zi|[00]) p(Zi|[10]) p(Zi|[11]) p(Zi|[01])
[0 0] 23.51% 74.08% 1.072 % 0.40% 23.42%
[1 0] 25.64% 24.26% 76.08% 1.27% 0.38%
[1 1] 26.53% 0.42% 22.47% 76.75% 1.19%
[0 1] 24.32% 1.23% 0.38% 21.58% 74.95%
Table 5.5.: The state and transition probabilities of iris codes
We choose 4 samples from CASIA interval v3 database and represent their iris codes with [Zi,Z j] patterns
in Figure 5.13. Instead of binary images, iris codes are depicted with 16 different colors. Most of the regions
appear mark blue ([00,00]), light blue ([10,10]), red ([11,11]) and yellow ([01,01]). From left to right, the iris
codes change in the order of blue→light blue→red→yellow. Small transition areas with the color representing
[Zi,Zi+1] can be recognized between the area of [Zi,Zi] and [Zi+1,Zi+1]. The patterns [Zi,Zi+2] and [Zi,Zi+3]
happen rarely and appear randomly. We also mark special patterns in sector form with green curves. Comparing
with the iris images on the left, these patterns are derived from the upper and lower eyelids. In these regions, the
[Zi,Zi] patterns repeat longer and produce large areas in dark blue, light blue, red and yellow. The color patterns
in the left sectors (red→yellow→blue→ light blue) and the right sectors (blue→light blue→red→yellow) are
different. It seems that the upper eyelid has pi-phase shift than the lower eyelid. However, it is not always the
case that a sector can be observed. For instance, on the left side in b) and d) of Figure 5.13, such a sector is
expected due to the distortion of the eyelids. However, they do not occur on the figures. If the occlusion of eyelid
is just under or above the iris, a symmetric structure can be observed inside the sector region (e.g. the sector in
a)). The [Zi,Z j] patterns are very helpful to analyse the properties of iris codes.
Due to the disturbance of eyelids and eyelashes, it is difficult to evaluate the stationarity and ergodicity of
iris codes. Here we make assumption that iris codes are stationary and ergodic and propose the Markov model
to describe the distribution of iris codes. The Markov diagram is shown in Figure 5.14. The blue circles show
the state Zi ∈ Z for i ∈ GF(4). With high probability, the adjacent iris elements are the same or change anti-
clockwise as the solid blue line shown. With much lower probability, the iris bits change clockwise and with
extremely lower probability they change in the diagonal directions. The derived Markov model is quite stable,
since the probability estimation of p([Zi,Z j]) is almost invariant with different databases and feature lengths.
The information rate H(Z) = 0.901 of iris code is calculated with Eq A.30. It is much smaller than 2 bits
in the case of uniform independent distribution. With Eq A.12, the chain rule of joint probability and Markov
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properties, the entropy of a Markov sequence can be written as:
H(Z1,Z2, · · · ,Zn) = H(Z1)+H(Z2|Z1)+ · · ·+H(Zn|Zn−1) (5.7)
= H(Z1)+(n−1) ·H(Z)
Then the estimated entropy of the iris code Hˆ(Z1, · · · ,Z1024) = 923.72 for m = 2048 and Hˆ(Z1, · · · ,Z4800) =
4325.88 for m = 9600.
(a) Sample 06 of Subject 1001
(b) Sample 09 of Subject 1001
(c) Sample 04 of Subject 1233
(d) Sample 02 of Subject 1223
Figure 5.13.: Iris images from CASIA interval v3 and their iris codes represented with transition patterns
Additionally, the iris entropy derived from Markov model is quite different from Daugman’s estimation. De-
spite the differences in the Gabor filter implementation, preprocessing as well as the iris databases, the main
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Figure 5.14.: Markov model of iris features
reason is that only the horizontal dependency of the adjacent states is analyzed. We investigate only horizontal
dependency because of 1D-Gabor filter used in the iris feature extraction. From the examples in Figure 5.13 we
can see that the vertical dependency also exists. Moreover, the high order dependency, namely dependency be-
tween the second, the third, even higher adjacent states, might also exist. Assumed that Daugman’s iris features
are also stationary and ergodic, the information rate of his iris codes per elements is 249/2048× 2 = 0.2432,
which is much smaller than that obtained in our experiment. If the estimation of the iris code distribution of iris
codes can be improved with more general models, for instance, with context-tree weighting [WST95], it can be
expected that the entropy of our iris codes reduces and even converges to Daugman’s result.
The Markov property of the iris codes is not a coincidence. Gabor filters describe the local texture of iris
patterns. Due to the inherent dependency in nature image, the adjacent regions can have the same or similar
Gabor filter coefficients. It explains the transitions of the Markov model that the adjacent iris states are more
frequently the same or the neighboring states. The transition between diagonal opposite directions is very rare.
However, it is still unclear, why the iris codes change often in anti-clockwise directions.
As shown in [STW04], Gabor filter is also a kind of local ordinal measure, which describes local relative
relationships of adjacent regions. Moreover, the local binary pattern measures directly the local relative relations
by comparing the intensity of local region with all its surrounding regions. In [TTMM00], Maenpaa et al. also
found out the 9 patterns with very few bit transition in the whole 256 possible patterns are the most informative
ones and contribute to more than 90% spatial patterns in the images used in their experiments. Similarly, in
our Markov model, some transitions are much more probable than others. The Markov properties of Gabor
filter features might be an inherent characteristic of nature images. This can only be further proved with more
experiments on iris features extracted from different databases with different Gabor filter implementations.
In this section we analyze the statistical properties of iris codes. We show that iris masks occur at relatively
constant areas, which correspond to upper and lower eyelids. The coding method proposed by Hao [HAD05] is
not optimal for iris codes. The probabilities of intraclass errors in the upper eyelids are higher than other regions.
And the regions close to sclera are more noisy than those close to pupil. Additionally, we also proved that iris
codes are not uniformly independently distributed either. The method for estimating the entropy of iris codes
proposed by Daugman [Dau03] cannot be applied in iris codes used in our experiments. We propose Markov
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model to simulate the iris distribution. In the following section we will take a close look at the security and
privacy of the fuzzy commitment system for iris recognition.
5.3.2. Assessment of Security and Privacy
In the previous section, we showed that iris codes have the Markov property. It is not a surprise that security and
privacy leakage can be measured in the advanced threat model. In this section we give a precise assessment on
the privacy and security.
In the fuzzy commitment system, auxiliary data W is the XOR of an iris code and a codeword. Therefore, the
security and the irreversibility of PI are equivalent. In the following we make use of all the available information
and calculate the complexity to retrieve secrets as well as iris codes from W .
RS code is a systematic code. The first ms blocks in C are the message blocks. To retrieve the secret, it is
sufficient to give a correct estimation of these message blocks. A 2l−1 bit Hadamard codeword contains only l
bit information. Although Hadamard code is not a systematic code, its code book can be recursively calculated
(see Appendix B.3). If C2
i
1 is a Hadamard code with length of 2
i, C2
i+1
1 are also Hadamard codes of length 2
i+1
with:
C2
i+1
1 = [C
2i
1 ,±C2
i
1 ] (5.8)
where +C2
i
1 =C
2i
1 and −C2
i
1 =C
2i
1 ⊕12
i
1 . Here we also define ± for Z j ∈ Z = {[00], [10], [11], [01]}:
+Z j = Z j
−Z j = Z j+2 (5.9)
where j ∈GF(4). To estimate a (2l−1, l,2l−3−1) Hadamard code, it is sufficient to know the two initial bits and
the l−2 bits at position 2i+1, i ∈ [1, · · · , l−2].
We use a recursive method to estimate an iris feature block corresponding to a Hadamard codeword. The
auxiliary data W is public. If X2
i
1 and C
2i
1 are known, there are only two possible candidates of the next iris block,
namely Xˆ2
i+1
2i+1 = ±C2
i
1 ⊕W 2
i+1
2i+1. Eq 5.8 shows that the sum of the two candidates must be 1
2i
1 . It means that the
first two bits of the next subblock, X2
i+2
2i+1 , are either Z j or Z j+2. Given the last two bits X
2i
2i−1 in the previous iris
block and W 2
i+2
2i−1 , the last two bits in the previous auxiliary block and the first two bits in the next auxiliary block,
the conditional probabilities of the coming-up two iris bits can be calculated with the following equations:
p(X2
i+2
2i+1 = Zk|X2
i
2i−1 = Z j,W
2i+2
2i−1 ) =
p([Z j,Zk])
p([Z j,Zk])+ p([Z j,Zk+2])
p(X2
i+2
2i+1 = Zk+1|X2
i
2i−1 = Z j,W
2i+2
2i−1 ) = 0
p(X2
i+2
2i+1 = Zk+2|X2
i
2i−1 = Z j,W
2i+2
2i−1 ) =
p([Z j,Zk+2])
p([Z j,Zk])+ p([Z j,Zk+2])
p(X2
i+2
2i+1 = Zk+3|X2
i
2i−1 = Z j,W
2i+2
2i−1 ) = 0
(5.10)
For instance, given W 2
i+2
2i−1 = [Z j1 ,Z j2 ], then C
2i
2i−1 = Z j+ j1 and k = j+ j1+ j2, where k, j, j1, j2 ∈ GF{4}.
Now we are able to calculate the conditional entropy H(X2
i+2
2i+1 |X2
i
2i−1,W
2i+2
2i−1 ). According to Eq A.8, it can be
computed with:
H(X2
i+2
2i+1 |X2
i
2i−1,W
2i+2
2i−1 ) = − ∑
X2
i+2
2i−1,W
2i+2
2i−1
p(X2
i+2
2i+1 ,X
2i
2i−1,W
2i+2
2i−1 ) log p(X
2i+2
2i+1 |X2
i
2i−1,W
2i+2
2i−1 ) (5.11)
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The joint probability p(X2
i+2
2i+1 ,X
2i
2i−1,W
2i+2
2i−1 ) can be derived from the distributions of [X
2i+2
2i+1 ,X
2i
2i−1] and the bits
C2
i+2
2i−1 in a Hadamard codeword:
p(X2
i+2
2i+1 ,X
2i
2i−1,W
2i+2
2i−1 )
(a)
= p(X2
i+2
2i+1 ,X
2i
2i−1,C
2i+2
2i−1)
(b)
= p(X2
i+2
2i+1 ,X
2i
2i−1)p(C
2i+2
2i−1)
(c)
=
1
8
p(X2
i+2
2i+1 ,X
2i
2i−1) (5.12)
Step (a) follows from the effect that W = X ⊕C and each combination of X and C gives a unique W ; step (b)
follows from the independency of X and C; step (c) follows from the rekursive properties of C and information
rate of H(C2
i+2
2i−1) = 3 for any i ∈N . With Eq 5.11, 5.10 and 5.12, we can obtain:
H(X2
i+2
2i+1 |X2
i
2i−1,W
2i+2
2i−1 ) = 0.1051 (5.13)
It is much smaller than H(C2
i+2
2i+1|C2
i
1 ) = 1 and H(Z) = 0.901. It shows that uncertainty about the iris as well as
secret reduces rapidly given the iris distribution and W .
We give an estimation of the uncertainty about a whole iris block corresponding to a Hadamard of length 2l−1:
Hˆ(X jγ+γjγ+1 |W jγ+γjγ+1 ) = H(X jγ+2jγ+1 )+
l−1
∑
i=2
H(X jγ+2
i+2
jγ+2i+1 |X
jγ+2i
jγ+2i−1,W
jγ+2i+2
jγ+2i−1 ) (5.14)
= 2+(l−2) ·0.1051 (5.15)
for any j ∈ {0,1,2, · · · ,mRS− 1}. Here γ = 2l−1 and mRS is the symbol length of an RS code. Eq 5.14 only
makes use of the bits around the informative positions in the Hadamard code. It is a close approximation of the
real H(X jγ+γjγ+1 |W jγ+γjγ+1 ). According Eq A.12, the chain rule of joint information:
H(X jγ+γjγ+1 |W jγ+γjγ+1 ) =
l−1
∑
i=1
H(X jγ+2
i+1
jγ+2i+1|X
jγ+2i
jγ+1 ,W
jγ+γ
jγ+1 )
H(X jγ+2
i+1
jγ+2i+1|X
jγ+2i
jγ+1 ,W
jγ+γ
jγ+1 )
(a)
= H(X jγ+2
i+2
jγ+2i+1 |X
jγ+2i
jγ+1 ,W
jγ+γ
jγ+1 )
≤ H(X jγ+2i+2jγ+2i+1 |X
jγ+2i
jγ+2i−1,W
jγ+2i+2
jγ+2i−1 )
Step (a) is valid, since the knowledge of any bit in X jγ+2
i+1
jγ+2i+1 can expose the rest of the block. If the whole block
W jγ+γjγ+1 is taken into account by estimating X
jγ+2i+2
jγ+2i+1 , the uncertainty about X
jγ+2i+2
jγ+2i+1 might further reduce.
In our experiment, two settings of Hadamard code are used: Hˆ(X jγ+2
l−1
jγ+1 |W jγ+2
l−1
jγ+1 ) = 2.523 at l = 7 and
Hˆ(X jγ+2
l−1
jγ+1 |W jγ+2
l−1
jγ+1 ) = 2.631 at l = 8. Eq5.15 shows that the uncertainty about X increases very slowly with l.
Enlarging l, the real gain on the security is very poor.
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The complexity to estimate the whole iris code is:
Hˆ(X |W ) = Hˆ(X γ1 |W γ1 )+
mS−1
∑
j=1
Hˆ(X jγ+γjγ+1 |X jγjγ−γ+1,W jγ+γjγ−γ+1)
= Hˆ(X γ1 |W γ1 )+
mS−1
∑
j=1
(
H(Z)+
l−1
∑
i=2
Hˆ(X jγ+2
i+2
jγ+2i+1 |X
jγ+2i
jγ+2i−1,W
jγ+2i+2
jγ+2i−1 )
)
(5.16)
= 2+(mS−1)0.901+mS · (l−2) ·0.1051
= 1.099+0.6908 ·mS +0.1051 ·LS (5.17)
where mS is the number of message blocks in the RS code and LS =ms · l is the secret length. The second term in
Eq 5.16 is different from Eq 5.14. The reason is that if the previous Hadamard code is known, the next Hadamard
block can be initialised with dependency of the iris code.
Table 5.6 shows Hˆ(X |W ) at different settings. Since Hˆ(X |W ) = Hˆ(S|W ), the values in Table 5.6 represent
both the security and irreversibility of protected templates. The previous section shows that it is not difficult to
learn the statistics of iris codes. An experienced attacker can exploit Markov property of the iris codes to crack
the system. Section 5.3.4 will show a method to crack the fuzzy commitment algorithm.
m 9600 2048
LS 24 40 56 72 14 16 32 48 64
mS 3 5 7 9 2 2 4 6 8
Hˆ(X |W ) 5.6938 8.7570 11.8202 14.8834 3.9520 4.1622 7.2254 10.2886 13.3518
Table 5.6.: Hˆ(X |W ) of the fuzzy commitment system for iris recognition at different settings
In the last section we show that Hˆ(X96001 ) = 4325.88 and Hˆ(X
2048
1 ) = 923.72. The current fuzzy commitment
scheme has more than 4300 bits privacy leakage for m = 9600 and 900 bits for m = 2048. We know that privacy
leakage is unavoidable. If W is unknown, the uncertainty of X is equal to its entropy. The privacy leakage shows
the reduction of the complexity to estimate the iris features in comparison with a blind estimation. Additionally,
the dependency of iris codes reduces the security significantly and Hˆ(X |W ) is much smaller than LS. High secret
leakage also exists.
In the original paper [HAD05], Hao et al. also gave a lower boundary of the security. An iris code has
2249 possible candidates. They empirically measured that their coding algorithm can correct up to 27% of the
bit errors, which is about 67 bits in a 249 bits code. If all the bit strings in a sphere within the Hamming
distance of 67 bits can be mapped to the same key as well as the same iris code, the searching effort is at least
2249/∑67i=0
(249
i
)≈ 2249/(24967 )= 244. They claimed that it is the worst case scenario. They also claimed that “with
our current state of knowledge we really do not know how to correlate someone’s iris bits unless we know their
iris code anyway.”
We argue that their security assessment is too optimistic. Their estimated entropy is 249 bits, which is much
smaller than the feature size 2048 bits. It means that their iris codes are also strongly correlated. Additionally,
the equation they used to estimate the searching effort is the Hamming bound of linear block codes. It means that
the achievable secret size of a 249 bit codeword with 67 bit error tolerance is at most 44, which is much smaller
than the secret size of 140 in their system. The secret leakage also exists in their system.
Section 5.3.1 explored the distribution of iris codes and proved that distribution estimation is possible for iris
codes. In this section we gave an alternative to quantify the security, which is based on the knowledge of the
80
5. Evaluation of Template Protection for Iris Recognition
coding scheme and the distribution of iris codes. We found out that Hadamard codes mismatch the iris code
structure. It causes high security leakage.
5.3.3. Assessment of Unlinkability
In this section we evaluate the unlinkability of the algorithm regarding cross matching and leakage amplification.
The previous section showed that high privacy leakage exists in the helper data W , therefore, the protected
system is definitively vulnerable to cross matching. Figure 5.5 in Section 5.2 shows the coding scheme used
in the protected system. This scheme is vulnerable to the decodability attack proposed in [STP09]. The final
codeword CRS+Had consists of mRS Hadamard codeblocks and W = CRS+Had ⊕X . Like all linear block codes,
the sum of two Hadamard codewords is still a codeword. The sum of two auxiliary data generated from the
same subject is decodable with higher probability than those from different subjects. On the other hand, the
decodability attack can further be applied on the RS coding layer, only if linearity between secrets and encoded
codewords exists: given C1 = Enc(s1) and C2 = Enc(s2) are two codewords, s1 and s2 are their secrets, C1⊕C2
is also a codeword with s1⊕ s2 = Dec(CHad,1⊕C2).
Hadamard code is a kind of linear block code. However, the linearity is not required in the Hadamard encoding
and decoding algorithms shown in Appendix B.3. The codebook used in our experiment is the Hadamard matrix
given in Appendix B.3. Each row in the matrix is coded with a bit string converted from a decimal number.
The decimal number starts from zero and increases with the number of the rows. Figure 5.15 shows an example
of the codebook used in our experiment. The sum of two codewords is also a valid codeword, but it is not the
codeword corresponding to the sum of their secrets. The linearity between secrets and encoded codes does not
exist. Therefore, the decodability attack is not feasible in the RS coding layer. But if the Hadamard codebook is
not carefully designed, the decodability attack on RS coding layer is possible.
We evaluate the recognition performance with the decodability attack. The number of decodable Hadamard
blocks is the corresponding comparison score. The length of Hadamard block is 128. The number of Hadamard
blocks is 16 for m = 2048 and 75 for m = 9600. The Hadamard code has the fixed code rate given the block
length. Therefore, the performance is independent of the secret size in the protected system. The corresponding
FMR and FNMR are shown in Figures 5.16 and 5.17. The blue lines are the results from CASIA v1 database
using mask; the green lines are from CASIA interval v3 with mask; the red lines are from CASIA interval v3
without mask. The number of decodable blocks of CASIA interval v3 without mask is much smaller than the
other two. The FMR of CASIA v1 and CASIA interval v3 with mask is very similar. However the FNMR of
CASIA v1 is much better than of CASIA interval v3. Table 5.7 shows the recognition performance, where FMR
is approximately equal to FNMR. The ROC curves of this attack is plotted in Figure 5.18 and compared with
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Figure 5.15.: Example of a Hadamard codebook used in our experiment with the message length of 4 and code-
word length of 8
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the performance of the fuzzy commitment algorithm. The dashed lines are the curves of m = 2048 and the solid
lines are the curves of m = 9600. The ROC curves of the fuzzy commitment algorithm are marked with ’+’
and they are on the upper left of the ROC with decodability attack. The resulting recognition performance is
comparable with that of the protected system using only one layer coding with the Hadamard code. Therefore,
the performance with decodability attack is worse than the original fuzzy commitment algorithm with the two
layer coding scheme.
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Figure 5.16.: FMR and FNMR with decodability
attack at m = 2048
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Figure 5.17.: FMR and FNMR with decodability
attack at m = 9600
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Figure 5.18.: ROC curves of the fuzzy commitment algorithm and the decodability attack
82
5. Evaluation of Template Protection for Iris Recognition
m = 2048 m = 9600
CASIA v1 CASIA v3 CASIA v1 CASIA v3
mask mask no mask mask mask no mask
FMR 15.37% 24.49% 21.85% 17.05% 23.54% 15.68%
FNMR 17.9% 24% 17.58% 15.64% 22.28% 18.64%
# of decodable blocks 4 3 1 18 14 7
Table 5.7.: The recognition performance with the decodability attack
The privacy leakage caused by Hadamard codes is dependent on their codeword length γ. The shorter γ is,
the smaller the privacy leakage rate is. Increasing the codeword length (with decreasing code rate) can reduce
FNMR and increase FMR.
Although this algorithm is vulnerable to cross matching, it has good resistance to leakage amplification. If two
secure templates are generated with the same coding parameters, leakage amplification is impossible. Even if
different coding parameters are used, leakage amplification is still infeasible. Theorem 1 in Appendix B.2 shows
that an RS codeword of short secret length is also a codeword of the same codeword length but large secret length.
Additionally, the Hadamard codebook with long codeword length can be derived by concatenating the codebook
of smaller codeword length. For instance, given Cγ is the Hadamard code book of the block length γ and C˜γ is
a set consisting of all the codes with the same block length, which are concatenated with two codewords from
Cγ/2. Obviously, Cγ is a subset of C˜γ. Changing the secret length in the fuzzy commitment algorithm can not
bring additional information about secret or biometric features. Therefore, privacy amplification is impossible.
5.3.4. Cracking the Fuzzy Commitment for Iris Recognition
The assessment in Section 5.3.2 showed poor security and irreversibility of secure templates. In this section we
prove that retrieval of iris codes as well as secrets is indeed feasible with low lost. Here we assume the advanced
threat model and make use of knowledge about the distribution of iris codes and the details of the protected
iris systems. The idea behind is to exploit all available information and to find out the most likely iris codes or
secrets.
We propose the following estimation method. A secure template [h(S),W ] is generated from iris feature X .
The set X = {X1,X2, · · · ,XN} consists of all the possible candidates of X given W . Since the distribution of
the features X is known, it is possible to calculate the probability p(X = Xi|W ) for Xi ∈ X. We rank Xi with
decreasing p(X = Xi|W ) and start the estimation with the most probable sequences.
We denote X jγ+γjγ+1 = [x jγ+1,x jγ+2, · · · ,x jγ+γ] as a subblock of X , for j ∈ {0,1,2, · · · ,mS − 1}, which cor-
responds to a Hadamard codeword. W jγ+γjγ+1 is the corresponding subblock in W . The Hadamard codebook
Cγ = {C1,C2, · · · ,CN} with the message length of l consists of N = 2l Hadamard codewords. Every codeword is
γ= 2l−1 bit long. For all Ci ∈ Cγ, Xi is a candidate of X jγ+γjγ+1 with:
Xi =W jγ+γjγ+1 ⊕Ci (5.18)
X = {Xi|i ∈ [1,2, · · · ,N]} contains exactly N candidates. The search space of X jγ+γjγ+1 is limited only to the N
possible candidates. Since we use Markov model to simulate iris features, the probability p(X jγ+γjγ+1 = Xi|W jγ+γjγ+1 )
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can be calculated with:
p(X jγ+γjγ+1 = Xi|W jγ+γjγ+1 ) = p(zi1) · p(zi2|zi1) · · · p(ziγ/2|ziγ/2−1) (5.19)
whereXi = [zi1,zi2, · · · ,ziγ/2] and zij ∈Z = {[00], [10], [11], [01]}. Then we create a ranking list by sorting p(X jγ+γjγ+1 =
Xi|W jγ+γjγ+1 ) in descending order for all i ∈ [1,2, · · · ,N]. XT = argmaxXi∈X{p(X jγ+γjγ+1 = Xi|W jγ+γjγ+1 )} is the most
probable one. Guessing X jγ+γjγ+1 should start with the first one in the ranking list, and then the second and so on,
till the correct one is found.
A secure template contains the hash of the whole secret. We are not able to check the correctness of the
estimated individual subblocks. Therefore, we apply this process to all the subblocks corresponding to the
message blocks of RS codes and recalculate the probabilities of all the possible combinations of the iris bits:
p(XmSγ1 |W mSγ1 ) =
mS−1
∏
j=0
p(X jγ+γjγ+1 |W jγ+γjγ+1 ) (5.20)
For every possible XmSγ1 , a corresponding secret can be estimated by decoding Hadamard codes and concatenating
the secret bits of individual Hadamard codes. Now we can rank p(XmSγ1 |W mSγ1 ) and start the estimation with the
most probable ones. If the hash of the estimated secret candidate is exactly matched with the stored hash value,
then the correct secret is found.
Additionally, in order to speed up the searching process, we use the following logarithmic representation of
the probabilities so that multiplications are converted into additions:
log(p1 · p2 · · · , pn) = log(p1)+ log(p2)+ · · ·+ log(pn) (5.21)
We test our cracking algorithm in CASIA interval v3 database with 2639 different iris images. The Hadamard
code of (128, 8, 31) is used. We try to estimate the subblocks of iris codes and secrets corresponding to individual
Hadamard code blocks with Eq 5.19. The results of different settings are shown in Figure 5.19. The x-axis
indicates R, the number of performed attempts till the correct secret is found; the y-axis shows the probability,
that the R-th attempt is successful. Comparing with low conditional entropy H(X jγ+γjγ+1 |W jγ+γjγ+1 ) = 2.532, it is not
surprising that the most Hadamard blocks can be cracked with only two attempts. Without mask, more than 58%
blocks can be successfully estimated at the first attempts and more than 36% at the second attempts. With mask,
more than 56% blocks are correctly guessed at the second attempts and more than 32% at the first attempts.
The success probability at the first attempt in the case without mask is higher than that with mask, because our
Markov model is trained with the iris features without mask. Moreover, if iris masks are used, iris bits in the
marked regions are all zeros, which also belong to the highly probable state transition. Therefore, a lot of blocks
can be cracked after the second attempts in the case with mask. The guessing entropy of Hadamard blocks can
be calculated with Eq A.18. Based on our test results, it is less than 1.5 attempts.
When estimating the whole secret, the conditional probability can be calculated sequentially with Eq 5.20. If a
candidate list of X jγ1 is with the size of U , the new candidates list of X
jγ+γ
1 including the next subblock increases
to U×N. The size of the candidate list increases exponentially with mS, the number of the message blocks in an
RS code. It can block the memory very fast. We use the following sub optimal solutions to reduce the memory
size as well as the computational power required.
In the first implementation we use the Viterbi algorithm and give a limit on the length of the candidate list.
If the number U of the candidates exceeds a predefined limit, the rest of the candidates will be deleted from
the sorted candidate list. In the second implementation, we change the ranking strategy and choose the first V
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Figure 5.19.: The number of attempts and their corresponding successful rate
candidates of every Hadamard block. For instance, if the candidate list of X jγ1 is with the size of U , the new
candidate list of X jγ+γ1 is extended with the first V candidates of X
jγ
1 . And the size of the new list increases to
U×V =V j+1. We denote the first implementation as Algo 1 and the second implementation as Algo 2.
In the experiment with Algo 1, the candidate list length never exceeds the length of the Hadamard codebook,
namely 256 for the128 bit long Hadamard codewords. The number of the candidates to be calculated during
ranking is never larger than 256×256, which corresponds to 16 bits. The estimation results are plotted in Figure
5.20. This setting works very well with the short LS. However, as LS grows, not all features can be successfully
estimated. For LS = 40, 99.85% secure templates without mask can be cracked with up to 10.52 bit attempts
and 99.51% with mask can be retrieved with up to 9.66 bit attempts. For LS = 56, 91.22% protected templates
without mask and 91.68% with mask can be cracked with maximum 10.38 bit attempts. The success probabilities
reduce strongly at LS = 72. Only 44.19% secure templates without mask and 45.71% with mask can be estimated
with maximum 9.98 bit attempts. We also try to increase the length of the candidate list to improve the number
of crackable templates. However, the success rate increases very slowly with the length of the list.
In the experiment with Algo 2, only the first 4 most probable candidates of individual codeblocks are taken
into account. The maximum number of attempts is 4mRS . The results are plotted in Figure 5.21. For LS =
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{40,56,72}, the maximum attempts are 10, 14, 18 bits. The maximum success rates are 96.59%, 98.59% and
99.09% respectively.
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Figure 5.20.: The success rate of cracking secure templates from CASIA v3
Interval Database with Algo 1
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Figure 5.21.: The success rate of cracking secure templates from CASIA v3
Interval Database with Algo 2.
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Except the setting of LS = 40, Algo 2 is generally better than Algo 1. The memory and computational power
required in Algo 2 grow with the secret size. This avoids the waste of the resource by estimating short secrets.
The success rate curves of Algo 1 grow faster than those of Algo 2, however, they reach saturation also earlier
than Algo 2. Additionally, Algo 2 shows a better performance for long secret. In Algo 1, the candidates in the
previous block are weighted more than that in the later blocks. However, the success of estimation is dependent
on the correctness of every subblock. Figure 5.19 already shows that the correct secret of individual subblocks is
with high probability in front of the ranking list. Therefore, Algo 2 is more efficient than Algo 1.
The algorithms with the current settings can not crack all the secure templates. Those unsuccessfully estimated
templates need more than NT attempts, where NT is the maximum number of attempts used in a setting. We assign
NT to those unsuccessful templates and calculate the average number of attempts needed to reconstruct iris codes
with Algo 2 for m = 9600 in CASIA interval v3 database. The results are shown in Table 5.8. The number of
attempts for those unsuccessful templates might be larger than NT . Therefore, the results are a lower bound of
the average number of attempts and the risk of overestimation on the security is avoided.
LS
Average # of attempts
no mask mask
40 7.73 7.65
56 11.06 10.93
72 14.42 14.25
Table 5.8.: The average number of attempts (in bits) needed to reconstruct iris codes with Algo 2 for m = 9600
in CASIA interval v3 database
5.3.5. Discussions
In Section 5.3.2 we measured the security and privacy protection ability of the protected iris recognition system
with mutual information and conditional entropy. It was shown that the uncertainty of iris code X as well as
secret S given auxiliary data W is much smaller than the secret length. The security and irreversibility of secure
templates are very poor. In Section 5.3.4, we proposed a cracking algorithm, which exploits the distribution
of iris codes and the detail of the coding method. We show that cracking protected templates is possible with
low complexity. It confirms the results obtained in our theoretical analysis. An adversary can really use the
security and privacy leakage of the system and perform a practical attack. The cracking algorithm requires
certain memory and computational power. In Section 5.3.4, the calculation of candidate list was based on a
recursive method, which is not time consuming. However, temporary storage of the list needs huge memory.
We solved this problem by limiting the length of the candidate list. It is a sub optimal solution with quite high
success rate and only several secure templates can not be cracked successfully.
In Section 5.3.3, we analyzed the unlinkability. The system is resistant to leakage amplification, but vulnerable
to cross matching. Cross matching is caused by high privacy leakage and a decodability attack can be performed
at Hadamard coding layer. With the cracking method, it is easy to explain the effect of leakage amplification.
If W1 and W2 are the helper data generated from features X1 and X2 of the same subject using the same coding
method, they result in the similar candidate lists with a linear shift of X1−X2. Linking W1 and W2 will not give
any additional information about X1 or X2. However if different coding schemes are used, two different candidate
lists can be produced. The ranking can be further optimized with the similarity between the candidates in two
different lists. It means that the real X1 and X2 are in two candidate lists and their distance is smaller than those
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between other candidates. This causes leakage amplification. However, if the noise between X1 and X2 is too high
and their distance is too large, then there is no advantage combining two templates and leakage amplification is
impossible. It also supports the analysis in [STP09] (see also Section 3.4.2).
The security and privacy leakage is a serious problem in the system. Hadamard code has good error correction
ability, however, its code construction strengthens the leakage. A subblock of a Hadamard code is a repetition
or an inversion of its previous block. It complies with the path with the lowest probability in the Markov chain
of iris codes. Therefore, the possible candidates of an iris codes are far from a uniform distribution given the
helper data. It is possible to improve the security of the system by changing the coding scheme. We can modify
iris encoding process so that a state and its inversion on the Markov chain are not in the diagonal positions,
e.g switching the state [01] and [11] in Figure 5.14. Unfortunately, the error probability will increase, since the
Hamming distance between adjacent quantization areas grows from 1 bit to 2 bit. Alternatively permutation is
also a useful tool. We can change iris codes or Hadamard code such that the distribution of iris candidates given
the helper data looks more uniform. It is also possible to scramble the whole iris codes and the complexity of
calculating the ranking list can increase strongly and more memory is required. But this method will break burst
error patterns in iris codes and RS code will be no longer useful. The potentials to improve security exist by
designing more adequate coding scheme.
On the other hand, if iris features are stationary and ergodic, secrecy leakage is unavoidable with the fuzzy
commitment scheme. In [Ign09], Ignatenko gave a lower bound of the entropy H(W ) for this case:
H(W )≥ n ·h(h−1(H(X))∗h−1(LS
n
)
)
(5.22)
where h is binary entropy function, h−1 is the inverse function of h, and the operator ∗ is defined for 0 ≤
a,b ≤ 1 as a ∗ b = a(1− b)+ (1− a)b. The achievable secret size of the system H(S|W ) can not be larger than
H(X)+LS− n ·
(
h−1(H(X)) ∗ h−1(LSn )
)
. For LS = 72 and m = 9600, H(S|W ) is at most 54.4234 bits. In order
to prevent security leakage inherently, either iris codes should be decorrelated or alternative template protection
construction should be used.
5.4. Summary
In this chapter, we continued the evaluation and gave a rigorous assessment on a template protection system
for iris recognition. Iris is a widely used biometric modality. Most of iris recognition algorithms describe the
local pattern of iris textures. We introduced briefly iris recognition and extracted the iris features from CASIA
database with an open source Matlab code using 1D log-Gabor filter. We implemented the fuzzy commitment
algorithm proposed by Hao et al. which is a fundamental work of protecting iris features. Iris codes have high
discriminative power, however, the intraclass errors are also quite high. The two layer coding scheme including
Hadamard code and RS code is used to achieve good robustness. Comparing with results in the original paper, we
can not obtain the same recognition performance and the secret size. The reason is the use of different databases
and feature extraction algorithms. However, it does not affect our work on the security and privacy assessment.
We evaluated the implemented template protection system based on our framework. We analyzed the distri-
bution of iris codes and found out that they can be well characterized with a Markov model. It is shown that iris
codes are strongly dependent. With high probability the adjacent states in an iris code are the same or change
anti-clockwise along the Markov model. Based on this, we quantify the security and privacy protection ability
of the system with information theoretical metrics such as mutual information and conditional entropy. Due to
the dependency of iris codes as well as the coding scheme, the security and irreversibility are very poor. Es-
pecially, the Hadamard code has an opposite pattern to iris codes and decreases the security significantly. As a
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consequence of high privacy leakage, the system is also vulnerable to cross matching. Although the performance
linking secure templates is much worse than the protected system, it is still a serious security weakness. The
advantage of this construction is the resistance to leakage amplification.
We did not limit our evaluation to the theoretical assessment and designed a cracking algorithm to retrieve
secrets and iris codes from secure templates. We exploited the knowledge about the coding scheme and the
properties of iris codes. It is shown that both secrets and iris codes can be successfully estimated with low
complexity. It confirms the results of the theoretical assessment. It is possible to improve the security to a certain
extent by changing the coding scheme. However, it is already proved in the literature that the secret leakage is
unavoidable as long as iris codes are non-uniform stationary and ergodic sequences.
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In Chapter 3, we proposed a generalized evaluation framework for privacy and security assessment. In Chapters
4 and 5, we applied this framework on the template protection system for 3D face recognition and iris recognition
using fuzzy commitment. Their privacy and security performance were strictly investigated under the advanced
threat model. In this chapter, we complete the evaluation including the assessment in the naive and collision
models. Furthermore, we take a look at the existing security analyses on the fuzzy vault system for fingerprint
recognition and show that these analyses fit perfectly into the proposed framework. With the help of the frame-
work as well as the definitions of security and privacy, we are able to compare three different template protection
systems regarding their security and privacy performance.
Both fuzzy commitment and fuzzy vault belong to biometric cryptosystems. Additionally, we validate the
framework on the transformation-based approaches. In contrast to biometric cryptosystems, their evaluation is
based on individual attacks. We investigate and extend the existing security analyses. These analyses can map
well to the framework and measure different protection goals, namely security, privacy protection ability and
unlinkability under special threat models.
6.1. Biometric Cryptosystems
6.1.1. Assessment of the Fuzzy Commitment Scheme in Different Threat Models
In Section 3.4 as well as Chapters 4 and 5, we concentrated on the assessment of fuzzy commitment in the
advanced threat model. In this section, we generalize our assessment to all three threat models including the
naive and collision models.
As shown in Section 3.4, a protected template in a fuzzy commitment scheme consists of PI and W, where
PI = h(S) is the hash of a randomly generated secret S and W includes all auxiliary data, for instance, the XOR
of the codeword and biometric feature and the positions of the most reliable bits used in the fuzzy commitment
system for 3D face recognition as shown in Section 4.2.1. In the naive threat model, we assume that an adversary
has no information about the system. The only attack, which he can perform, is to invert the hash h(S). For
a perfect hash function there exists no useful inversion function. Since S is a LS-bit long uniformly distributed
string (property of random number), the brute force on h(S) requires 2LS−1 trials on average. The secret length,
which can be achieved currently with fuzzy commitment, is relatively short. In this case, the computational
time required to calculate a hash is very small. We consider it as a constant and denote O(1) to measure the
computational time of the hash function. Recalling the security definition Def 1 given in Section 3.2.3, fuzzy
commitment is (T ,ε)- secure in the naive model with T =O(1) and ε= LS−1. In this threat model, an adversary
can only retrieve the secret. He can, for instance, reuse this secret and try to be verified as an authorized subject.
However, neither privacy information can be learned nor any linkage attack is possible.
In the advanced model, more information is available to an adversary and the assessment is much more rig-
orous than in the naive model. In Chapters 4 and 5, information-theoretical metrics are used to evaluate the
security and privacy preserving ability. A perfectly secure fuzzy commitment scheme requires independently
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uniformly distributed features and does not leak information about the secret. Our evaluation results on 3D face
and iris recognition show that serious privacy and security leakage exists, if the requirement of independency is
not fulfilled.
Dependency of features is very common in biometric systems. Especially, those feature extraction algorithms
based on local patterns preserve more or less the inherent correlation present in biometric modalities. On the one
hand, we can use additional processes such as random projection or independent component analysis, to reduce
the dependency of biometric features. On the other hand, we show that coding algorithms have a strong influence
on security. Although security leakage can not be eliminated with coding algorithms, a well-designed method
can be adapted to statistical properties of biometric features and minimize secret leakage and an improper coding
method can enlarge the leakage. For instance, we show in Section 5.3.5 that the achievable security of the iris
fuzzy commitment system is H(S|W ) = 54.42 bits at LS = 72 according to our iris model. The really achieved
security with Hadamard code and RS code is only 14 bits (see Section 5.3.2). We can also use Def 1 and 2
in order to measure the security and privacy. A fuzzy commitment scheme is (T ,ε)- secure in the advanced
model with T = O(1) and ε = log2 G(S|W ), where G(S|W ) is the conditional guessing entropy of S given W
and implies the average number of guesses required to successfully estimate S. The hash function is necessary
in the reconstruction and we use the computational time of a perfect hash to quantify T . From the privacy point
of view, a fuzzy commitment scheme is (t,T ,ε)- preserving in the advanced model with t = 0, T = O(1) and
ε= log2 G(X |W ). Here t is equal to zero, because the biometric feature is linked with the secret through W and
the corresponding features can be totally recovered with known secrets.
In both theoretical and practical analyses with possible attacks, the distribution of binary biometric features
is the key in the assessment. Without knowing their probability distribution, it is not possible to compute the
information-theoretical metrics. An adversary can perform an efficient attack with the help of information about
the distribution. Therefore, we made an effort in Chapters 4 and 5 to study the distribution of the features. We
used two models, the second order dependency tree and the Markov model for the 3D facial features and the
iris features, respectively. The use of statistical models can limit the estimation complexity. The challenge is
to find an appropriate model for the biometric features. Sometimes further assumptions and simplifications are
necessary such that features can be fitted to the chosen model. The empirical non-parametric methods are more
accurate, however, their complexity can grow very fast with the dimensionality of the features and they are hard
to use in practice.
In Section 5.3.4, we used a cracking algorithm to reconstruct the iris features from their secure templates. In
the non-perfectly secure systems, the computational time of one reconstruction attempt is larger than that of the
hash function. In this case, the secret is no longer uniformly distributed given the auxiliary data and the number of
necessary reconstruction attempts is much smaller than that in the case of perfect secure systems. The candidates
of a secret need to be stored and their probabilities must be calculated and ranked. More computational power is
required. Here we use O(1) to give a very loose lower bound of the required computational time. The required
memory can be quantified with H(S|W ).
Linkability is a serious problem in the fuzzy commitment scheme. It is caused by the inevitable privacy
leakage and possible personal identifiable information in protected templates. The resistance to linkability can
be improved, if an optimal coding method is used and privacy leakage is minimized. Moreover, it should be
avoided to store any personal identifiable information. Ideally, protected templates are totally random.
In the collision model, the security is dependent on the FAR of a system. An adversary can perform a FAR
attack and find biometric data in his database, that can pass the pseudonymous identifier verification process.
Here the search space is limited to the database of an adversary. The average success rate is equal to the FAR
and the average number of guesses needed is 1/FAR. The fuzzy commitment scheme is (T ,ε)- secure in the
collision model, where ε=− log2 FAR and T depends on the complexity of the whole pseudonymous identifier
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verification process including feature extraction and pseudonymous identifier recorder. The data found in the
adversary’s database is also close to the biometric data of the target person. Therefore, this attack also harms
privacy. We can use the same metrics of the security definition to measure the privacy preserving ability. In this
case, the accuracy of the reconstruction of biometric data is equal to the tolerance of the PI verification process by
default. In this threat model, linking different applications is not possible due to the lack of system information.
Of course, the similar biometric data, that an adversary finds, can be falsely accepted in other applications. The
security performance is strongly related to recognition performance, namely the achieved FAR.
We showed the evaluation of the fuzzy commitment scheme for different threat models. The evaluation results
are strongly dependent on the information and resources available to an adversary. Therefore, the evaluation
results of distinct models can be quite different. A system designer should choose a threat model subject to the
security and privacy requirements of the application at hand. By designing an algorithm, a rigorous assessment
is recommended. Assessment of only the naive model is not sufficient. Both the advanced and collision models
need to be taken into account. Especially in the advanced model, all protection goals identified in Section 3.2.2
can be assessed, which is very helpful for an algorithm developer to find weaknesses or potential flaws.
6.1.2. Comparison of Different Biometric Cryptosystems
The proposed framework is helpful to give a rigorous assessment of a template protection system. Additionally,
it creates a basis to compare different systems regarding security and privacy. In this section, we compare fuzzy
commitment for 3D face recognition and iris recognition using the evaluation results obtained in Chapters 4 and
5. In order to demonstrate the generalizability, an existing security assessment on the fingerprint fuzzy vault
system is also included.
The details of the fuzzy vault algorithm and the security analysis are given in Section 3.5. We use the results
of Nandakumar et al. in [NJP07] with the FVC2002-DB2 database. In their experiment, 24 minutiae points are
used in the enrolment, the degree of the polynomial d = 8, and 224 chaff points are generated. The length of the
secret is 128 bits. The FAR of 0.01% at FRR of 9% is achieved with one reference and one query fingerprint
image per comparison. With Eq 3.20, they calculated the expected number of combinations, which is needed
to be evaluated in order to find the genuine points and retrieve the secret. These are 2.5× 109 combinations
corresponding to 31.24 bits.
For the 3D face recognition system, we use the results with the FRGC database including version 1.0 and 2.0.
The feature length of 476 and the length of BCH-codeword of 255 are chosen. For the iris recognition system,
the results with CASIA-V1.0 database and the feature length of 9600 with iris mask are utilized.
According to the evaluation framework proposed in Section 3.2.4, we analyse three template protection sys-
tems regarding the protection goals, namely security, privacy protection ability and unlinkability in different
threat models. In order to compare different algorithms, generally applicable evaluation metrics are necessary.
In Section 3.2.4 we give Def 1 and 2 to quantify the security of PI and the irreversibility of biometric features.
The advantage is that the metrics can be calculated empirically as well as theoretically. In the following, we will
make use of these definitions and the metrics measuring privacy leakage and unlinkability (see Sections 3.2.3,
3.4 and 3.5). The differences of the three systems in privacy and security performance are shown.
6.1.2.1. Comparison of Security
In Def 1, the metrics ε and T are proposed, which show the average number of attempts needed to guess a
pre-image of PI and the computational time required for one attempt. They represent average computational
complexity required in an attack scenario. These unified metrics allow the comparison of different template
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protection systems. In Table 6.1, the security assessment using Def 1 in three threat models is displayed. Both
fuzzy commitment and fuzzy vault belong to biometric cryptosystems and the PI in their systems is the hash of
randomly generated secret. In the naive model, an adversary can only guess the plain text of the hash. Therefore, ε
is dependent on the secret size and T corresponds to the computational time of the hash function. The assessment
in the naive model indicates the computational complexity of a brute force attack on the PI.
In the advanced threat model, ε reduces strongly, since the estimation of secrets becomes easier with knowl-
edge about the system and biometric features. As shown in the previous section, ε is the logarithmic representa-
tion of the conditional guessing entropy G(S|W ). In both the 3D face and the iris recognition systems, we can
not measure G(S|W ) directly. However, in the face recognition system, the BCH-coding is used. A lower bound
of G(S|W ) can be calculated with Eq 4.21 and ε in Table 6.1 shows this lower bound. For the iris recognition
system, we empirically calculate the average number of attempts needed by the cracking algorithm. This result
is dependent on the cracking algorithm and its settings. It is an approximation of ε. The result of fingerprint
recognition is calculated with Eq 3.20 and cited from [NJP07]. Eq 3.20 is based on the assumption that an
adversary can not distinguish the chaff points from genuine ones. The chaff points and genuine points should
have the same statistical properties and all the combinations of subsets should be equally probable minutiae sets.
Otherwise Eq 3.20 will overestimate the security. In fuzzy commitment, the reconstruction still relies on the
hash function, therefore, T is the same as in the naive model. In fuzzy vault, polynomial reconstruction is the
dominant operation in the reconstruction. Its T shows the computational time of a polynomial reconstruction,
which is equal to O(nlog2(n)) [Sha79].
As shown in the previous section, ε and T in the collision model depend on the FAR and the computational
time of the whole verification process. Table 6.1 shows ε of three systems, and ε varies from 5.18 bits to 13.29
bits. We can reduce the FAR to achieve higher security, however, FRR will increase and the system will become
inconvenient. The best way is to design a better feature extraction algorithm and a better template protection
algorithm to improve the recognition performance.
In the naive model, the fingerprint fuzzy vault system has the largest secret size. In the advanced model, it
also has the highest ε and T . In the collision model, its ε is equal to 13.29 bits with the smallest FRR. Therefore
the fingerprint system is the most secure one in all threat models. Similarly, we can recognise that the iris fuzzy
commitment system is the second secure one.
System LS
Naive Model Advanced Model Collision Model
ε= LS−1 T ε T ε=− log2 FAR(FAR@FRR)
Fuzzy Commitment for 3D face
47 46 O(1) 5.20 O(1) 5.18 (2.75%@9.64%)
55 54 O(1) 6.79 O(1) 6.24 (1.32%@17.68%)
71 70 O(1) 11.13 O(1) 6.48 (1.12%@19.97%)
Fuzzy Commitment for Iris
40 39 O(1) 7.65 O(1) 6.86 (0.86%@19.96%)
56 55 O(1) 10.93 O(1) 7.18 (0.69%@21.30%)
72 71 O(1) 14.25 O(1) 7.41 (0.59%@22.74%)
Fingerprint Fuzzy Vault 128 127 O(1) 31.24 O(nlog2(n)) 13.29(0.01%@9%)
Table 6.1.: Security assessment of the three template protection systems in the naive, advanced and collision
threat models
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If a fuzzy commitment scheme is perfectly secure, the security assessment with the naive model is equal to that
with the advanced model. Due to strong dependency of 3D face features and iris features, ε in the naive model
is much larger than in the advanced model. Although ε increases with the secret length, the secret length can
not represent the security in the advanced and collision model. In many papers, only the secret length is given
for the security assessment, which is definitively not proper in a rigorous analysis. The security of fuzzy vault is
determined by the hardness of polynomial reconstruction among numerous chaff points. The complexity of the
reconstruction should be high enough to guarantee computational security.
6.1.2.2. Comparison of Privacy Protection Ability
We analyze the privacy protection ability. In the naive model, an adversary can not obtain information about
biometric data lacking of knowledge about the systems. In the collision model, he can only find biometric data,
from which the same or a similar PI as that of the target person can be generated. Therefore, it makes more
sense to assess privacy protection ability in the advanced model. The results are shown in Table 6.2. The privacy
leakage measures the amount of information about biometric features contained in protected templates. The
irreversibility of PI is measured with Def 2. The threshold t in the definition is equal to 0.
System
Uncertainty
LS
Privacy Leakage Irreversibility
of bio. features ε T
Fuzzy Commitment for 3D face 153.7
47 84.3 67.4 O(1)
55 82.1 69.6 O(1)
71 77.5 74.2 O(1)
Fuzzy Commitment for Iris 4325.88
40 4317.12 7.65 O(1)
56 4314.06 10.93 O(1)
72 4311.00 14.25 O(1)
Fingerprint Fuzzy Vault 923.83 128 892.59 31.24 O(nlog2(n))
Table 6.2.: Privacy assessment of the three template protection systems in advanced model
The privacy leakage of the fuzzy commitment schemes is evaluated as H(X |W ). The entropy of the 3D facial
features is 153.7 at a feature length of 476. In the 3D face recognition system, only 255 elements of the whole
feature vector are used in the fuzzy commitment system. If the secret is compromised, still 221 bits of the features
need to be estimated. Therefore, the 3D facial feature has less privacy leakage in comparison with the other two
systems. In addition, its irreversibility is higher than the security of PI in the advanced model1. In contrast, all
bits in the iris features are used in the fuzzy commitment scheme. The irreversibility is equal to the security in
the advanced model. The entropy of iris features is 4325.88 at a feature length of 9600. The privacy leakage is
extremely high.
All these results are based on the statistical models, which are utilized to simulate the distribution of biometric
features. A more accurate estimation is possible, if better methods can be found for modeling the distributions.
Additionally, it is shown that the privacy leakage increases when decreasing the secret size in fuzzy commitment.
This confirms the similar conclusion drawn in [Ign09].
1The threshold t in Def 2 shows how precise an adversary wants to reconstruct biometric features. If a larger t is chosen, the irreversibility
of the protected 3D face system becomes smaller.
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The irreversibility of the fuzzy vault scheme is also equal to the security, since the compromise of the secret
is accomplished with exposure of minutiae information. In [NJP07], a minutia is represented by a 16 bit feature,
6 bit for the vertical dimension, 5 bit for the horizontal dimension and 5 bit for the orientation. As shown in
Section 3.5, the uncertainty of a feature set containing 24 minutiae is equal to log2
(
25 ·(21124 ))= 923.83. 2 Given
a vault set containing 224 points, the uncertainty reduces to the complexity of finding 24 genuine points among
the vault set. We use Eq 3.21 and obtain the privacy leakage of 892.59 bit.
Comparing the uncertainty of biometric features with the privacy leakage in Table 6.2, the 3D face system
has the smallest privacy leakage. The iris system has the worst privacy preserving ability. The iris system and
fingerprint system expose more than 96% biometric information.
6.1.2.3. Comparison of Unlinkability
Finally we investigate the unlinkability. In Chapters 4 and 5 we showed that both fuzzy commitment systems
are vulnerable to cross matching. In the 3D face system, an EER of 5% can be obtained by linking the position
vectors. In the iris system, an EER of 16.34% is achieved with the decodability attack. The 3D face system is
vulnerable to privacy leakage amplification, however, the iris system is resistant to the leakage amplification. The
fuzzy vault system is unprotected to both cross matching and privacy leakage amplification. As shown in [SB07],
linking protected templates of the same subject can retrieve the genuine minutiae in the vault set. Unfortunately,
no assessment on the linkability is given in the cited fuzzy vault paper [NJP07]. The feasibility of linkage attack
was proved by Kholmatov et al. in [KY08]. The databases and implementation used in their fuzzy vault scheme
are not exactly the same as in [NJP07]. Therefore, we can not use it in our comparison. Nevertheless linkage is
a serious problem for fuzzy vault.
In this section we analyzed the security, privacy protection ability as well as unlinkability of three template
protection systems. From the security point of view, the fingerprint fuzzy vault system has the best performance.
However it has large privacy leakage and is unresistant to the linkage attack. The security of the iris fuzzy
commitment system is slightly better than that of the 3D face system. However, its privacy leakage is quite high.
All these three systems can not fulfill all the protection goals. Further improvement is necessary.
6.2. Transformation-Based Algorithms
Till now we investigated the security and privacy of biometric cryptosystems. Transformation-based algorithms
are also an important category of template protection. Biometric cryptosystems can generate distinct secrets from
biometric data. In contrast, transformation-based methods either distort or randomize biometric data such that the
original data can not be recognised any more. In these algorithms, user- and application-specific transformation
parameters are used, which are the auxiliary data (AD) and parts of protected templates as described in Section
2.2.2. Normally they need to be kept secret.
The main focuses of transformation-based algorithms are to enable renewability and the non-invertibility with
good recognition performance: Changing transformation parameters should result in different transformed data
(PI), which do not match each other even if they are derived from the same subject; it is hard to derive the orig-
inal data from its transformed template; additionally, transformation functions should preserve the recognition
performance of the original biometric system.
2The real entropy of minutiae features is lower than the estimated result, since the position of a minutiae is correlated with its angle
information. The encoding of minutiae in [NJP07] contains redundancy and is not optimal. However, our assessment is based on the
assumptions and parameters used in [NJP07] and the correlation is ignored.
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In Table 6.3 we give the examples of some important transformation-based algorithms and show their AD and
PI. In this section we focus on transformation-based algorithms and validate the evaluation framework proposed
in Section 3.2. We will define the different threat models and analyze the corresponding protection goals for
different algorithms.
Algorithm AD PI
Cancelable
Face image morphing [RCB01] Morphing parameters Transformed image
Cartesian transformation of
minutiae [RCCB07]
Transformation parameters Transformed minutiae
Biometrics Polar transform of
minutiae [RCCB07]
Transformation parameters Transformed minutiae
Surface folding transformation of
minutiae [RCCB07]
Transformation parameters Transformed minutiae
Biohashing
Random projection& binarization
[JLG04, TJC∗06, CTGN05]
Projection matrix Binary vector
Complex number randomization &
phase binarization
Randomization vector Binary vector
Random binarization [AL09] Randomization threshold Binary vector
Cancelable
biometrics filters
Convolution with a random kernel
& MACE [SKK04]
– Encrypted MACE filter
Table 6.3.: Examples of transformation-based algorithms
6.2.1. The Threat Models
The threat models are the important precondition for the assessment and can influence the evaluation results. In
this section we define different threat models for transformation-based algorithms.
Evaluation of transformation-based algorithms in the naive model is not necessary, since protected templates
mean nothing outside the algorithms and an adversary cannot perform any attack. In the rest of the section we
skip the assessment with the naive model.
The assessment with the advanced model assumes that an adversary knows the template protection algorithms.
Secret auxiliary data is an important security and privacy factor. The advanced model can be further refined with
following assumptions:
• AM1: An adversary has no access to AD.
• AM2: An adversary has indirect access to AD. He can make use of AD as well as the transformation
functions without knowing AD exactly.
• AM3: An adversary has direct access to AD. He knows AD and can use both AD and the transformation
functions.
From AM1 to AM3, the complexity for an adversary to calculate a pre-image or to retrieve biometric features
decreases.
Similarly, the assessment in the collision model can be divided into the cases with or without AD. We also
define the two sub models:
• CM1: An adversary has no access to AD.
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• CM2: An adversary has access to AD.
Neither CM1 nor CM2 requires the detailed information about AD. However, CM2 assumes that an adversary
can use the AD of the target person during a collision attack, while in CM1 he cannot.
Based on the threat models we can design an evaluation process to measure the protection goals. In practical
evaluation an attack algorithm can be used and its efficiency quantifies the protection goals. During experiments
we can define different kinds of genuine and impostor comparisons to evaluate the efficiency of an attack algo-
rithm. In Table 6.4 we give an overview of possible comparisons and the corresponding protection goals, which
can be assessed. Genuine comparisons using the same AD show the usability (robustness) of transformed fea-
tures (PI) and those using different AD represent the unlinkability of CM1. Impostor comparisons with stored AD
show the discriminative power of PIs in the same transformed feature space, while impostor comparisons with
different AD show the general discriminative power of PIs. Impostor comparisons also represent the security in
different collision models. Genuine comparisons between biometric data and the data reconstructed from PI with
stored AD display the security in advanced model AM2 or AM3. Those with different AD show the accuracy
of a reconstruction function and can evaluate irreversibility in advanced model AM2 or AM3. A generalized
reconstructed datum can be matched with protected templates of the same subject and accepted in other applica-
tions. Table 6.4 is helpful for the design of evaluation processes. In the following we analyze achievements of
the protection goals for transformation-based algorithms in different threat models.
Comparison stored AD different AD
Genuine
biometric vs.
biometric data
usability of PI (performance)
security (collision model CM2 )
unlinkability
(collision model CM1 )
biometric vs.
reconstructed data
security
(advanced model AM2, AM3)
Irreversibility
(advanced model AM2, AM3)
Impostor discriminability (performance)
security (collision model CM2)
discriminability (performance)
security (collision model CM1)
Table 6.4.: The different kinds of comparisons and the assessment of corresponding protection goals
6.2.2. Security Assessment
According to Section 3.2.3, the security of template protection is determined by the complexity to construct
a pre-image Mˆ, which can pass through the PI verification process, PIC(PIR(AD,Mˆ,AD)),PI) = 1. Under
threat model AM1, the reconstruction of a pre-image is hard. Under threat models AM2 and AM3, most of the
transformation-based algorithms are reversible.
The cancelable biometrics for fingerprint minutiae applies different (many-to-one) functions to change minu-
tiae. In [NJ09], Nagar et al. investigated its security. The important step is the calculation of the pre-image of
each minutia. The pre-image is a set of candidate minutiae, which can produce the same transformed minutiae
as those stored in a protected template. They computed the transformed positions of all pixels in the fingerprint
area and found the candidate positions of a particular transformed minutia. Obviously, any combination of the
minutiae in the individual pre-images is a valid Mˆ. As calculating the pre-image, it is not necessary to know the
transformation parameter, namely AD exactly. It is sufficient for an adversary to use the transformation function.
It corresponds to the assessment in threat model AM2.
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In biohashing based on random mapping as shown in [CTGN05, JLG04], a biometric feature M is projected
onto randomly generated basis vectors and the new feature is binarized. The algorithm is conducted in the
following steps:
1. Generate n orthogonal normalized random vectors with length m (n ≤ m), R = {r j| j ∈ [1, · · · ,n]} with
rTj · r j′ = 0 for ∀ j 6= j′; rTj · r j = 1 3.
2. Calculate the inner product τ = [τ1, · · · ,τn]} of the biometric feature M = [m1, · · · ,mm] and the random
vectors. τ j = M · r j.
3. Calculate b = [b1, · · · ,bn], by comparing τ with the binarization thresholds. b ∈ {0,1}n is the pseudony-
mous identifier and also called biohash.
In [CKYZ05] Cheung et al. evaluated the non-invertibility of this algorithm. They assumed that the projection
matrix R and the biohashes b are available to an adversary. b′ is a modified version of b: b′j = 1, if b j = 1; or
b′j = −1, if b j = 0. By τ = 0. A valid Mˆ = b′ ·R∗, where R∗ is a pseudo inverse of R. It can be easily proved
that any Mˆ fulfilling the following equation is a valid pre-image:
Mˆ = (τ+∆) ·R∗ (6.1)
where ∆ = [δ1, · · · ,δn] with δi > 0 for bi = 1 and δi < 0 for bi = 0. Since R consists of pair wise orthogonal
rows, its pseudo inverse exists (the definition of pseudo inverse can be found in [MV99]):
R∗ = RT (6.2)
R∗ has the property that R∗ ·R = 1 and R ·R∗ ·R = R, then:
Mˆ ·R = (τ+∆) ·R∗ ·R = τ+∆ (6.3)
The binarization of Mˆ can give the same biohash b and Mˆ can pass through the verification process. This attack
algorithm and security analysis correspond to the assessment with threat model AM3.
For the cancelable biometric filter, Adler proposed a hill climbing attack to find an operative image [Adl04],
which corresponds to threat model AM1. Although there is no real implementation shown, he said that the
comparison score of the queried and stored PI can be utilized in a recursive algorithm to improve the similarity
between the reference image and the image submitted by an adversary. The detail of the algorithm is described
in Section 3.1.2.
In the collision model, the security also depends on FAR. Normally FARCM1 with threat model CM1 becomes
smaller and a transformation-based algorithm can improve the dissimilarity between PI of different subjects. It
is due to the use of user-specific AD. The threat model CM2 is stricter. A well-designed transformation function
should not degrade recognition performance and preserve the same discriminative power even if AD is known to
an adversary. The assessment with CM1 shows the renewability of an algorithm and the evaluation with CM2
shows the resistance against collision. For instance, Kong et al. showed in [KCZ∗06] that zero EER can be
achieved by biohashing algorithms with CM1. However, they demonstrated the decreasing of the recognition
performance with CM2.
6.2.3. Privacy Assessment
Privacy assessment includes the privacy leakage and irreversibility of biometric information. The essential part
is irreversibility, which is defined as the complexity to reconstruct a datum Mˆ close to biometric datum M of the
target person. The privacy assessment requires more precise estimation of biometric data.
3A simple way to generate orthogonal random vectors is to apply Gram-Schmidt process to a set of random numbers.
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The privacy performance of cancelable biometrics for fingerprint minutiae was evaluated in [RCCB07,NJ09].
In [RCCB07], Ratha et al. calculated the number of possible pre-images given the transformed features. It is the
assessment based on a brute force attack with threat model AM1.
In [NJ09], Nagar et al. analyzed further the irreversibility. The pre-image of a transformed minutia is calcu-
lated, which may contain more than one candidates. With the general distribution of fingerprint minutiae, the
candidate minutiae in the pre-image are ranked and an adversary can guess the original minutia based on the
ranking list. They plotted the effort, namely the number of guesses, versus the coverage, the probability of the
success retrieval. Their experiments showed that the coverage and effort also depend on the transformation pa-
rameters. It is also a drawback of this cancelable biometrics algorithm that the irreversibility varies with different
parameters. Given vi is a transformed minutiae, i ∈ [1, · · · ,m] and m is the number of transformed minutiae.
Vi is the pre-image of vi, which contains li candidate minutiae and mi ∈ Vi is the original one. H(mi|vi) is the
uncertainty about mi given its transformed one vi. The equation calculating H(mi|vi) was proposed in [NJ09]:
H(mi|vi) = −∑lij=1 p(vi, j|vi) · log(p(vi, j|vi)). It is a metric to quantify the irreversibility based on threat model
AM3.
In [NNJ10], Nagar et al. also proposed an algorithm attacking biohashing, which can give more precise esti-
mation of biometric features than Cheung’ algorithm [CKYZ05]. In their algorithm, several features in a dataset
are chosen in such a way that their biohashes with the projection matrix of the target person are very similar to
the biohashes of that person. The optimization algorithm for constrained linear least-squares problems is used
to find a biometric feature M˜, which has the minimum distance to a selected biometric feature and can result
in exactly the same biohashes as the target one. The final estimation is an average of all M˜ calculated from the
selected features.The experimental results on facial database showed significant similarity between the original
images and reconstructed images. In order to improve the irreversibility, they also proposed a new binarization
method, which adds two more binarization thresholds at λ and 100−λ - quantile. The value in the first and the
third quantiles is signed into 0 and the rest is signed to 1. With the factor λ, the continuity of the reconstructed
images is broken and the uncertainty about the original images increases. However, they also showed that this
algorithm reduces the recognition performance. The analysis is also based on threat model AM3.
We cannot find analysis on privacy protection ability of the face image morphing algorithm and cancelable
biometric filters. The cancelable biometric filter has the advantage that random kernel used in enrolment is
not stored. It increases the difficulty of reconstruction. More investigation on privacy is necessary for these
algorithms. Additionally, a distance function as described in Def 2 is very helpful to quantify the accuracy of
reconstruction.
6.2.4. Assessment of Unlinkability
In transformation-based algorithms, cross matching is avoided by using different transformation parameters. A
transformed feature, PI, should have enough dissimilarity to the original feature as well as those transformed
features generated from the same subject but with different parameters. For instance, the results in [RCCB07]
show that the performance of genuine comparisons with different parameters is very similar to impostor compar-
isons of the original untransformed features with the cancelable biometrics for minutiae. In [TJC∗06], Teoh et al.
showed that Hamming distance of impostor biohashes approaches to binomial distribution. It indicates that the
resulting biohashes are perfectly random bit strings. In [SKK04], Savvides et al. also visualised the original and
transformed MACE filters with cancelable biometric filter. Convolution with different kernels changes strongly
MACE filters.
Moreover, leakage amplification needs to be analyzed. As shown in the previous section, the inversion al-
gorithm proposed in [NJ09] can estimate the candidate minutiae from a transformed one. The original minutia
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can be simply retrieved by overlapping pre-images of different secure templates generated from the same user.
Similarly, the reconstruction algorithm in [NNJ10] can give more accurate estimation with more biohashes and
the projection matrixes. In these algorithms, combining more protected templates of the same subjects can cause
more privacy leakage. In the following we show another example of the biohashing using scalar randomization.
The Biohashing based on scalar randomization is introduced in [AL09], where biometric features are binarized
with randomly generated thresholds. Assume that xk = [xk,1, · · · ,xk,n] is a biometric feature of subject k. The
interclass probability density function of xi is denoted as pxi , where xi is the i-th element of x. The cumulative
function of pxi is fxi(τ) =
∫ τ pxi(ε)dε with fxi− = 0 and fxi+ = 1. The binarization threshold of xk,i is tk,i =
[t1k,i, · · · , tmk,i], which is randomly generated with the distribution pti = pxi . Biohash bk,i = [b1k,i, · · · ,bmk,i] is the
binarized feature of xk,i:
b jk,i =
{
1 if xk,i ≥ t jk,i
0 if xk,i < t
j
k,i
(6.4)
Multiple bits can be extracted from a single element in a feature vector. The resulting biohashes have the follow-
ing properties:
• For a bit b ji of a unknown user, the probability p(b ji = 1) is:
p(b ji = 1) =
∫
pxi(xi)
∫ xi
pti(t
j
i )dt
j
i ·dxi
=
∫ ∫ xi
pti(t
j
i )dt
j
i ·d fxi(xi) =
∫
fxi(xi)d fxi(xi)
= (
1
2
fxi(xi)
2)+− =
1
2
(6.5)
It indicates that the bits from different subjects are uniformly distributed, since the binarization thresholds
have the same distribution as the biometric features.
• p(bk,i = 1) is the probability that a bit in biohash bk,i of subject k is equal to 1:
p(bk,i = 1) =
∫ xk,i
pti(t
j
k,i)dt
j
k,i = fxi(x)
xk,i
−
= fxi(xk,i) (6.6)
It shows that the bits in bk,i of subject k are identically and independently distributed with the probability
of fxi(xk,i). The distribution of bk,i is dependent on xk,i. H(bk,i) is the entropy of bk,i:
H(bk,i) = m ·H( fxi(xk,i)) (6.7)
For all users, the average entropy of bi is calculated as:
H(bi) = m ·
∫ +
−
p(xk,i)H( fxi(xk,i))dxk,i = m ·
∫ 1
0
H( fxi(xk,i))d fxi(xk,i)≈ 0.74 ·m (6.8)
It shows the randomization ability of this Biohashing algorithm.
• The probability p(b jk,i = b jk′,i) that the j-th bits from different users are equal can be calculated:
p(b jk,i = b
j
k′,i) = fxi(xk,i) fxi(xk′,i)+(1− fxi(xk,i))(1− fxi(xk′,i))
= 2 fxi(xk,i) fxi(xk′,i)− fxi(xk,i)− fxi(xk′,i)+1 (6.9)
Dependency between the bits from different subjects exist. They are independent only if fxi(xk,i) = 0.5 or
fxi(xk′,i) = 0.5 (Eq 6.9 is equal to 0.5).
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Combining biohashes of the same subject helps to precisely retrieve biometric features. Assume that an adver-
sary collects m bit biohashes of xk,i. The Hamming weight of these bits equals l. Then l is binomially distributed
with m and fxi(xk,i). From the properties of binomial distribution, we obtain:
E{ l
m
}= fxi(xk,i) (6.10)
fˆxi(x) =
l
m is an estimation of fxi(x). The larger m is, the more reliable is the estimation. Depending on whether
fˆxi(x) is close to 0 or 1, a prediction of new biohashes extracted from x is possible. Moreover, if fxi(x) is known,
an estimation of xi can be given. Biohashes with scalar randomization have poor randomness and poor resistance
to leakage amplification. The proposed attack can be performed in threat model AM2.
6.3. Summary
In this chapter we firstly analyzed and compared the security and privacy performance of three different biometric
cryptosystems, the fuzzy commitment scheme for 3D face recognition, the fuzzy commitment scheme for iris
recognition and the fuzzy vault algorithm for fingerprint recognition with the help of the evaluation framework.
It not only allows a systematic assessment of individual algorithm but also enables the comparison of different
protected biometric systems.
We investigated the protection goals for three main threat models. It is shown that privacy and security assess-
ment are strongly dependent on the threat models. For instance the security of the 3D face and iris systems in the
naive model is much higher than in the advanced model. The naive model is based on a simple assumption that
an adversary knows nothing about systems. In a rigorous assessment, advanced model and collision model are
indispensable. Our proposed security and privacy definitions provide unique metrics, which allow both empirical
and theoretical measurement on security of PI and irreversibility of biometric features. We used these metrics to
compare three template protection systems and showed that the fuzzy vault algorithm for fingerprint recognition
has the best security and irreversibility.
A disadvantage of these systems is the high privacy leakage. Although the privacy leakage in fuzzy commit-
ment is unavoidable, the dependency in the 3D face features and iris features strengthens the privacy leakage.
The 3D face system has less privacy leakage than the iris system, since not all bits in the 3D features are used
in fuzzy commitment. However, the position of selected features must be stored as a part of secure templates
in the protected 3D face system. It causes the serious cross matching problem. The protected iris recognition
system is also vulnerable to cross matching of the auxiliary data due to high privacy leakage. In the cited paper
of the fuzzy vault implementation, no evaluation on linkability is given. But fuzzy vault is not resistant to cross
matching either and shown in other literatures. All these systems can not fulfill the requirement of unlinkability.
In the second part of this chapter we validated the evaluation framework in transformation-based template pro-
tection algorithms. It was shown that our identified protection goals cover the security and privacy requirements
on transformation-based as well. In contrast to biometric cryptosystems, the evaluation of transformation-based
algorithm relies on practical attacks. The theoretical metrics are only limitedly utilized in the analysis of special
attacks. Naive model is not applicable, since only experienced adversary or someone owning a large biometric
database can perform an attack. The advanced and collision models can be further divided into the sub models
depending on access to AD (secret transformation parameters), since AD is crucial by calculating a pre-image of
PI or retrieving biometric features. The security in collision model is determined by FAR. However, it should
be evaluated with two collision threat models: a unauthorized subject uses the AD of authorized subject and a
unauthorized subject uses his own AD and wants to be verified as an authorized subject.
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Additionally, if the transformation functions as well as their parameters are compromised, it is straightforward
to reconstruct a datum, which can spoof the verification process. However, retrieving the original biometric data
is more complicated. The transformation functions used in cancelable biometrics have many-to-one property.
In biohashing, biometric data is randomized. Cancelable biometric filter makes biometric data extremely noisy.
These increase the difficulty to reconstruct the original biometric data. Furthermore, there is no references linked
directly to biometric data and a precise reconstruction is hard. Transformation-based algorithms have good
privacy protection ability. However, more investigation on privacy especially with quantitative assessment is
necessary.
Due to user-specific transformation parameters, these algorithms have good resistance to cross matching. How-
ever, the risk of leakage amplification is high. Combining secure templates of the algorithms such as cancelable
biometrics and biohashing with random projection can strengthen privacy leakage, if AD is known. In some
algorithms such as biohashing using scalar randomization can expose information and leakage amplification is
possible, even if AD is not explicitly given.
As conclusions, the proposed evaluation framework is a useful evaluation tool for both biometric cryptosys-
tems and transformation-based algorithms. The existing security analysis measured one or more protection goals
in the framework. More assessment of different algorithms is still necessary.
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Biometrics provides the nice security property of binding an identity to its owner and is therefore an important
tool to fight identity fraud. Nevertheless, the related potential privacy and security risks should not be under-
estimated. Biometrics can not be applied at the cost of sacrificing user’s privacy. Biometric data should be
safeguarded against internal and external attackers in order to prevent identity theft and cross matching. Biomet-
ric template protection techniques have been developed to overcome these privacy and security drawbacks.
The research interests in this area should not be limited to a successful integration of template protection with
good recognition performance. It is also important to prove that these algorithms can really improve security and
privacy. Practical applications need a comprehensive rigorous assessment with quantitative measurements. This
thesis meets the challenge of quantifying the security and privacy of biometric template protection.
The research question “how can we make a comprehensive and systematic assessment of the privacy and se-
curity performance of biometric template protection algorithms” is solved. The essential steps of an assessment,
determining evaluation criteria and threat models, and designing evaluation process were identified. The formal
definitions of privacy and security were given and a basis of ranking different algorithms was provided. My con-
cept of systematic evaluations was validated with rigorous assessments of different template protection systems.
Their privacy and security performance are compared.
7.1. Conclusions
The main contribution of this thesis is to propose a generalized evaluation framework for privacy and security
assessment. It answers the main research question. The framework supports a systematic assessment of different
algorithms. Its essential components include protection goals, threat models and evaluation metrics. Protection
goals represent the objectives which we want to achieve with template protection. Three protection goals namely
security, privacy preserving ability and unlinkability, were proposed. The security represents the hardness for
an adversary to generate a datum, which can fool the verification process. Privacy preserving ability measures
the hardness to retrieve biometric data and information about biometric data contained in a protected template.
The unlinkability measures whether a protected template contains personal identifiable information and whether
combining protected templates can reduce the security or privacy preserving ability. The protection goals cover
thoroughly the requirements on template protection and are the evaluation criteria.
In order to measure the attainment of the protection goals, the ability of an adversary regarding information
and computational resources available for him are defined with the threat models. They are the prerequisites for
an evaluation. Without them, the security measurement is meaningless, since the validated scenario is not clear.
We propose three threat models: The naive model assumes that adversaries have very limited information about
the system. The advanced model applies Kerckhoffs’ principle, that adversaries know details of the system and
properties of biometric features. The collision model assumes that adversaries own a large biometric database
and exploit inaccuracies of a biometric system. The threat models also determine which system parameters can
be accessed during an assessment or an attack.
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If protection goals and threat models are determined, the metrics measuring protection goals and the corre-
sponding evaluation process can be developed. On the one hand, theoretical analyses can be used to measure the
protection goals directly with e.g. information-theoretical metrics. On the other hand, practical analyses based
on individual attacks are also possible to show security and privacy performance in practice. Theoretical and
practical analyses complement each other. The framework describes the formal workflow for an evaluation. It is
an indispensable tool for privacy and security assessment.
Additionally, we define (T ,ε)-secure and (T ,ε, t)- preserving for template protection, which describe security
and irreversibility of protected templates respectively. The metric T shows the computational time required of
one attack attempt and the metric ε shows the average number of attempts needed to achieve an attack objective.
Together, they quantify the computational complexity of attacks. The metric t determines the desired recon-
struction accuracy of biometric data. These unified metrics enables comparison of different protected systems
regarding their security and irreversibility.
The second contribution is to validate the framework and to assess strictly two biometric template protection
systems, the fuzzy commitment scheme for 3D face recognition and the fuzzy commitment scheme for iris
recognition. A novel algorithm utilizing the histogram of the depth information is developed to characterize the
3D face surface. It is successfully integrated in fuzzy commitment. The experimental results using the FRGC
databases show a good recognition performance while achieving a high secret size. Additionally, an open source
iris recognition algorithm with Gabor filter is used and the protection scheme proposed by Hao is implemented,
which is a fundamental work protecting iris data.
I carefully analyzed the statistical distribution of 3D face features and iris features as well as the interclass
and intraclass error patterns. The intraclass bit errors are not uniformly distributed in a feature vector. The
coding methods used in fuzzy commitment are not optimal. Additionally, strong dependencies exist in these
features, since they describe the local characteristics of a 3D face or an iris. A second order dependency tree
is used to simulate the dependency of 3D features. Iris features can be well described with a Markov model.
Based on this, the security and privacy were measured with information-theoretical metrics. Two cross matching
attacks were applied to link the protected templates. In both systems, the achieved security is very poor and high
privacy leakage is observed in the advanced threat model. The results showed that the feature dependency has
strong influence on security and privacy. In the security analysis of fuzzy commitment, any assumption on the
distribution of biometric features must be made very carefully. If dependency of features is ignored, security can
be highly overestimated. Moreover, both protected systems suffer from cross matching. In the protected 3D face
system, privacy leakage can be amplified by combining two protected templates of the same subject.
The security and privacy performance of both systems are not satisfactory. The reason is that the optimal
performance of a fuzzy commitment scheme can only be achieved, if binary biometric features are uniformly and
independently distributed. It is a very strict condition, which is hard to fulfill. The thesis shows that there exists
the possibility to improve the security by changing the coding methods. However, in order to prevent security
leakage inherently, better binarization processes or alternative template protection schemes are necessary.
The third contribution is to compare two fuzzy commitment systems with a fuzzy vault system for fingerprint
recognition using the framework. In order to enable a comparison, the security and privacy definitions quan-
tifying security and privacy from computational complexity point of view were used. The fuzzy vault system
outperforms the other two algorithms in security and irreversibility. However, high privacy leakage exists in all
the systems and they are vulnerable to cross matching.
In order to prove the generality, the framework was also validated using the transformation-based algorithms.
The existing security analyses of these algorithms measure one or more protection goals based on corresponding
threat models. The proposed framework is also suitable to evaluate these algorithms.
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The assessment is very important for template protection to check security and privacy performance. The pro-
posed framework enables rigorous assessments in practical applications. The security and privacy performance
can be quantified. With the framework, potential weaknesses of an algorithm can be identified. It provides an
overview of the privacy and security requirements. Algorithm designers can adopt a defensive perspective in the
development and consider all the aspects in advance. It is much more efficient than current reactive perspective.
It is essential for technology innovation. To promote and popularize these techniques, a provable security and
privacy analysis is necessary and this framework is an indispensable tool. Additionally, it creates a basis for
benchmarking and certification. The framework is flexible and system designers can derive different evaluation
processes for specific applications to select a suitable algorithm for their needs.
7.2. Future Work
In the future, the framework can be extended further. Potential directions are e.g. the enrichment of the evaluation
metrics. The protection goals proposed in this work give only necessary criteria and the definitions of security
and privacy are kinds of evaluation metrics. Universal and constructive criteria, which can guarantee security
and privacy performance of template protection, are required.
Additionally, we can use the framework to evaluate more template protection algorithms regarding all protec-
tion goals. On the one hand, the achievement of the security and privacy requirements can be inspected; on the
other hand, potential weaknesses can be detected. The distribution of biometric features plays an essential role
in the assessment. More general models for distribution estimations can be used.
It is shown in this thesis that coding algorithms and binarization process strongly influence the security and pri-
vacy performance of fuzzy commitment. The future research directions are how to binarize dependent biometric
features into uniformly independent binary features, and how to design appropriate coding methods. The theo-
retical analysis of helper data scheme predicts better security and privacy performance than fuzzy commitment.
A better alternative to protect biometric features can be developed.
Unique metrics enable comparisons of different template protection algorithms regarding individual protection
goals. However, in order to give an overall ranking including all protection goals, additional functions combining
different evaluation metrics are necessary. Security and privacy are an important part for evaluation of biometric
template protection systems. Moreover, a general evaluation should also include the recognition performance.
The relation between recognition performance and security should be further analyzed.
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A.1. Probability and Entropy
The probability shows the likelihood of occurrence of an event. Assume that X and Y are two discrete random
variables. X and Y are the collections of all the possible X and Y . The probability that X is equal to x is denoted
as:
p(x) = Pr{X = x} for x ∈ X (A.1)
p(X ,Y ) is the joint probability of X and Y . p(X |Y ) is the conditional probability. The Bayesian rule can be
expressed:
p(X |Y ) = p(X ,Y )
p(Y )
=
p(Y |X) · p(X)
p(Y )
(A.2)
p(X) = ∑
Y∈Y
p(X ,Y ) (A.3)
Assume that X is a binary string of length N and X = [x1,x2, · · · ,xN ]. X is statistically independently dis-
tributed, if p(X) =∏Ni=1 p(xi). X is identically independently distributed, if X is independently distributed and
p(x1) = p(x2) = · · · = p(xN) = p, where p is a constant. X is uniformly independently distributed, if X is
identically independently distributed and p = 0.5.
The entropy shows the amount of information contained in a random variable. The entropy of X is defined as:
H(X) =− ∑
x∈X
p(x) log p(x) (A.4)
Similarly the joint entropy H(X ,Y ) is defined as:
H(X ,Y ) =− ∑
x∈X ,y∈Y
p(x,y) log p(x,y) (A.5)
Their conditional probability H(Y |X) is defined as:
H(Y |X) = ∑
x∈X
p(x)H(Y |X = x) (A.6)
= − ∑
x∈X
p(x) ∑
y∈Y
p(y|x) log p(y|x) (A.7)
= − ∑
x∈X
∑
y∈Y
p(x,y) log p(y|x) (A.8)
The mutual information I(X ;Y ) is defined as:
I(X ;Y ) = ∑
x∈X
p(x,y) log
p(x,y)
p(x)p(y)
(A.9)
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If X1,X2, · · · ,Xn are n discrete random variables, the chain rule exist:
I(X1;X2) = H(X1)−H(X2|X1) (A.10)
H(X1,X2, · · · ,Xn) =
n
∑
1
H(Xi|Xi−1, · · · ,X1) (A.11)
= H(X1)+H(X2|X1)+ · · ·+H(Xn|Xn−1,Xn−2,X1)
I(X1,X2, · · · ,Xn;Y ) =
n
∑
1
I(Xi;Y |Xi−1, · · · ,X1) (A.12)
H(X1,X2|X3) = H(X1|X3)+H(X2|X1,X3) (A.13)
I(X1;X2|X3) = ∑
x1,x2,x3
p(x1,x2,x3) log
p(x1,x2|x3)
p(x1|x3) · p(x2|x3)
= H(X1|X3)−H(X1|X2,X3) (A.14)
Relative entropy, also called Kullback-Leibler distance, KL-divergence is an efficient method to measure the
difference of two probabilities. If p(x) and q(x) are two probability functions, Kullback-Leibler distance is
defined as follows:
D(p||q) = ∑
x∈x
p(x) log
p(x)
q(x)
(A.15)
= Ep{log p(x)q(x) }
A.2. Min-Entropy and Guessing Entropy
Min-entropy and guessing entropy are often used in cryptography for security assessment. Min-entropy charac-
terizes the most probable occurrence of a random variable:
H∞(X) =− log
(
max
x∈X
{p(x)}) (A.16)
Obviously, H∞(X) is always smaller or equal to H(X). The equality is valid, only if X is perfectly uniformly
and independently distributed.
The average min-entropy is defined as the average min-entropy of X given Y :
H˜∞(X |Y ) =− log
(
∑
y∈Y
p(y) ·maxx{p(x|y)}
)
(A.17)
Min-entropy and average min-entropy represent security performance in the worst case scenario. They are indis-
pensable metrics for rigorous security assessment.
The guessing entropy is eligible to measure the average number of guesses required to find a random variable
successfully. Assuming that X is chosen from {x1,x2, · · · ,x|X|} with the probability p(x1), p(x2), · · · , p(x|X|),
where |X | is the number of possible X and p(x1) ≥ p(x2) ≥ ·· · ≥ p(x|X|). The best guessing strategy of an
adversary is to start with the most probable occurrence. The guessing entropy G(X) is defined as:
G(X) =
|X|
∑
i=1
i · p(xi) (A.18)
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Here i indexes the number of the attempts and the probability that the i-th attempt is successful is equal to p(xi)
according to this guessing strategy. If an adversary can try maximum K attempts, his successful rate is ∑K1 p(xi).
Guessing entropy is related with entropy, which shows minimum average coding length for a random variable.
In [Mas94], Massey gave a lower bound of guessing entropy regarding to entropy:
G(X)≥ 2H(X)−2+1 (A.19)
for any variable X with H(X)≥ 2. Similarly the conditional guessing entropy G(X |Y ) is defined as the average
number of attempts required to estimate X given Y :
G(X |Y ) = ∑
y∈Y
p(Y )
|X|
∑
i=1
i · p(xi|Y ) (A.20)
A.3. Binomial distribution
The binomial distribution is widely used to model distributions of binary variables. Binomial distribution can
be seen as discrete Poisson distribution. It describes the statistics of a Bernoulli sequence, which can be defined
as [Bur99]:
• Each trial results in one of only two possible outcomes.
• The trials are statistically identical so that the probability p of an event’s occurrence is constant
for each trial.
• The trials are statistically independent.
Under these conditions, the probability of obtaining k occurrences in n Bernoulli trials is given by:
b(k, p,n) =
(
n
k
)
pk(1− p)n−k (A.21)
The expected value and variance of a Binomial variable are given by:
E{k} = n · p (A.22)
var{k} = n · (1− p) · (p) (A.23)
whereE{·} and var{·} denote expected value and variance. When the sample size n is large enough, the Binomial
distribution approximates to Gaussian distribution. Additionally, the entropy of the corresponding independently
identically distributed sequence is equal to n ·h(p), where h(p) is the binary entropy function.
If X and Y are two uniformly independently distributed binary vectors with the length n and E = X +Y is the
bit error vector comparing X and Y , then E is also uniformly independently distributed. The Hamming distance
of E is binomially distributed with parameter n and p = 0.5. The bit error rate BER = ||E||/n has the following
properties:
E{BER} = n · p
n
= 0.5 (A.24)
var{BER} = n · p · (1− p)
n2
=
0.25
n
(A.25)
All X , Y and E contain n bits entropy.
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A.4. Markov Chain
The Markov chain is appropriate to describe dependency of random variables. Let {Xi} be a sequence generated
from a stochastic source with xi ∈ X . A stochastic process is called stationary, if the joint distribution of any
subset is invariant to shifting:
Pr{X1 = x1,X2 = x2, · · · ,Xn = xn}= Pr{X1+l = x1,X2+l = x2, · · · ,Xn+l = xn} ∀ n, l (A.26)
A discrete stochastic processing X1,X2, · · · has Markov properties, if for all n ∈N and all x1,x2, · · · ,xn ∈ X :
Pr{Xn = xn|Xn−1 = xn−1,Xn−2 = xn−2, · · · ,X1 = x1}= Pr{Xn = xn|Xn−1 = xn−1} (A.27)
The variable Xn is only dependent on its previous variable Xn−1 not on other previous states. The joint probability
p(x1,x2, · · · ,xn) of Markov chain can be written as:
p(x1,x2, · · · ,xn) = p(x1)
n
∏
i=2
p(xi|xi−1) (A.28)
The information rate of a stochastic process Xi is defined as [CT91]:
H(X ) = lim
n→∞
1
n
H(X1,X2, · · · ,Xn) (A.29)
if the limit exists. The information rate of Markov chain is:
H(X ) =− ∑
i, j∈[1,··· ,n]
p(Xm = xj)p(Xm+1 = xi|Xm = xj) log p(Xm+1 = xi|Xm = xj) (A.30)
where X = {xi|i ∈ [1, · · · ,n]}.
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B.1. Linear Block Code
Coding theory is the fundamental of modern digital techniques. It enables reliable data transmission and efficient
data storage. Linear block code is an important code class. For instance, a message block S of k symbols can be
extended into a codeword C of n symbols with a linear coding method and the codeword can correct t errors. We
denote this code as a (n,k, t) block code. If d is the minimum Hamming distance of the codewords, d ≥ 2t+1.
A k×n generation matrix G can be used to produce a codeword with C = S ·G. Every row of G is a valid code.
If C is corrupted with an error E and the Hamming weight of E is not larger than t, the errors can be corrected
with the parity check matrix H. H is an r×n matrix, where r ≤ n− k. It is orthogonal to G and codeword space,
namely G ·HT = 0. The syndrome of a code V is defined as syn(V ) = v ·HT . The codes with the same syndrome
share the unique error pattern E, whose Hamming weight is smaller than d/2.
The Hamming (sphere-packing) bound of a (n,k, t) block code over a q symbol space exists:
qk ≤ q
n
∑ti=1
(n
i
)
(q−1)i (B.1)
Instead of coding in a vector space, the polynomial coding in Galois field is an efficient alternative. A Galois
field GF(q) contains q symbols, where q = pm, p is a prime number and m ∈ N is a natural number. A (n,k)
linear block code is a block code with length n and consists of qk codewords, “if and only if these codewords
from a k- dimensional subspace of all the n- tuples vector space over the field GF(q)” (definition 3.1 in [LC83]).
Obviously these qk codewords form also a vector space in GF(q). A (n,k) codeword C = [c0,c1,c2, · · · ,cn−1]
with C ∈ GF(qn) can be described as a polynomial c(X) of degree n− 1 in GF(q). A (n,k) cyclic code can be
generated by a multiplication of a generator polynomial g(X) with degree of n− k and an arbitrary polynomial
u(X) with degree not larger than k−1.
c(X) = c0+ c1X + c2X2+ · · ·+ cn−1Xn−1
= u(X) ·g(X)
= (u0+u1X + · · ·+uk−1Xk−1)(1+g1X + · · ·+gn−kXn−k)
where X ∈ GF(q).
In the following we show some important polynomials over GF(2) with special properties (the detailed de-
scription can be found in section 2.3 and 2.5 in [LC83]):
• Irreducible polynomial: A polynomial f (X) over GF(2) of degree m is irreducible, if it can not be divided
by any polynomial over GF(2) with degree smaller than m and greater than 0
• Primitive polynomial: An irreducible polynomial f (X) of degree m is called primitive, if it is divisible by
a Xn+1 and the smallest n is equal to 2m−1. The number of irreducible polynomials of degree m can be
more than one.
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• Minimal polynomial: The minimal polynomial φ(X) of β is the polynomial with the smallest degree of
GF(q), that φ(β) = 0 and β ∈ GF(2m).
It can be proven that the minimal polynomial φ(X) of β is unique and irreducible. Any f (X) over GF(2) is
divisible by φ(X), if β is a root of f (X).
B.2. BCH and RS Codes
The Bose, Chaudhuri and Hocquenghem (BCH) codes are the generalised Hamming codes. It is not only qualified
for binary codes, but also non-binary codes. Reed-Solomon codes are one of the most important subclasses of
non-binary BCH codes. In the following we introduce the properties of BCH and RS codes.
For any positive integer m, t with m≥ 3, a binary BCH code exists:
Codeword length n = 2m−1
Number of correctable bit errors t < 2m−1
Number of parity bits n− k ≤ mt
Minimum Hamming distance dmin ≥ 2t+1
A BCH code is a polynomial code (also a cyclic code). Let φi(X) be the minimal polynomial of αi for
i ∈ {0,1, · · · ,2n−1}. Then the generator polynomial g(X) of the BCH-code is:
g(X) = LCM{φ1(X),φ3(X),φ5(X) · · · ,φ2t−1(X)} (B.2)
where LCM is the least common multiple. In other words g(X) is the lowest-degree of polynomial, which has
roots of α,α2, · · · ,α2t . 1
The above described binary BCH code can be extended into non-binary Galois field GF(q) (i.e., q = 2m). A
q-array (n, k) BCH code can also be generated with a generation polynomial g(X) of degree n− k over GF(q).
And such a BCH code exists for t correctable symbol errors and n = qs− 1, where s and t is positive integers.
The Reed-Solomon (RS) Code is an important subclass of non-binary BCH code in GF(q) with s = 1. The RS
code has the following parameters:
Codeword length n = q−1
Number of parity digits n− k = 2t
Minimum distance dmin = 2t+1
Please note that a RS code is a sequence in {GF(q)}n.
Theorem 1. A (n,k1) BCH code is also a (n,k2) BCH code, if k1 < k2.
Proof. Let c1(X) be a (n,k1) BCH code. g1(X) and g2(X) are the generator polynomials for the BCH codes of
(n,k1) and (n,k2). If t1 and t2 are the corresponding number of correctable errors. And t1 > t2, since k1 < k2.
g2(X) = LCM{(X−α)(X−α3) · · ·(X−α2t2−1)}
g1(X) = LCM{((X−α)(X−α3) · · ·(X−α2t2−1) · (X−α2t2+1) · · ·(X−α2t1−1)}
1LCM{φ1(X),φ3(X),φ5(X) · · · ,φ2t−1(X)} = LCM{φ1(X),φ2(X),φ3(X), · · · ,φ2t(X)}, since the odd power sequence and even power se-
quence have the same minimal polynomial ( section 6.1 in [LC83]).
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Therefore g1(X) is divisible by g2(X) and a quotient v(X) exists so that g1(X) = g2(X) · v(X). Then
c1(X) = g1(X) ·u1(X)
= g2(X) · v(X) ·u1(X)
where u1(X) is a polynomial over GF(q)with the degree not greater than k1−1 and is the corresponding message
of c1(X). Therefore c1(X) is also a (n,k2) BCH codeword and its message code is v(X) ·u1(X).
The BCH code and RS code are the widely used error correction codes. They are also kinds of cyclic codes
that shifting the symbol in a code words results also a codeword. They can correct a certain amount of errors and
the occurring error at each position is supposed to be equally probable.
B.3. Hadamard Code
The Hadamard code is the first order Reed-Muller code. Hadamard codes can be derived from a Hadamard
matrix. A Hadamard matrix is a 2k×2k squared matrix consisting of 1 and -1, where k is a positive integer.
Hd1 = [1] , Hd2 =
[
1 1
1 −1
]
, Hd4 =

1 1 1 1
1 −1 1 −1
1 1 −1 −1
1 −1 −1 1

The Hadamard matrix can be generated recursively with increasing k:
Hd2k =
[
Hd2k−1 Hd2k−1
Hd2k−1 −Hd2k−1
]
= Hd2⊗Hd2k−1 (B.3)
where⊗ is the Kronecker product, also called tensor product or the direct product [Mal]. Any two different rows
in Hd are orthogonal [Mal] (with normal arithmetic operation not arithmetic operation in e.g. Galois Field).
Given the codeword length n= 2k, the Hadamard code book can be derived with Hadamard matrix by replacing
-1 with 0:
CnHd =
[
Hd∗n
−Hd∗n
]
(B.4)
The length of message code is k+1. The minimum Hamming distance of the codewords is 2k−1. The maximum
number of correctable bit error is 2k−2−1. The codeword length increases exponentially with k, while the secret
length increases linearly with k. The code rate is relatively poor, however, it can correct (2n−2− 1)/2n ≈ 25%
bit errors.
Assuming that a sequence C′ is observed in the decoding process. The zero components in C′ are replaced
with -1 and the resulting code C˜ multiplied with the Hadamard matrix. If the number of bit errors is not larger
than 2n−2−1, a unique maximum absolute value of the multiplication exists. The corresponding row in the code
book with the maximum value is the decoding output, if the value is positive; the inverse of the corresponding
row is taken, if the value is negative.
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Notations
{0,1}m m-dimensional binary feature space
|| · || Hamming weight
D(p(X)||q(X)) Kullback-Leibler distance of distributions p(X) and q(X)
E{·} Expected value
G(X) Guessing entropy of a random variable X
G(X |Y ) Conditional guessing entropy of random variable X given Y
GF Galois Field
h(p) Binary entropy function, h(p) =−p log(p)− (1− p) log(1− p)
H(X) Entropy of a random variable X
H∞(X) Min-entropy of a random variable X
H(X |Y ) Conditional entropy of a random variable X given Y
H˜∞(X |Y ) Average min-entropy of a random variable X given Y
I(X ,Y ) Mutual information of random variables X and Y
N Natural number
⊕ XOR operator
p Probability density function
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Abbreviations
AD Auxiliary Data
BSC Binary symmetric channel
BER Bit error rate
BCH code Bose, Chaudhuri and Hocquenghem code
EER Equal Error Rate
FAR False Accept Rate
FNMR False Non-Match Rate
FMR False Match Rate
FRGC Face Recognition Grand Challenge
FRR False Reject Rate
FTA Failure to Acquire
FTE Failure to Enrol
ICAO International Civil Aviation Organization
IDA Independent Component Analysis
i.i.d identically independently distributed
LDA Linear Discriminate Analysis
NIR Near InfraRed
PCA Principle Component Analysis
PIE Pseudonymous Identifier Encoder
PIR Pseudonymous Identifier Recorder
PIC Pseudonymous Identifier Comparator
PI Pseudonymous Identifier
ROC Receiver Operation Characteristics
RS code Reed-Solomon code
SD Statistical Distance
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